Warshaw v. City of Miami Firefighters' & Police Officers' Retirement Trust
This text of 885 So. 2d 892 (Warshaw v. City of Miami Firefighters' & Police Officers' Retirement Trust) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinions
Donald H. Warshaw, a former police chief of the City of Miami, appeals from an order of the Board of Trustees of the City of Miami Firefighters’ and Police Officers’ Retirement Trust [Board], which order directs the forfeiture of Warshaw’s city retirement benefits.1 We affirm.
The forfeiture came about because of Warshaw’s conviction of one count of mail fraud in violation of Title 18, United States Code, § 1341.2 This federal conviction led [894]*894to the Board’s application of section 112.3173(3), Florida Statutes (2001), which reads:
“(3) FORFEITURE. — Any public officer or employee who is convicted of a specified offense committed prior to retirement, or whose office or employment is terminated by reason of his or her admitted commission, aid, or abetment of a specified offense, shall forfeit all rights and benefits under any public retirement system of which he or she is a member, except for the return of his or her accumulated contributions as of the date of termination.”
“Specified offense” is defined in section 112.3173(2)(e), Florida Statutes (2001) to include the embezzlement of public funds, or any theft by a public employee or officer from his or her employer.3
Pursuant to section 112.3173(5), the Board held a hearing for the purpose of determining whether Warshaw’s pension rights and privileges should be forfeited. The Board concluded that Warshaw had been convicted of a specified offense as provided in section 112.3173, and ordered the forfeiture.
The testimony at the Board hearing revealed the following. Do The Right Thing [DTRT] is a not-for-profit corporation whose mission, as stated in its articles of incorporation, is to assist the city in recognizing and rewarding young adults and children for their contributions to the community. It was financed principally by the city and based its operations at the physical plant of the Miami Police Department, where it utilized those facilities, including conducting meetings at that location. It used the uncompensated services of at least one employee of the police department in its operations. By the terms of DTRT’s articles of incorporation, then police chief Warshaw was designated as its registered agent for service of process (at the same address as the Miami Police Department). As we observed previously the purposes of DTRT are to expand the City of Miami’s municipal practices of recognizing individuals who have made significant contributions to the community, and to form an alliance between the Police Department and area businesses for the benefit of children in high crime, disadvantaged segments of the community. The financing of DTRT has been 80 to 90 percent from the city’s criminal forfeiture proceeds contained in the city’s law enforcement trust fund. Warshaw used the powers of his public office as police chief to arrange through the Miami City Commission for the city funds to be transferred to DTRT bank accounts, preparatory for use by DTRT for the city’s purposes. Warshaw, however, used part of those transferred funds to pay for personal, unauthorized matters over a period of years.
Warshaw argues that he did not embezzle or commit a theft of public funds (thus there was no “specified offense”) as he embezzled or committed a theft only of DTRT funds. He further argues that as DTRT was a private not-for-profit corporation and not a public entity, no provision of section 112.3173 is applicable, and there[895]*895fore his federal conviction was not of a specified offense, thus his pension cannot be ordered forfeited. As his support for this proposition Warshaw points out that his federal conviction was for mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 for defrauding DTRT. In simple parlance, Warshaw argues, no city public funds were embezzled or stolen by him, just DTRT’s private funds.
We reject this thoroughly disingenuous argument. Warshaw, as city police chief, arranged through the city commission for public city funds to be transferred to DTRT, which was mandated to use these city funds to carry out city functions, effectively as an alter ego of the city, and certainly as its agent. The funds never lost their character as public funds. War-shaw simply took two steps in order to have access to the public funds by (1) arranging to have the city funds transferred to DTRT, then (2) arranging for the city funds to be transferred from DTRT to him. Whether the funds remained with the city’s law enforcement trust fund or were transferred to DTRT, the funds always were slotted for public uses.4
The Board also found that Warshaw had violated section 112.3173(2)(e)(6), Florida Statutes, which section is set out in footnote 3. We find it unnecessary to discuss or pass on this issue in light of our foregoing conclusions.5
Affirmed.
SCHWARTZ, C.J., and FLETCHER, J., concur.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
885 So. 2d 892, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 13651, 2004 WL 2049756, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/warshaw-v-city-of-miami-firefighters-police-officers-retirement-trust-fladistctapp-2004.