Warren v. . Warren

96 N.E. 417, 203 N.Y. 250, 1911 N.Y. LEXIS 777
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 24, 1911
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 96 N.E. 417 (Warren v. . Warren) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Warren v. . Warren, 96 N.E. 417, 203 N.Y. 250, 1911 N.Y. LEXIS 777 (N.Y. 1911).

Opinion

Werner, J.

This is an action for partition of real property, in which the court at Special Term fell into the error of granting extra allowances of costs which were so obviously unauthorized that the same court, upon motion of certain defendants who had not answered and had been awarded no costs, vacated its first order and then refused to allow any costs beyond those which were regularly taxable. From the order embodying this latter decision, the attorneys for the plaintiff took an appeal to the Appellate Division where there was an unanimous affirmance, with permission to appeal to this court upon two questions which have been certified to us. These questions are as follows:

1. In a partition suit where several different attorneys appear for several different defendants and file answers creating issues, can the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion under section 3253 of the Code of Civil Procedure grant an extra allowance of five per cent to the plaintiff and any further sums not exceeding five per cent to the attorneys for the defendants?
“2. The trial court having exercised.its discretion and having granted five per cent extra allowance to a plaintiff, and five per cent to each of four different sets of defendants appearing by separate attorneys, can such court, on motion, after the entry of judgment, at the instance of a defendant who has defaulted without showing excuse for his default, amend the judgment by striking out all extra allowances so granted?”

These questions, although evidently framed with a view to minimizing rather than emphasizing the malpractice which is the proper ground for criticism in the case at bar, are comprehensive enough to permit of answers which will lay down a general rule of practice under the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to extra *253 allowances of costs, and to that end a short discussion may he of some value.

First of all it is to be noted that extra allowances of costs, pursuant to sections 3253 and 3254 of the Code of Civil Procedure are in no case a matter of right, but may be granted or withheld in the discretion of the court. The proper exercise of that judicial discretion necessarily includes the power to correct mistakes or abuses in the granting or withholding of extra allowances, and that is palpably true where the amount limited by the statute has been either inadvertently or consciously exceeded. The statute (section 3253) provides that the allowance shall not exceed five per centum upon the sum recovered or claimed, or the value of the subject-matter involved, and that is subject to the further limitation that in no case shall the sum awarded to a plaintiff, or to a party or two or more parties on the same side, exceed in the aggregate, two thousand dollars. In the case at bar the allowances granted to the attorneys for the plaintiff and for several defendants amount in the aggregate to more than twenty-eight per centum of the price for which the property was sold. When this error was brought to the attention of the court, it was at once corrected by striking from the order all provisions for extra allowances. That was an exercise of discretion as clearly within the power of the court as the granting of the excessive allowances was beyond its power. The mistake made by the court, in assuming to exercise a power and discretion which it did not have, was properly subject to correction -under the broad provisions of sections 723 and 724 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and we may, therefore, end the discussion as to the second question certified to us by answeringit in the affirmative. The court clearly had the power to correct its mistake, even to the extent of refusing to grant any extra allowance.

The first certified question cannot be disposed of so summarily for it involves an analysis and interpreta *254 tion of sections 3253 and 3254 above referred to. The question, fairly paraphrased, is whether the court has power in a partition suit, where several different attorneys appear for different defendants and file answers creating issues, to grant an extra allowance of five per cent to the plaintiff, and any further sums not exceeding five per cent to the attorneys for the defendants. It will be noted that this question as certified is much too broad to permit of a categorical answer, for it omits any reference to either of the limitations of sections 3253 and 3254 fixing the point beyond which the court may not go in awarding extra allowances, and it mentions one limitation which is not to be found in these sections as they now exist. The framer of the question apparently assumed that the power of the court to award extra allowances to defendants, in suits for partition, was confined to defendants who file answers creating issues! !No such restriction is to be found in section 3253, for it distinctly provides that the power may be exercised in “any action, or special proceeding, specified in this section, where a defense has been interposed, or in an action for the partition of real property. ” In the italicized part of this sentence extracted from the statute,, we find a clear negation of the assumption that the power of the court to award extra allowances in partition suits is, limited, so far as defendants are concerned, to those who have filed answers creating issues. Ho such restriction is to be found in the statute.

Passing to the limitations of the statute which, as we have pointed out, are ignored by the first certified question, it is to be noticed that the language of sections 3253 and 3254, as applied to partition suits; is so general as to be open to divergent interpretations except in one particular, and that is that the total allowance must not exceed five per centum. When we look further to ascertain the subject-matter upon which this percentage is to be based, we are confronted by the very comprehensive phrase *255 “upon the sum recovered or claimed, or the value of the subject matter involved. ” (Section 3253, subd. 2.) Does this mean the value of the whole subject-matter as to each party who may ask for an extra allowance? Obviously not, for that view would sanction an allowance in excess of five per cent of the value of the subject-matter involved. Does it mean that a plaintiff with a small interest in the property to be partitioned or sold is to be limited to an allowance of five per cent upon the value of his interest? That view is open to the practical objection that many partition suits involve a vast amount of labor, the burden of which falls principally upon the plaintiff’s attorney. Almost of necessity we are driven to the conclusion that so narrow an interpretation of the statute would tend to defeat the very purpose for which the provisions for extra allowances were enacted. But if we adopt the reasonable view that as to a plaintiff in partition the value of the subject-matter involved is the value of the whole property, we are met by the impossibility of fixing the allowances to defendants upon the same basis without exceeding the limitation that the aggregate allowances shall not exceed the sum of five per centum upon the value of the subject-matter involved. Therefore, the only workable rule that can be evolved out of this situation is to hold that as to a plaintiff the value of the subject-matter is the value of the whole property, and as to each defendant it is the value of his interest in the property.

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Bluebook (online)
96 N.E. 417, 203 N.Y. 250, 1911 N.Y. LEXIS 777, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/warren-v-warren-ny-1911.