Warren v. St. Paul

29 F. Cas. 282, 5 Dill. 498

• Court: U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota
• Decided: July 1, 1877
• Status: Published

Opinion

NELSON, District Judge.

The corporation of the city of St. Paul is, under its charter (chapter 1, § 1, 1874). invested with all the general powers possessed by municipal corporations at common law, including the power to contract for the grading of streets, and can sue and be sued upon such contracts. It may, therefore, lawfully take any steps which an individual could, to arrange all differences growing out of such contracts by an amicable settlement and adjustment. It could relieve from performance, refer to arbitration, or compromise by agreement, and the question of expediency in so doing is left entirely to its judgment. Unless collusion between the officers of the corporation and contractors is shown, or fraud exists, nothing less than a legislative restriction can prevent the exercise of this power by the proper authorities. See Dill. Mun. Corp. § 398, and numerous authorities cited. Endowed with liberal and plenary authority, the corporation must necessarily, for the general welfare of its inhabitants, and incident to the powers expressed in the charter, possess an inherent right to adjust all disputed claims, and .a decision bona fide made by the proper corporate officers is final and conclusive. 1 do not understand this proposition to be disputed, but it is said that the creation of a board of public works in the charter, and the law compelling the owners of the property benefited to pay for local improvements, have limited and restricted the right ordinarily conferred upon the common council of a municipal corporation, with reference to compromising and adjusting claims growing out of public improvements. I find nothing in the city charter intrusting this power to any other than the governing body. The common council are specially intrusted with the care, supervision, and control of all public thoroughfares and public improvements within the city limits. Charter 1874, c. 4, § 7. An executive department, entitled “the board of public works,’’ was organized and constituted by chapter 6, but nothing therein limits this general supervision and care conferred upon the council.

The execution of contemplated local improvements ordered by the common council, and assessments for the expenses thereof, are intrusted to this department, but the power to initiate all improvements relating to the grading of streets, etc., emanates from the former, and. by a unanimous vote of the members thereof, can be ordered irrespective of the approval or disapproval of the board of public works. Charter 1874, c. 7. § 5.

In view of these provisions of the charter, and applying thereto the ordinary principles of construction, the common council, acting in behalf of the corporation, are authorized to exercise the power of compromising or submitting to arbitration disputed claims against the city, to be paid out of such funds as are provided by law to meet any and all liabilities incurred, and additional legislation is unnecessary.

The charter, as amended in 1S7G, merely defined the manner in which the common council might submit any matter to arbitration, and restricted the exercise of the power already existing to a two-thirds vote. The repeal of this section left it, as before, to a majority.

A taxpayer may, perhaps, by injunction, restrain the corporate authorities from a misappropriation of money raised by taxation; but when the proposed appropriation is to settle a disputed claim arising under a contract not ultra vires and within the scope of their powers, a court will not interfere. It is urged that the common council acted upon a mistaken idea as to the law governing the rights of the corporation in the premises. Admit it, and the case is not altered. The compromise is a matter of discretion and judgment, exercised in a manner deemed for the best interests of the city. If unwisely adopted, it is an error of opinion as to the expediency of an adjustment, and does not originate in any bad motive. The report of a committee of investigation in favor of this settlement, and the concurrence therein of the city attorney, after a full examination of the facts, were first obtained before any compromise was favored by the council.

I lay out of view entirely the position assumed by counsel, that the city was not liable in any event, and the contractors could not enforce, by suit, their claim. This question does not enter into a decision of the case, and to my mind the fact that the city might successfully interpose a defence if suit was commenced by the contractors is immaterial when bad faith is not alleged.

The action of the common council recognized the existence of a contract between the city corporation and the defendants named, and presupposes a liability to pay something.

It is urged that the complainant can have no relief if denied in this suit. The stringency of the local assessment or improvement provisions of the charter affects both resident and nonresident property-holders alike. When enacted, the statute was regarded as beneficial and necessary to an equitable and proper exercise of the. general powers of the corporation. If experience has demonstrated it to be harsh and cumbersome, and illy adapted to subserve the interests of the city, an appeal should be made to the legislature to modify it or substitute some other more simple and less expensive mode of making improvements. While such provisions are embodied in the charter, and the corporation is in good faith proceeding to enforce them, the fact, if true, as stated, that no relief can be had by a taxpayer interested, except in the manner pointed out in the law, can afford no justification for judicial interference.

Bill dismissed.