Warren v. Lewis

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: March 30, 2004
• Docket: 02-5983
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Warren v. Lewis No. 02-5983 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0090P (6th Cir.) File Name: 04a0090p.06 Appellant. Charles E. Walker, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS _________________ FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT OPINION ________________ _________________

TOMMY RAY WARREN, X ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Virginia Lewis (“Lewis”) appeals the decision of the district court granting Petitioner-Appellee, - habeas corpus to Petitioner Tommy Ray Warren (“Warren”). - - No. 02-5983 Because we find that the state court proceedings in question v. - did not result in a decision that is contrary to, or involve an > unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as , determined by the United States Supreme Court, we reverse. VIRGINIA LEWIS , Warden, - Respondent-Appellant. - I. N Appeal from the United States District Court On April 12, 1993, Tommy Ray Warren pled guilty to two for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville. counts of first degree murder and was sentenced to two No. 02-00228—John T. Nixon, District Judge. consecutive life terms. At the guilty plea hearing, the State advised that, if the case went to trial, the State would prove Argued: September 16, 2003 that on March 24, 1992, while driving his truck, Mr. Warren struck Della May Richter and Patricia Weaver, killing Decided and Filed: March 30, 2004 Weaver. Warren then kidnaped Richter and stabbed her to death. Mr. Warren specifically agreed that these facts were Before: SILER, BATCHELDER, and COOK, Circuit correct. Judges. At his post-conviction hearing, Mr. Warren gave a more _________________ colorful recitation of the facts. On March 24, 1992, he said, he got off work early and spent the day driving around in his COUNSEL truck, drinking beer and smoking marijuana. Following the consumption of what he estimated to have been 3 or 4 six- ARGUED: David H. Findley, OFFICE OF THE packs of beer, he hit a pothole, which caused him to lose ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, for control of his truck and to strike two women who were Appellant. Charles E. Walker, Nashville, Tennessee, for walking along the road. He claimed that the impact caused Appellee. ON BRIEF: David H. Findley, OFFICE OF his pocket knife to slide off the seat, that he reached down and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, for picked the knife up, and only then did he realize that he had hit the women. Warren testified that these were “good size

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women” and he is a small man, and that when he went to give While Warren was in custody, Dr. Gillian Blair, at the assistance to one of the women, she responded by “slinging instance of Warren’s counsel, performed a psychological [him] around like a rag doll.” When—open-bladed knife in evaluation of him and prepared a preliminary report for the his hand—he attempted to help the woman (identified as court. Dr. Blair determined that Warren’s overall I.Q. was 71, Della May Richter), she said “okay” and got into his truck, one point over the upper limit for mental retardation for Warren said, and only then did he see the blood on her and purposes of imposition of the death penalty under Tennessee realized that he had stabbed her. law. See TENN. CODE ANN . § 39-13-203(a). Dr. Blair concluded that “Mr. Warren functions within the upper limits Warren’s recitation of the events is substantially of mental retardation and the lower limits of borderline undermined by the evidence collected at the time. Warren intellectual level”; that he understood the charges against him, gave a detailed four-page statement to the police several hours appreciated the likely outcome of trial if he were found guilty, after the incident. In that statement, he made no mention of and was able to work with his attorneys and understand his a pothole, but said that immediately before hitting the women, options if those options were explained in “concrete terms.” he had spilled his beer and had looked down for a second. Dr. Blair concluded that Warren was therefore competent to His statement made no mention of a knife sliding off the seat, stand trial. or that he had been smoking marijuana, and although the statement certainly said that he had been drinking beer, the At Warren’s counsel’s request, the trial court scheduled a quantity described did not approach the 3 to 4 six-packs that competency hearing to consider Warren’s competency and he claimed in the post-conviction hearing. The evidence is mental retardation. In order to avoid the death penalty, inconclusive as to how intoxicated Warren actually was at the Warren needed to show not only that he was sub-average in time of the incident. Blood and urine tests taken several his intellectual functioning, that is, he had an I.Q. of 70 or hours later—shortly before he made his statement to the below, but that he also had deficits in adaptive behavior, and police—showed low levels of alcohol and no traces of that this mental retardation had manifested during the marijuana in his system. Furthermore, the state had a witness developmental period or by the time he reached age eighteen. who was prepared to testify at trial that Warren drove past the women slowly, stopped, turned around, and drove back toward them. It was the State’s theory that Warren had been stalking the women, and after intentionally running into Ms. home in his wife’s truck, put Ms. Richter’s body into his wife’s truck, took the body up the road some d istance and, after remo ving the clothes, Weaver, he abducted and murdered Ms. Richter. Warren was dumped the body, and returned home with the clothes. Once back at eventually charged with two counts of first degree murder and home, Warren set his truck on fire, and p ut M s. Richter’s clothes as well “especially aggravated kidnaping.”1 as those he had been wearing, including his brown work boo ts, his jeans and his blue pullover shirt, into the wood burner in the living room of their home. He then went to the friend’s ho me and had sup per with his 1 wife and children. Returning home after supper, Warren and his wife saw In his stateme nt to the p olice, W arren described in some detail how the truck blazing. They summoned help, including the fire d epartment, he had struggled with Ms. Richter befo re he stabbed her; how, after and after the police cam e and looked at the truck, they read W arren his determining that she was dead, he first put her bod y in the wo ods but, Miranda rights, and soon thereafter took him to the place where he had deciding that “that wouldn’t work,” he put her on the floor of his truck, hit the two women with his truck. covered the bo dy with a brown co at, went to a friend’s home where W arren was first charged with vehicular homicide, first degree W arren’s wife was and got her to take him back to his truck and tow it to murder, arson and aggravated kidnaping. The vehicular homicide charge their home. He then took his wife back to the friend’s home, returned was later changed to a second count of first degree murder. No. 02-5983 Warren v. Lewis 5 6 Warren v. Lewis No. 02-5983

Id. Warren’s counsel did not believe that he would be able to On January 23, 1996, Warren filed a motion for post- demonstrate both the sub-average I.Q. and deficits in adaptive conviction relief in state court, raising two claims: 1) That his behavior, as required by Tennessee law, because in addition guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary because his to Dr. Blair’s report showing an I.Q. of 71 and competency to decision was “heavily influenced” by the death penalty, which stand trial, the record established that Warren had been he did not know would not be an option if he were found to employed for many years, had a wife of nearly twenty years be mentally retarded; and 2) that his counsel was ineffective and children, whom he supported, had a driver’s license, and for failing to further pursue a hearing concerning mental had served in the military for a short time before being retardation. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court discharged for physical—not mental—reasons. Warren’s denied relief. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals counsel therefore did not believe that he would be able to affirmed the denial, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied demonstrate that Warren was not eligible for the death penalty review. under Tennessee law. On February 4, 2002, Warren, acting pro se with the A month prior to the scheduled competency hearing, assistance of Inmate Legal Aide, mailed his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Warren’s counsel began serious plea negotiations with the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the United States State in attempt to obtain a plea deal that would protect District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The Warren from a death sentence on either or both counts of cover letter included a handwritten note: murder. He met with Warren, both during and following these negotiations, to explain the best- and worst-case The five dollar ($5.00) filing fee for a § 2254 Petition is scenarios, and Warren’s options—including the option of forthcoming. A form must be processed through the entering a guilty plea premised on the State’s agreement not Inmate Trust Fund account/Business Office–who will to seek the death penalty. Warren eventually discussed the forward a check to the Clerk’s Office. This may take matter with his wife and daughters, and opted to enter a guilty upwards of 7-10 days. plea to each count of murder in order to avoid the death penalty. His counsel testified that the decision was entirely But Warren did not even initiate the request for withdrawal Warren’s, and that his lawyers did not coerce him to enter the from his inmate account until February 13, 2002–one day plea. after the one-year statute of limitations had run. The withdrawal was approved on February 14, 2002, and the clerk Prior to accepting Warren’s plea of guilty to two counts of received the filing fee on February 28, 2002. On February 28, first degree murder (and agreeing to the dismissal of the arson 2002, the court returned Warren’s § 2254 petition for failure and kidnapping charges), the trial court questioned Warren at either to pay the filing fee or to submit an application to length to determine whether he understood the charges proceed in forma pauperis. Warren re-filed his petition with against him, his rights, the possibility that he might face the proof of payment on March 5, 2002. death penalty, and the effect of the guilty pleas. Satisfied that Warren’s pleas were both knowing and voluntary, the trial The district court then granted Warren’s request for court accepted them and thereafter sentenced Warren to two appointed counsel, and ordered supplemental briefing consecutive terms of life imprisonment. Warren v. concerning the issues of equitable tolling of the statute of Tennessee, No. M1999-1319-CCA-R3-PC, 2000 WL limitations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 1133558 (Tenn. Crim. App., Aug. 10, 2000). Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 No. 02-5983 Warren v. Lewis 7 8 Warren v. Lewis No. 02-5983

Stat. 1214 (1996), and Warren’s claim that his guilty plea A state court adjudication is “contrary to” Supreme Court was not knowing and voluntary. Following briefing, the precedent under § 2254(d)(1), “if the state court arrives at a district court found that Warren was entitled to equitable conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court tolling,2 and granted a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the on a question of law,” or “if the state court confronts facts that state trial court’s failure to hold a pre-plea competency are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme hearing violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Court precedent” and arrives at a different result. Williams v. Process requirements that the guilty plea be knowing and Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state court adjudication voluntary. Lewis filed a request to alter or amend judgment, involves “an unreasonable application of” Supreme Court which was denied. This timely appeal followed. precedent under § 2254(d)(2), “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court's cases II. but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case,” or if the court unreasonably refuses to extend, or Warren filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus unreasonably extends, existing legal principles from the after the effective date of AEDPA, the statute governing this Court's precedents to a new context. Williams, 529 U.S. at court’s inquiry. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 407. The state court’s application must be more than (1997). A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus incorrect or erroneous; it must be “objectively unreasonable.” with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. This court reviews a district court unless such state adjudication: court’s disposition of a habeas corpus petition de novo. Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 282 (6th Cir. 2000). (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly The district court granted Warren a writ of habeas corpus established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme based upon Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), which it Court of the United States; or cited for the proposition that where evidence of a defendant’s mental deficiencies raise doubt as to his competence, due (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an process requires a competency hearing. Relying upon the unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the report proffered by Dr. Blair, which stated that Warren evidence presented in the State court proceeding. functions “within the upper limits of mental retardation and the lower limits of borderline intellectual level,” the district 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). court found that the state court was on notice of Warren’s mental deficiencies, and that Pate therefore required the court to hold a pre-guilty plea competency hearing. Contrary to its characterization by the district court, the 2 W hile we do not reach this question, we express grave do ubt as to standard established in Pate for requiring competency whether equitable tolling was appropriate in this case. It is well- hearings prior to trial or the entry of a guilty plea is not established that where a party sits on his rights, fails to take timely steps merely whether extant evidence raises “doubt” as to the to complete the filing, and suggests that equitable tolling is justified solely defendant’s capacity to stand trial, but rather whether because of ignorance of the law, equitable tolling is not appropriate. “It evidence raises a “‘bona fide doubt’ as to a defendant’s is well-settled that ignorance of the law alone is not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling.” Rose v. D ole, 945 F.2d 13 31, 1335 (6th Cir. 1991). competence.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 173 (1975) No. 02-5983 Warren v. Lewis 9 10 Warren v. Lewis No. 02-5983

(quoting Pate, 383 U.S. at 385). In Warren’s case, the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), “to the Tennessee court had before it a single piece of expert properly developed facts was reasonable.” The state court testimony regarding Mr. Warren’s competence: the findings had held that Warren had not even attempted to show any of Dr. Blair, Warren’s own doctor. While Dr. Blair found that prejudice from his counsel’s allegedly inadequate Warren possessed poor judgment and an I.Q. one point above performance, and the district court explicitly held that the state-established upper limit of retardation, she Warren’s trial counsel had reviewed the facts that militated nonetheless explicitly concluded that he was competent to against a finding of mental retardation and had reasonably stand trial.3 This expert testimony was bolstered by evidence counseled Warren that he risked the imposition of the death in the record, which established that Warren had been penalty if he continued to trial. We think that this record employed for many years, lived with his wife of nearly twenty amply supports the district court’s finding. That being the years and his children, had a driver’s license, and had served case, we think Warren cannot demonstrate that his guilty plea, in the military for a short time before being discharged for based on this reasonable advice of counsel, was not knowing physical—not mental—reasons. Accordingly, all the and voluntary because he would not have been eligible for the evidence available to the district court suggested that despite death penalty as a matter of law. functioning at the upper-end of mental retardation, Warren was in fact competent to stand trial or enter a guilty plea. For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of Given this evidence, we must conclude that the state court the district court granting the petition for a writ of habeas applied Pate in an objectively reasonable manner when it corpus. failed sua sponte to grant a pre-guilty plea competency hearing. The district court erred in concluding to the contrary. The district court noted with sympathy, but did not specifically reach, Warren’s claim that his guilty plea was neither knowing nor voluntary because he entered it out of fear that he might otherwise receive the death penalty, a fear that he now claims was groundless because his mental retardation made him ineligible for the death penalty. It is worth noting in this context that the district court denied Warren’s petition for habeas relief premised on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue the scheduled hearing on mental retardation and for counseling Warren to plead guilty to avoid the death penalty. The district court held that the state court had adequately considered and developed the facts, and that the state court’s application of

3 The com peten cy stand ard to stand trial is identical to the standard to plead guilty. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 , 397 (1993 ).