Warren District Development Co. v. Miners & Merchants Bank

166 Ill. App. 540, 1911 Ill. App. LEXIS 112
Appellate Court of Illinois·Decided December 22, 1911·No. Gen. No. 15,945·Published

Opinion

Mr. Justice Smith

delivered tlie opinion of tlie court.

This action was brought in the Circuit Court by appellee, the Warren District Development Co. Ltd., a limited partnership under the laws of Michigan, against the Miners and Merchants Bank of Bisbee, Arizona, appellant, to recover the sum of $7,500 with interest, alleged to have been deposited by the appellee with the appellant Bank, and which money, it was alleged, was paid out by the Bank contrary to instructions accompanying the deposit.

The defenses of the Bank are: first, that such departure from the instructions as were made, were authorized and directed by one Fred A. Sutter, an attorney-at-law in Bisbee, who, while nominally standing as one of the parties to the transaction, in reality acted as the agent and attorney for the party that issued the original instructions, and was also equally interested with the depositing party in the fruits of the enterprise, being a member of a partnership of four persons who conceived the scheme in which the creation of the Warren District Development Co. Ltd., was an intermediate step, for a profit-seeking plan in which the four persons in question were to reap large rewards; that Sutter had just as much right to dictate or vary instructions to the Bank as Hanchette, whose unsigned letter constituted the instructions from which Sutter authorized the deviations complained of.

Secondly, the Bank contends that the delay of ten months on the part of the plaintiff before repudiating the acts of the agent and making demand on the defendant for the return of the money, after it had been fnlly informed of the action of the Bank, during which period it sought by divers pretexts to retain the fruits of the transaction, that is, certain mining properties, constituted in law a ratification of the action of the Bank; that the principal with full knowledge of what the Bank had done sanctioned a suit brought to settle the claims of certain jumpers and did not wait for the favorable outcome of the action; that it refused an offer for the vendor of the properties to return the money, thereby prejudicing the chances of the Bank to reimburse itself; that it authorized assessment work to be performed in its behalf on the properties, expecting from the favorable development work done on adjacent properties that this particular property would greatly enhance in value; that it issued stock to Sutter pursuant to the original partnership agreement; that it invited and accepted subscriptions to stock, and manifested in other ways as plainly as it could be done an unmistakable desire to hang on to the mining claims until after ten months’ delay, waiting for better conditions and stock subscriptions in the Development Company which failed to materialize; and it seeks in this action to hold the Bank for its already ratified action in regard to the payment of the money.

The case was tried by the court without a jury, and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff in the sum of $9,297.51.

The declaration filed in the case consisted of the common counts. Later three additional counts were filed. These additional counts are framed upon the theory that because of the ■ violation of instructions by the defendant, the plaintiff was entitled to a repayment of the money with interest, and not upon the theory that the plaintiff, because of the violation of its instructions by the Bank, was entitled to damages occasioned thereby.

No proof was made of actual damages suffered by tlie plaintiff. The plaintiff rested its case on the trial entirely npon the proof of the alleged violation of instructions, without any proof that the plaintiff returned or authorized the return by the Bank of the papers and property received by it for the money of the plaintiff paid out by the defendant. No question, therefore, as to the measure of damages is presented. The sole question is as to the right of the plaintiff, upon the facts shown in evidence, to have the money deposited in appellant Bank paid over to the plaintiff and, on refusal, to have a judgment therefor.

"The action is necessarily based on the theory that the money when advanced belonged to the plaintiff, and was placed in defendant’s hands and possession by the plaintiff under specific directions as to when it was to be paid over, and that the defendant Bank, without authority, violated the instructions given it, and therefore it is legally obliged to repay the money to appel-lee.

In order to determine the main question of the right of plaintiff to recover back the money deposited by it in appellant Bank, we must first determine who advanced the $7,500 sued for to the appellant; and secondly, who did Sutter represent, and in what capacity, and what was his authority?

The evidence shows that on May 5, 1903, Fred Hed-burg was the owner of a group of twelve mining claims located in the Warren district, Cochise county, Arizona, and gave an option to purchase the same to one George C. Clark, agreeing to convey, to Clark, the mining claim described therein on the payment of the sum of $75,000, ten per cent, of which sum was to be paid on July 4, 1903, twenty per cent, on or before one year from that date, and the balance on or before two years from that date, the payments to be made at the Miners and Merchants Bank of Bisbee, Arizona, to the credit of Hedburg. On the same date, namely, May 5, 1903, George C. Clark assigned and transferred the option, in consideration of one dollar, to Fred A. Sutter.

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Warren District Development Co. v. Miners & Merchants Bank, 166 Ill. App. 540, 1911 Ill. App. LEXIS 112 (Ill. Ct. App. 1911).

166 Ill. App. 540 (Warren District Development Co. v. Miners & Merchants Bank) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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