PER CURIAM:
Paul Leon Ware, proceeding
pro se,
appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action based on lack of jurisdiction under the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. After review, we discern no error and affirm.
Ware, also proceeding
pro se
before the district court, brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the following defendants: 1) Polk County Board of County Commissioners (“the Board”); 2) David Kearns, a Polk County employee; 3) Kevin McCullough, a Polk County employee; 4) Randy M. Mink, Assistant Polk County Attorney; 5) the State of Florida; and 6) Judge Charles B. Curry, a judge on Florida’s Tenth Judicial Circuit Court (collectively “Defendants”). Ware alleged that the Board, Kearns, McCullough, and Mink (collectively “Polk County agents”) violated his constitutional rights when they imposed a fine on him for failing to obtain the necessary building permit before building on his property, placed a lien on his property for failing to pay the fine, and then filed a state court lawsuit to foreclose on his property. Ware further alleged that Judge Curry violated his constitutional rights by dismissing his state court counterclaim against the Polk County agents, which was filed in the state court lawsuit to foreclose on Ware’s property.
Ware also alleged that the state of Florida was liable under a theory of
respondeat superi- or
for the actions of Judge Curry. The district court dismissed Ware’s complaint, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the complaint under the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.
See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923);
D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).
On appeal, Ware argues that: (1) the district court erred in finding that the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine barred it from exercising jurisdiction over his claims and (2) the court erred by not holding a hearing to determine whether the state court had jurisdiction to hear the underlying state court action before dismissing Ware’s instant federal complaint.
A district court’s determination that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a plaintiffs claims in light of the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is reviewed
de novo. Nicholson v. Shafe,
558 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir.2009). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine generally “recognizes that federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to act as appellate courts and precludes them from reviewing final state court decisions.”
Green v. Jefferson County Comm’n,
563 F.3d 1243, 1249 (11th Cir.2009), ce
rt. denied,
- U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 199, 175 L.Ed.2d 127 (2009). The Supreme Court has held that the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is confined to cases that are “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521-22, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). “The doctrine applies both to federal claims raised in the state court and to those ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s judgment.”
Casale v. Tillman,
558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir.2009). “A claim is inextricably intertwined if it would effectively nullify the state court judgment or it succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues.”
Id.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Ware’s claims fall squarely within that description. Ware lost in state court. His § 1983 claims effectively ask the district court to review and reject the state court’s judgment. And his federal claims are either the same as those raised in his counterclaims in state court or otherwise inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment because they focus on the legality of the lien that was litigated in state court.
The only remaining question is whether the state-court judgment was rendered before proceedings in the district court commenced. We have interpreted
Exxon Mobil
to apply the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine only to instances where the state court proceedings have ended at the time the federal action is filed.
Nicholson,
558 F.3d at 1277. “[Sjtate proceedings have not ended for purposes of
Rooker-Feldman
when an appeal from the state court judgment remains pending at the time the plaintiff commences the federal court action that complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment and invites review and rejection of that judgment.”
Id.
at 1279. Here, the defendants attached several exhibits to their motion to dismiss related to the disposition of the state court proceedings. A district court “generally must convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment if it considers materials outside the complaint.”
Day v. Taylor,
400 F.3d 1272, 1275-76 (11th Cir.2005). However, a court “may consider a document attached to a motion to dismiss without converting the motion into one for summary judgment if the attached document is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim and (2) undisputed.”
Id.
at 1276. Because the documents attached to the motion to dismiss are central to Ware’s claim and undisputed, the district court properly considered them on a motion to dismiss. The exhibits establish that the claims in the state trial court had
proceeded to final judgment. The exhibits also establish that Ware had no intention of appealing the judgment to a state appellate court, preferring instead “to go straight to federal” court. Because no appeal remained pending at the time Ware commenced this federal action, the state proceedings were ended for purposes of the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.
Ware also argues that the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine should not apply because the state court lacked jurisdiction and its judgment was void
ab initio.
We have not yet recognized an exception to the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine in cases where the state court that issued the underlying state court judgment lacked jurisdiction.
Casale,
558 F.3d at 1261 n. 3. This case is not the proper occasion to answer that question because the state court had jurisdiction to issue its judgment.
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PER CURIAM:
Paul Leon Ware, proceeding
pro se,
appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action based on lack of jurisdiction under the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. After review, we discern no error and affirm.
Ware, also proceeding
pro se
before the district court, brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the following defendants: 1) Polk County Board of County Commissioners (“the Board”); 2) David Kearns, a Polk County employee; 3) Kevin McCullough, a Polk County employee; 4) Randy M. Mink, Assistant Polk County Attorney; 5) the State of Florida; and 6) Judge Charles B. Curry, a judge on Florida’s Tenth Judicial Circuit Court (collectively “Defendants”). Ware alleged that the Board, Kearns, McCullough, and Mink (collectively “Polk County agents”) violated his constitutional rights when they imposed a fine on him for failing to obtain the necessary building permit before building on his property, placed a lien on his property for failing to pay the fine, and then filed a state court lawsuit to foreclose on his property. Ware further alleged that Judge Curry violated his constitutional rights by dismissing his state court counterclaim against the Polk County agents, which was filed in the state court lawsuit to foreclose on Ware’s property.
Ware also alleged that the state of Florida was liable under a theory of
respondeat superi- or
for the actions of Judge Curry. The district court dismissed Ware’s complaint, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the complaint under the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.
See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923);
D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).
On appeal, Ware argues that: (1) the district court erred in finding that the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine barred it from exercising jurisdiction over his claims and (2) the court erred by not holding a hearing to determine whether the state court had jurisdiction to hear the underlying state court action before dismissing Ware’s instant federal complaint.
A district court’s determination that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a plaintiffs claims in light of the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is reviewed
de novo. Nicholson v. Shafe,
558 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir.2009). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine generally “recognizes that federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to act as appellate courts and precludes them from reviewing final state court decisions.”
Green v. Jefferson County Comm’n,
563 F.3d 1243, 1249 (11th Cir.2009), ce
rt. denied,
- U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 199, 175 L.Ed.2d 127 (2009). The Supreme Court has held that the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is confined to cases that are “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521-22, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). “The doctrine applies both to federal claims raised in the state court and to those ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s judgment.”
Casale v. Tillman,
558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir.2009). “A claim is inextricably intertwined if it would effectively nullify the state court judgment or it succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues.”
Id.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Ware’s claims fall squarely within that description. Ware lost in state court. His § 1983 claims effectively ask the district court to review and reject the state court’s judgment. And his federal claims are either the same as those raised in his counterclaims in state court or otherwise inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment because they focus on the legality of the lien that was litigated in state court.
The only remaining question is whether the state-court judgment was rendered before proceedings in the district court commenced. We have interpreted
Exxon Mobil
to apply the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine only to instances where the state court proceedings have ended at the time the federal action is filed.
Nicholson,
558 F.3d at 1277. “[Sjtate proceedings have not ended for purposes of
Rooker-Feldman
when an appeal from the state court judgment remains pending at the time the plaintiff commences the federal court action that complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment and invites review and rejection of that judgment.”
Id.
at 1279. Here, the defendants attached several exhibits to their motion to dismiss related to the disposition of the state court proceedings. A district court “generally must convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment if it considers materials outside the complaint.”
Day v. Taylor,
400 F.3d 1272, 1275-76 (11th Cir.2005). However, a court “may consider a document attached to a motion to dismiss without converting the motion into one for summary judgment if the attached document is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim and (2) undisputed.”
Id.
at 1276. Because the documents attached to the motion to dismiss are central to Ware’s claim and undisputed, the district court properly considered them on a motion to dismiss. The exhibits establish that the claims in the state trial court had
proceeded to final judgment. The exhibits also establish that Ware had no intention of appealing the judgment to a state appellate court, preferring instead “to go straight to federal” court. Because no appeal remained pending at the time Ware commenced this federal action, the state proceedings were ended for purposes of the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.
Ware also argues that the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine should not apply because the state court lacked jurisdiction and its judgment was void
ab initio.
We have not yet recognized an exception to the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine in cases where the state court that issued the underlying state court judgment lacked jurisdiction.
Casale,
558 F.3d at 1261 n. 3. This case is not the proper occasion to answer that question because the state court had jurisdiction to issue its judgment. In Florida, state circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all equitable actions, including those to foreclose a lien.
See
Fla. Stat. § 26.012(2)(c);
Corbin Well Pump & Supply, Inc. v. Koon,
482 So.2d 525, 527 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
Because the underlying state court proceedings had ended, and Ware was complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments and seeking the district court to review and reject those judgments, the district court did not err in concluding that, under the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Ware’s claims.
Next, Ware argues that the district court erred by not holding a hearing to determine whether the state court had jurisdiction to hear his underlying state court claim before dismissing his federal complaint. We review a district court’s decision to rule on a motion to dismiss without an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion.
Sunseri v. Macro Cellular Partners,
412 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir.2005). It is not an abuse of discretion for a court to decide a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction based on documentary evidence and without an evidentiary hearing if neither party makes a timely and unequivocal request for an evidentiary hearing.
Id.
at 1251. The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Ware’s complaint without holding a hearing because neither party requested that the district court hold a hearing, and the court1 could determine whether it had jurisdiction over Ware’s federal claims based on the complaint, the motion to dismiss, and the exhibits attached to the motion to dismiss.
After carefully reviewing the record and considering the parties’ briefs, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Ware’s civil action.
AFFIRMED.