Ware v. Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Mississippi
DecidedMay 7, 2025
Docket3:24-cv-00314
StatusUnknown

This text of Ware v. Commissioner of Social Security (Ware v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ware v. Commissioner of Social Security, (N.D. Miss. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI OXFORD DIVISION

BRANDY SKIPPER WARE PLAINTIFF

V. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-314-DAS

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT

This cause is before the court on the plaintiff’s complaint for judicial review of an unfavorable final decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration regarding her application for supplemental security income. The parties have consented to entry of final judgment by the United States Magistrate Judge under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), with any appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in not providing an adequate explanation for his persuasiveness findings on the mental health opinions of the plaintiff’s two treating nurse practitioners. In this case there were four sources of opinions, the two nurse practitioners, a consulting examiner and the DDS opinions. Three of the opinions were closely aligned and found only mild to moderate mental health restrictions which were incorporated into the RFC. The medical source statement of one of the nurse practitioners put forth work-preclusive limitations. Considering the ALJ’s extensive review and comments on all the mental health records and his explanations for the persuasiveness findings from all four sources, the court finds the rejection of the outlier opinion of the nurse practitioner was adequately explained. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. FACTS The plaintiff, Brandy Skipper Ware, filed for benefits on October 1, 2021. The Social Security Administration denied the claim initially and on reconsideration. Following the hearing, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Dkt. 5, p. 18-30).1 The Appeals Council

denied the request for review, and this timely appeal followed. The ALJ found Ware had the following severe impairments: heart disease and chronic heart failure, depression and anxiety. The ALJ found Ware retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work, except she would be limited to occasional interactions with the public, supervisors and coworkers. She would also be limited to only occasional changes in the workplace or work processes. Ware has no past relevant work, and at forty-five years old, is an individual of younger age. She has at least a high-school education, having obtained her GED. Based on the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ found Ware could do other jobs that exist in substantial numbers in the national economy, namely, housekeeping cleaner, SVP2, a job performed at the

light level of exertion (133,00 jobs); photo copy operator, SVP 2, performed a the light level of exertion,(17,000 jobs); and deli cutter slicer, also SVP 2 and light exertion (18,000 jobs) in the national economy. The ALJ, therefore, determined that Ware was not disabled. ANALYSIS The plaintiff raises one issue: that the ALJ erred in his analysis of the medical opinions of Jessica Raines and Kristin Locke, both psychiatric mental health nurse practitioners, which addressed Ware’s mental residual function. The ALJ found the Raines’ opinion partially persuasive and found both statements provided by Locke to be unpersuasive. The record also

1 All references are to the administrative record using the court’s numbering system rather than the administrative numbering. includes the opinions of the state agency medical consultants (referred to in the ALJ’s decision by the previous initials as DDS), and the examination report and opinions of a consulting examiner, Dr. Ellingsworth. Ware argues that the ALJ did not adequately explain consistency and supportability in his

persuasiveness findings for the provider statements for these two treating nurse practitioners. The current regulations require ALJs to determine the persuasiveness of experts’ opinions based on five factors: 1) supportability; 2) consistency; 3) the source's relationship with the patient, 4) the source's medical specialty; and 5) a catchall provision for “other factors that tend to support or contradict” the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). However, the regulations only require the ALJs to discuss the supportability and consistency of the expert opinions in their decisions. Id. In evaluating the supportability of a medical opinion, the regulations provide that, “the strength of a medical opinion increases as the relevance of the objective medical evidence and explanations presented by the medical source increases.” Vellone v. Saul, 1:20–CV–00261, 2021

WL 319354, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2021) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)). The consistency evaluation is “an all-encompassing inquiry focused on how well a medical source is supported, or not supported, by the entire record.” Clay v. Kijakazi, No. 4:21-CV-149-SA-DAS, 2022 WL 13989015, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 21, 2022) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1) Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 FR 5844, 5853, 82 FR 5844-01, 5853). The purpose for requiring an explanation of the persuasiveness finding is to allow meaningful appellate review. It is critical that the ALJ's decisions provide enough information for the courts “to conduct a meaningful appellate review of the decision-making process.” Clay, 2022 WL 13989015, at *3. The courts need to know what evidence was considered and why a particular result was reached in the decision-making process. It is not sufficient to simply pay lip service to the regulatory requirements without providing any meaningful detail. See, e.g., Howard D. v. Saul, No. 5:19-CV-01615 (BKS), 2021 WL 1152834, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26,

2021). No decision may leave the court to speculate about the ALJ’s reasoning or require the court to engage in post hoc rationalization. Id. This duty of explanation is mandated not only by regulation but also by statute. In every decision, unless fully favorable, the Social Security Administration must provide a “statement of the case, in understandable language, setting forth a discussion of the evidence, and stating the Commissioner's determination and the reason or reasons.” 42 U.S.C. § 405 (b)(1). ALJs, however, are not required “to comment on every piece of evidence” but must “build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the final determination. Price v. Astrue, 401 F. App'x 985, 986 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Glomski v. Massanari, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1082, 77 (E.D. Wis. 2001)). The measuring stick for an “adequate discussion” is whether

the ALJ's persuasiveness explanation enables the court to undertake the meaningful review of whether his finding about the medical opinion was supported by substantial evidence. Ramirez v. Saul, No. SA-20-CV-00457-ESC, 2021 WL 2269473, at *6 (W.D. Tex. June 3, 2021). “The relevant question is not whether the ALJ presented an arbitrary level of detail; it is whether the decision contains a sufficient articulation to identify the evidentiary choices made by the finder of fact.” Jenkins v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:23-CV-305-JMV, 2024 WL 1158373, at *5 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 18, 2024). How much detail in the explanation of the persuasiveness finding is very context dependent.

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Related

Glomski v. Massanari
172 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (E.D. Wisconsin, 2001)

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Ware v. Commissioner of Social Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ware-v-commissioner-of-social-security-msnd-2025.