Warden v. Dept. of Natural Resources

2012 Ohio 3854
CourtOhio Court of Claims
DecidedApril 4, 2012
Docket2011-01232
StatusPublished

This text of 2012 Ohio 3854 (Warden v. Dept. of Natural Resources) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Warden v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 2012 Ohio 3854 (Ohio Super. Ct. 2012).

Opinion

[Cite as Warden v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 2012-Ohio-3854.]

Court of Claims of Ohio The Ohio Judicial Center 65 South Front Street, Third Floor Columbus, OH 43215 614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 www.cco.state.oh.us

RICHARD W. WARDEN

Plaintiff

v.

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

Defendant

Case No. 2011-01232

Judge Alan C. Travis

DECISION

{¶ 1} Plaintiff brought this action alleging age discrimination under R.C. 4112.14 and 4112.99. The issues of liability and damages were bifurcated and the case proceeded to trial on the issue of liability.1 {¶ 2} Plaintiff is a registered professional engineer who was employed by defendant for 29.5 years. On October 1, 2006, plaintiff accepted a two-year buyout and retired from his position as a Natural Resources Engineer 4 in defendant’s Mineral Resources Management (MRM) Division, after 31.5 years of state service. Plaintiff was 51 years old when he retired. {¶ 3} Following plaintiff’s retirement, legislation was enacted that required defendant to prepare an estimate of the cost to reclaim coal mining sites in the event that the coal mining operator forfeited. To comply with the new legislation, defendant’s MRM division was required to create a program that could perform such estimates. In March 2007, MRM’s Division Chief, John Husted, contacted plaintiff to see if he would

1 Plaintiff’s February 28, 2012 motion to strike “defendant’s argument II” is DENIED. Case No. 2011-01232 -2- DECISION

resume his employment with MRM on an intermittent basis in order to develop the required program. Plaintiff agreed and he was awarded a one fiscal year, “1000-hour” contract as an Engineer 4. Plaintiff was subsequently granted three additional 1000- hour contracts. {¶ 4} In the fall of 2009, MRM division officials began discussing whether to create a full-time Natural Resources Engineer 3 position to perform the work that plaintiff was performing under his intermittent assignments. During these discussions, Husted and Susan Grant, plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, approached plaintiff and asked him whether he would be interested in a full-time Natural Resources Engineer 3 position. On November 20, 2009, plaintiff informed Grant that he was interested in the position. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 22.) {¶ 5} In early 2010, defendant posted a position for a full-time Engineer 3. On February 24, 2010, plaintiff applied for the posted position. At the time of his application, plaintiff was still working for defendant pursuant to his most recent 1,000- hour contract. On March 31, 2010, Mamie Hollenback, defendant’s human resource associate, mailed a letter to plaintiff notifying him that an interview had been scheduled for him on April 29, 2010. However, according to Hollenback, prior to plaintiff’s interview, she informed the interview panel that former employees who had retired could not be rehired in a full-time position. Plaintiff’s interview went forward as scheduled. At the conclusion of the interviews, plaintiff had earned the highest overall score. {¶ 6} On May 5, 2010, Husted informed plaintiff that it was not likely that he would be selected for the full-time position because he was a retiree. Grant and Lanny Erdos, Deputy Chief of the Coal Regulatory Mine Safety and Industrial Minerals program, also informed plaintiff that he would not be selected for the full-time Engineer 3 position because the administration would not allow an individual who had retired from the agency to be rehired into another full-time position. Plaintiff complained to Husted, Case No. 2011-01232 -3- DECISION

Grant, and Erdos, that such a policy would result in the employment of a less qualified individual. Plaintiff’s final day in defendant’s employment was June 5, 2010. {¶ 7} Defendant eventually selected Jared Knerr for the Engineer 3 position. Knerr was 39 years old when he was hired. Plaintiff was 54 years old when he learned that he had been rejected for the full-time position. Plaintiff asserts that defendant’s failure to hire him constitutes discrimination on the basis of age in violation of R.C. 4112.14 and 4112.99. {¶ 8} R.C. 4112.14(A) provides: “No employer shall discriminate in any job opening against any applicant or discharge without just cause any employee aged forty or older who is physically able to perform the duties and otherwise meets the established requirements of the job and laws pertaining to the relationship between employer and employee.” In addition to Ohio case law, Ohio courts have consistently looked to federal cases interpreting federal civil rights and age discrimination legislation. Mauzy v. Kelly Scvs., Inc., 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 1996-Ohio-265; Barker v Scovill, Inc., 6 Ohio St.3d 146 (1983); Little Forest Med. Ctr. of Akron v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 61 Ohio St.3d 607, 609 (1991), (“[T]his court concluded that the evidentiary standards applicable to a determination regarding a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were likewise operable with respect to ascertaining whether a violation of R.C. Chapter 4112 has occurred.”) {¶ 9} A plaintiff claiming age discrimination may proceed upon theories of disparate treatment or disparate impact. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005); Adams v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 284 Fed. Appx. 296 (6th Cir.2008). “To prevail on a theory of disparate treatment discrimination, a plaintiff must prove that the protected trait motivated his employer's decision. * * * To prevail on a theory of disparate impact age discrimination, a plaintiff must prove that an employer's facially neutral policies or practices fall more harshly on a protected group.” Caldwell v. Ohio State Univ., 10th Dist. No. 01AP-997, 2002-Ohio-2393, ¶66. (Internal citation omitted.) Case No. 2011-01232 -4- DECISION

DISPARATE TREATMENT {¶ 10} Plaintiff’s claim of disparate treatment may be proven either by direct evidence of discrimination or through the burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See Harris v. Metro. Govt. of Nashville and Davidson Cty., Tenn., 594 F.3d 476, 485 (6th Cir.2010). {¶ 11} Plaintiff asserts that the testimony of former ODNR director Sean Logan and a memorandum (Bates memorandum) authored by Human Resources Director Steve Bates provide direct evidence of age discrimination. Defendant argues that it did not hire plaintiff because of its policy prohibiting a retired former employee from being rehired in the same or similar position; that his age was not a factor. {¶ 12} Logan testified that the employment decision was motivated by a desire to restrict the hiring of recently retired former employees and that plaintiff’s age was not a consideration. Indeed, the Bates memorandum states that “[t]he re-employment of State of Ohio/Public Employer Retirees will be strictly limited to intermittent positions that require specialized knowledge and/or experience * * *.” The Bates memorandum does not reference age as a factor for the policy. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 27.) Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to present direct evidence of age discrimination.

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Related

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Smith v. City of Jackson
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Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory
554 U.S. 84 (Supreme Court, 2008)
Raymond Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc.
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Allen v. Highlands Hospital Corp.
545 F.3d 387 (Sixth Circuit, 2008)
Harris v. METRO. GOV'T NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON CO. TN
594 F.3d 476 (Sixth Circuit, 2010)
Moore v. Abbott Laboratories
780 F. Supp. 2d 600 (S.D. Ohio, 2011)
Miller v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, Inc.
2010 Ohio 4291 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2010)
Adams v. Lucent Technologies, Inc.
284 F. App'x 296 (Sixth Circuit, 2008)
Shollenbarger v. Planes Moving & Storage
297 F. App'x 483 (Sixth Circuit, 2008)
Frantz v. Beechmont Pet Hospital
690 N.E.2d 897 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1996)
Barker v. Scovill, Inc.
451 N.E.2d 807 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1983)
Little Forest Medical Center v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission
575 N.E.2d 1164 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1991)
Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc.
1996 Ohio 265 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1996)

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Bluebook (online)
2012 Ohio 3854, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/warden-v-dept-of-natural-resources-ohioctcl-2012.