Ward v. Peck

59 U.S. 267, 15 L. Ed. 383, 18 How. 267, 1855 U.S. LEXIS 697
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedFebruary 26, 1856
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 59 U.S. 267 (Ward v. Peck) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ward v. Peck, 59 U.S. 267, 15 L. Ed. 383, 18 How. 267, 1855 U.S. LEXIS 697 (1856).

Opinions

Mr. Justice GRIER

delivered the opinion of the court.

The pleadings in this case present but the single question of the title or ownership of the. Bark Mopang.

Originally, the court of admiralty in England entertained jmisdiction of petitory as well ■ as mere possessory actions. Since the Restoration, that court, through the jealous interference of courts of law, had ceased to pronounce directly on questions of ownership or property. Petitory suits were silently abandoned, and, if in a possessory action a .question of mere property arose, especially of a more complicated nature, it declined to interfere.

This “ submission to authority rather than reason ” has continued till the statute of 3 and 4 Vivt. c. 65, § 4, restored to the admiralty plenary jurisdiction of such questions. See case of The Aurora, 3 Rob. 133, 136, and the Warrior, 2 Dodson, 288, 2 Brown Civ. & Ad. 430.

In this country, where the courts of admiralty have not been subjected to such jealous restraints, the. ancient jurisdiction over petitory suits or causes of property has been retained. In. the [268]*268case of The Tilton, (5 Mason, 465,) Mr. Justice Stoiy has examined this question with his usual learning and ability. The authority of that case has never been questioned in our courts. See Taylor v. Royal Saxon, 1 Wall, 322. In the case of the New England Ins. Co. v. Brig Sarah Anne, 13 Pet. 387, in this court, the only question was the title or ownership of the brig, yet the cause was entertained without any expression of doubt as to jurisdiction.

The following agreed statement of facts presents the merits of this case : —

“ That the libellants are the owners of the said Bark 1 Mo-pang,’ unless their title has been devested by the sale made by the master under the following circumstances: The bark sailed from New Orleans on or about the 29,th November, 1846, for Tampico and other Mexican ports. That, on or about the 6th of December thereafter, she struck aground, was abandoned by her officers and crew on the north breakers off the bar of Tampico ; that she floated over the bar, and was boarded by one Clifton, who refused to deliver her to the master; that a claim for salvage was made; that by agreement between the mastey and Clifton, the vessel was sold to the claimant, Ward, on the -. It is admitted that the sale to Ward was unauthorized by the circumstances in which the master was placed.

. “ The libellants had a valued policy upon the vessel taken out at New Orleans. On thé 9th day of January, 1847, they gave notice of abandonment to the underwriters as for a total loss, who refused to accept the same. They were sued for a totál loss by libellants. Judgment found for defendant.”

This statement amounts to an admission of want of title in the claimant. The abandonment by her owners to the underwriters could not affect the title of the claimant, by way of ratification or estoppel. The insurance is but a wager between the parties to it, on the safety of the vessel. By the rule of the contract the ship may be abandoned, and the whole insurance claimed, when the damages exceed half the value.

Nothing but extreme necessity can justify the sale of the vessel by the master. The abandonment was based on the damage done to the vessel at the time of the accident. If. accepted, the master became the agent of the insurer;' and whether accepted or not, his act, .without authority, can receive no ratification from allegations or admissions made by any party in a dispute on the contract of assurance, where the inquiry as to the act of the master was irrelevant. The defendant, having obtained pos session .unlawfully, was a trespasser, and can no more plead the abandonment as a confirmation of his title than if he had obtained it by theft or piracy; moreover, if the circumstances [269]*269would have justified a;sale by the master, no'abandonment was necessary. It cannot, therefore, by any possible implication, amount to a confirmation of such sale.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)
59 U.S. 267, 15 L. Ed. 383, 18 How. 267, 1855 U.S. LEXIS 697, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ward-v-peck-scotus-1856.