Ward v. NATIONAL MEDICAL ASSOCIATION OF DENVER

Supreme Court of Colorado

Ward v. NATIONAL MEDICAL ASSOCIATION OF DENVER

392 P.2d 162, 154 Colo. 595, 1964 Colo. LEXIS 478

CourtSupreme Court of Colorado

DecidedMay 11, 1964

Docket20752

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 392 P.2d 162 (Ward v. NATIONAL MEDICAL ASSOCIATION OF DENVER) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Ward v. NATIONAL MEDICAL ASSOCIATION OF DENVER, 392 P.2d 162, 154 Colo. 595, 1964 Colo. LEXIS 478 (Colo. 1964).

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Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice McWilliams

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In its complaint the National Medical Association of Denver alleged that as the “assignee of Children’s Hospital . . . the defendant [Ward] owes plaintiff $449.14 in accordance with the note dated November 21, 1959, which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.”

*596 The record before us does not include Ward’s answer to the complaint, although he presumably interposed a general denial thereto.

Upon trial all proffered evidence was received without any objection whatsoever on the part of Ward. At the conclusion of the trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff against Ward in the amount prayed for, the trial court finding that though Ward was not liable on the note proper, he was nevertheless otherwise “contractually obligated” to the plaintiff’s assignor.

The evidence will not be detailed inasmuch as Ward does not assign error, as such, to the trial court finding that he was “contractually obligated” to plaintiff. Rather, his only complaint is that the “plaintiff thus has been granted relief on a claim which plaintiff did not state,” which — according to Ward — the trial court is powerless to do. He cites no authority for this proposition.

Rule 15, R.C.P. Colo, provides, in part, as follows:

“ . . . when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleading. Such amendment to the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made on motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. ...” (Emphasis supplied.)

Our examination of the very sketchy record before us indicates that issues not raised by the pleadings were nonetheless tried by the express consent of the parties. This being the situation, it is of no legal significance that the trial court entered judgment on a “theory” different from the “theory” pled in the complaint. In Bridges v. Ingram, 122 Colo. 501, 223 P. (2d) 1051 it was stated that “if, under the facts, the substantive law provided relief upon any ‘theory’, the cause should proceed to judgment” and that if such be the *597 case “the theory of the pleader is not important.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Judgment affirmed.

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Mr. Chief Justice McWilliams

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In its complaint the National Medical Association of Denver alleged that as the “assignee of Children’s Hospital . . . the defendant [Ward] owes plaintiff $449.14 in accordance with the note dated November 21, 1959, which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.”

*596 The record before us does not include Ward’s answer to the complaint, although he presumably interposed a general denial thereto.

Upon trial all proffered evidence was received without any objection whatsoever on the part of Ward. At the conclusion of the trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff against Ward in the amount prayed for, the trial court finding that though Ward was not liable on the note proper, he was nevertheless otherwise “contractually obligated” to the plaintiff’s assignor.

The evidence will not be detailed inasmuch as Ward does not assign error, as such, to the trial court finding that he was “contractually obligated” to plaintiff. Rather, his only complaint is that the “plaintiff thus has been granted relief on a claim which plaintiff did not state,” which — according to Ward — the trial court is powerless to do. He cites no authority for this proposition.

Rule 15, R.C.P. Colo, provides, in part, as follows:

“ . . . when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleading. Such amendment to the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made on motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. ...” (Emphasis supplied.)

Our examination of the very sketchy record before us indicates that issues not raised by the pleadings were nonetheless tried by the express consent of the parties. This being the situation, it is of no legal significance that the trial court entered judgment on a “theory” different from the “theory” pled in the complaint. In Bridges v. Ingram, 122 Colo. 501, 223 P. (2d) 1051 it was stated that “if, under the facts, the substantive law provided relief upon any ‘theory’, the cause should proceed to judgment” and that if such be the *597 case “the theory of the pleader is not important.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Judgment affirmed.

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392 P.2d 162, 154 Colo. 595, 1964 Colo. LEXIS 478, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ward-v-national-medical-association-of-denver-colo-1964.

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