Ward v. . Howard

New York Court of Appeals

Ward v. . Howard

88 N.Y. 74, 1882 N.Y. LEXIS 73

CourtNew York Court of Appeals

DecidedFebruary 7, 1882

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 88 N.Y. 74 (Ward v. . Howard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ward v. . Howard, 88 N.Y. 74, 1882 N.Y. LEXIS 73 (N.Y. 1882).

Pincite

Opinion

Finch, J.

Upon the facts disclosed, the plaintiff’s intestate, Lintz, held the note in suit, without notice, and for a valuable consideration, and before maturity, so that he was entitled *76 tobe protected against the equities of the defendant, Charles' Howard. ( Werner v. Barden, 49 N. Y. 293.) Lintz had given' his note to Ketchum for $2,180, which was payable to the order of Eneas as an accommodation to the latter, who ■ was the real borrower, and received the entire proceeds of the loan, and acknowledged his liability therefor by giving his own note of the same date and for the same amount to Lintz. When the latter’s note to Ketchum was about maturing, Eneas found himself unable to meet it promptly and in full, and out of that inability arose the new arrangement. He agreed to pay Lintz $1,180 in cash, and transfer to him the note in suit for $1,000, upon condition that Lintz should take up and pay the note to Ketchum, which was in reality the debt of Eneas. The agreement was accordingly executed. The check for $1,180 and the note in suit were delivered .to Lintz, who paid the note to Ketchum, which, as the Special Term finds, was taken up and canceled. The discharge and cancellation of that note relieved Eneas from liability upon it as indorser, for its entire discharge was the obvious purpose of the agreement, and followed from the cancellation of the note.

It is further found that Lintz, at the same time, surrendered up and returned to Eneas the latter’s note of $2,180 which was given as collateral to his liability, or as an acknowledgment thereof. These facts show that Lintz took the Howard note,' not merely upon an antecedent debt, but upon the further consideration of the cancellation of one security, and the surrender of another, and materially changed his situation, with reference to Eneas. Before the new arrangement, he stood liable to pay the debt of the latter, without having actually paid any part of it. Under the changed agreement he actually paid $1,000 of that debt, taking as his sole security therefor the Howard note, indorsed by Eneas, and which fell due nearly a year later. It follows that Lintz became an innocent purchaser for a valuable consideration of the Howard note, it further appearing that he had no knowledge or notice of the alleged equity of the maker. ( Weaver v. Barden supra; Youngs v. Lee, 12 N. Y. 551.)

The fact, therefore, that $420 had been paid on the note in *77 suit before its transfer to Lintz was not available as a defense or to reduce the recovery.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

■ All concur.

Judgment affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Finch, J.

Upon the facts disclosed, the plaintiff’s intestate, Lintz, held the note in suit, without notice, and for a valuable consideration, and before maturity, so that he was entitled *76 tobe protected against the equities of the defendant, Charles' Howard. ( Werner v. Barden, 49 N. Y. 293.) Lintz had given' his note to Ketchum for $2,180, which was payable to the order of Eneas as an accommodation to the latter, who ■ was the real borrower, and received the entire proceeds of the loan, and acknowledged his liability therefor by giving his own note of the same date and for the same amount to Lintz. When the latter’s note to Ketchum was about maturing, Eneas found himself unable to meet it promptly and in full, and out of that inability arose the new arrangement. He agreed to pay Lintz $1,180 in cash, and transfer to him the note in suit for $1,000, upon condition that Lintz should take up and pay the note to Ketchum, which was in reality the debt of Eneas. The agreement was accordingly executed. The check for $1,180 and the note in suit were delivered .to Lintz, who paid the note to Ketchum, which, as the Special Term finds, was taken up and canceled. The discharge and cancellation of that note relieved Eneas from liability upon it as indorser, for its entire discharge was the obvious purpose of the agreement, and followed from the cancellation of the note.

It is further found that Lintz, at the same time, surrendered up and returned to Eneas the latter’s note of $2,180 which was given as collateral to his liability, or as an acknowledgment thereof. These facts show that Lintz took the Howard note,' not merely upon an antecedent debt, but upon the further consideration of the cancellation of one security, and the surrender of another, and materially changed his situation, with reference to Eneas. Before the new arrangement, he stood liable to pay the debt of the latter, without having actually paid any part of it. Under the changed agreement he actually paid $1,000 of that debt, taking as his sole security therefor the Howard note, indorsed by Eneas, and which fell due nearly a year later. It follows that Lintz became an innocent purchaser for a valuable consideration of the Howard note, it further appearing that he had no knowledge or notice of the alleged equity of the maker. ( Weaver v. Barden supra; Youngs v. Lee, 12 N. Y. 551.)

The fact, therefore, that $420 had been paid on the note in *77 suit before its transfer to Lintz was not available as a defense or to reduce the recovery.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

■ All concur.

Judgment affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

88 N.Y. 74, 1882 N.Y. LEXIS 73, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ward-v-howard-ny-1882.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack