Ward v. Grounds

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 29, 2026
• Docket: 2025-CA-61
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Ward v. Grounds, 2026-Ohio-2005.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT GREENE COUNTY

MARILYN WARD (fka GROUNDS) : : C.A. No. 2025-CA-61 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 2021 DR 0043 v. : : (Appeal from Common Pleas Court- ROBERT GROUNDS : Domestic Relations) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION

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Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on May 29, 2026, the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE

LEWIS, P.J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur. OPINION GREENE C.A. No. 2025-CA-61

LORI R. CICERO and TIMOTHY R. SAUNDERS, Attorneys for Appellant MARILYN WARD, Appellee, Pro Se

TUCKER, J.

{¶ 1} Robert Grounds appeals from the trial court’s judgment entry overruling his

motion to terminate or modify spousal support due to cohabitation by his ex-wife, appellee

Marilyn Ward.

{¶ 2} Grounds contends the trial court erred during a hearing on his motion by

excluding evidence of Ward’s cohabitation with an unrelated adult and sua sponte

dismissing his primary witness. He also claims the trial court should have terminated his

spousal support obligation due to Ward’s cohabitation or, at a minimum, should have

modified his obligation to account for financial assistance she receives.

{¶ 3} We are unpersuaded by Grounds’ arguments regarding the trial court’s

evidentiary ruling and dismissal of a witness. We also see no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s failure to find cohabitation for purposes of terminating spousal support. Nor did the

trial court abuse its discretion in failing to modify spousal support. Accordingly, we affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

I. Background

{¶ 4} The parties married in November 2000 and divorced in December 2021. The

divorce decree obligated Grounds to pay spousal support of $2,400 per month for

84 months. It provided for this obligation to terminate upon Ward’s cohabitation with an

unrelated adult. In April 2025, Grounds alleged that Ward was cohabiting with a man named

2 John Frost, and Grounds moved to terminate spousal support. Alternatively, he sought a

reduction in his support obligation.

{¶ 5} The matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing at which Grounds and Ward

were the sole witnesses. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court made the following

factual findings:

The parties were married for more than twenty years. Near the end of

the divorce proceedings, Marilyn moved to Florida in November 2001. She has

remained in Florida and the parties agreed that her income is $13,200

annually, plus the spousal support she receives. She does not have a high

earning work history, and suffers from PTSD and anxiety, which she stated

affects her ability to work full time.

Robert is steadily employed in Ohio with annual income of

approximately $155,000. He receives health insurance, retirement

contributions, and other employment benefits. Robert was the primary wage

earner during the parties’ marriage.

Upon moving to Florida in 2021, Marilyn lived with her sister and in Mr.

Frost’s residence for periods of time. At some point, which was never made

completely clear to the Court, Marilyn began to reside with Mr. Frost full time.

Marilyn agreed that she cohabitated with Mr. Frost, but she stated it was as

friends and roommates. She denied any romantic or marital type of

relationship. She initially paid rent in the amount of $1,100.00 per month, but

stated she later reduced her housing costs by providing household services in

exchange for rent. Marilyn never shared joint bank accounts, leases, utility

bills, or other financial obligations with Frost. She continues to pay her own

3 credit card bills, automobile expenses, cell phone, and personal expenses.

Robert offered no evidence of joint financial accounts, joint debts, or

commingled finances between Marilyn and Frost.

November 3, 2025 Judgment Entry, p. 2-3.

{¶ 6} The trial court found no cohabitation by Ward and Frost within the meaning of

the divorce decree. It noted that Ward primarily resided in one room of Frost’s two-bedroom,

750 square foot trailer. The trial court credited her claim that she and Frost were friends and

roommates and that she “initially paid rent, and later exchanged household services such

as gardening and cleaning for reduced housing expenses.” The trial court observed that

“[s]he pays her own car insurance, credit cards, and phone bills, and there was no evidence

of joint accounts, shared debts, or financial pooling.” The trial court determined that Frost

had not undertaken a duty to support Ward. It reasoned that “the absence of [a] financial

assumption/marital type relationship prevents a finding of cohabitation for the purposes of

spousal support termination.” Id. at p. 4.

{¶ 7} Finally, the trial court rejected Grounds’ alternative request for a spousal

support reduction in recognition of the financial benefit Ward received by living with Frost.

While acknowledging that it retained jurisdiction to modify spousal support, the trial court

found continued support of $2,400 per month to be equitable. It cited the parties’ greatly

disparate incomes, the duration of their marriage, Ward’s age, her limited earning capacity

and history, and her health. The trial court believed that her standard of living and ability to

meet future needs would decline drastically without her current support. Grounds timely

appealed, advancing three assignments of error.

4 II. Analysis

{¶ 8} The first assignment of error states:

The Trial Court erred in refusing to admit evidence of cohabitation and

dismissing Appellant’s witness, sua sponte.

{¶ 9} Grounds anticipated calling a Florida private investigator to testify remotely

during the hearing on his motion. He contends the trial court erred in sua sponte dismissing

the witness as unnecessary. He also claims the trial court erred in refusing to consider the

investigator’s report, video evidence, and evidence establishing ownership of the Florida

residence shared by Ward and Frost.

{¶ 10} We ordinarily review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.

The phrase “abuse of discretion” implies that a court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). Most abuses of

discretion involve decisions that are unreasonable rather than unconscionable or arbitrary.

K.S. v. J.C., 2026-Ohio-1395, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Malloy, 2012-Ohio-2664, ¶ 24

(2d Dist.). Here, however, Grounds did not object when the trial court found the private

investigator’s testimony unnecessary and dismissed the witness. Therefore, plain-error

review applies to that aspect of its decision. “In appeals of civil cases, the plain error doctrine

is not favored and may be applied only in the extremely rare case involving exceptional

circumstances where error . . . seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial

process itself.” Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116 (1997), syllabus.

{¶ 11} Having reviewed the record, we find no error, plain or otherwise, in the trial

court’s challenged rulings. At the outset of the hearing, the trial court told Ward that Grounds

had a private investigator who was prepared to testify to her living with Frost. She agreed to

5 stipulate to that fact. The trial court responded by sua sponte finding the investigator’s

testimony unnecessary and excusing him. Grounds then testified in support of his motion.

Early in his testimony, the trial court questioned the need for his exhibits A through F.

It engaged in the following exchange with the parties:

THE COURT: So I’m gonna say A through H—or A through F are not

necessary, right? Because that’s the investigation, the deeds on the house,

auditor information, voter information, videos. I mean, she’s agreed she’s living

with him.

[GROUNDS’ COUNSEL]: Sure. I think the—in terms of the—some of

that I think still goes towards whether or not, you know, who owns the house

specifically and whether or not there’s a—I think it’s—but some of that is still

relevant. I would—

THE COURT: Rights. Okay. Well, I think we can stipulate to the fact—

I’m gonna—just based on what she said, Marilyn, you—you’re gonna stipulate

to the fact that John Frost owns the house that you live in and you have no

legal right to it, right?

MS. WARD: That’s correct.

THE COURT: Okay. So that takes care of that. Are you also going to

stipulate to the fact that you don’t pay him rent, correct?

MS. WARD: I don’t pay him rent, no.

THE COURT: Correct. So you don’t pay taxes, insurance, utilities or

rent?

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

6 {¶ 12} Following this exchange, Grounds testified without relying on exhibits A

through F. At one point, however, he did reference the private investigator’s report. He

testified that based on the report, he believed Ward and Frost had been living together since

November 2021. During the cross-examination of Ward, the trial court permitted Grounds’

counsel to question her about one of the exhibits at issue, namely exhibit C, which was a

copy of property tax records for Frost’s Florida residence.

{¶ 13} Regarding the private investigator’s participation in the hearing, the better

practice would have been for Ward to seek his exclusion if she deemed his testimony

unnecessary. Nevertheless, Grounds has not established any prejudice due to the trial

court’s ruling excusing the private investigator from testifying. Grounds claims the

investigator’s testimony would have “touched on numerous aspects of cohabitation” beyond

Ward and Frost living together. After Ward admitted residing with Frost, however, the only

remaining relevance to the investigator’s testimony cited by Grounds’ attorney concerned

ownership of the Florida residence. Notably, Ward then stipulated that Frost owned the

property. She also admitted during the second day of the hearing that she had used Frost’s

address as early as 2021.

{¶ 14} On appeal, Grounds characterizes the investigator’s report and video

surveillance as supporting his claim of a romantic relationship between Ward and Frost. But

we see nothing in the exhibits contradicting Ward’s testimony that she and Frost were friends

who shared a residence. Exhibit A, the private investigator’s report, contained surveillance

pictures taken outside of Frost’s residence as well information pertaining to addresses,

vehicles, driver’s licenses, liens, and voter registration of Ward and/or Frost. Exhibit B was

a copy of the deed for Frost’s Florida residence. Exhibit C, about which the trial court allowed

Ward to testify, was a tax record regarding Frost’s residence. Exhibits D and E were voter

7 registrations identifying the Florida residence as the address of Frost and Ward. Finally,

exhibit H was video footage obtained by the investigator. The video itself was not admitted

into evidence, and Grounds did not proffer what it depicted.

{¶ 15} Based on our examination of the record, we see no basis for the private

investigator to have provided relevant testimony addressing anything beyond what Ward

stipulated. Therefore, the trial court did err in finding the investigator’s testimony

unnecessary. Nor did it abuse its discretion in excluding the referenced exhibits. Accordingly,

the first assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 16} The second assignment of error states:

The Trial Court erred by finding that Appellee was not cohabitating with

her paramour and denying Appellant’s Motion to Terminate Spousal

Support.

{¶ 17} Grounds challenges the trial court’s finding of no cohabitation between Ward

and Frost for purposes of terminating spousal support. He cites evidence that Ward and

Frost lived together as early as 2021 and remained so at the time of the hearing. Grounds

also claims Frost voluntarily undertook a duty of total support for Ward. He stresses that she

lived in Frost’s home without paying rent or bills for water, gas, electricity, internet, or trash

collection. He contends the present case is like Clark v. Clark, 2006-Ohio-4820 (11th Dist.),

which involved a finding of cohabitation by an ex-wife where her new partner provided her

with a rent-free residence.

{¶ 18} “[C]ohabitation is established, and a spousal support obligation is subject to

termination, when a paramour voluntarily undertakes a duty of total support or otherwise

assumes obligations equivalent to those arising from a ceremonial marriage.” Raska v.

Raska, 2018-Ohio-3921, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.), citing Perri v. Perri, 79 Ohio App.3d 845, 851-852

8 (2d Dist. 1992). A cohabitation provision in a divorce decree is intended “‘to prevent a person

from receiving support from two sources, each of whom is obligated or voluntarily undertakes

the duty of total support.’” Perri at 850, quoting Taylor v. Taylor, 11 Ohio App.3d 279, 280

(1st Dist. 1983). “Cohabitation is a question of fact for the trier of facts.” Raska at ¶ 10.

{¶ 19} Grounds claims that the trial court’s finding of no cohabitation between Ward

and Frost is against the manifest weight of the evidence. This standard “requires us to weigh

the evidence and all reasonable inferences, to consider the credibility of witnesses and

determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way

and created a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Carr v. Carr, 2021-Ohio-2530, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 20} Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the weight of the evidence

supports the trial court’s finding of no cohabitation. Ward testified that she initially lived with

her sister upon moving to Florida. After a job transfer, she looked for a place to rent but

ended up moving into Frost’s residence, a small two-bedroom trailer. Ward stated that she

initially paid Frost $1,100 per month for five months. She apparently then moved out for

some time before returning. Upon her return, she stopped paying rent. She instead agreed

to do all the cooking and cleaning and to do yard work including gardening, weeding, and

helping to clear trees from the property. Ward testified that she pays for her phone bill and

for her share of the food. She also makes her own vehicle payments and pays for her own

credit card. Ward explained that she was trying to reach a point financially where she could

“be on [her] own.” The plan was for her eventually to live in her recreational vehicle on Frost’s

property. The trial court found Ward to be credible and relied on much of her testimony.

{¶ 21} Although Ward did not directly pay for rent or utilities, she essentially bartered

for a place to live. Therefore, Frost did not undertake a duty of support by allowing her to

live rent-free without any contribution. She could be characterized as akin to a live-in maid

9 who exchanged work for lodging. The trial court found no evidence that Ward and Frost ever

shared accounts or comingled finances. It noted too that she paid her own personal

expenses while working for Frost. Considering this evidence, the trial court reasonably found

that Grounds had failed to establish Ward’s cohabitation with an unrelated adult for purposes

of terminating spousal support.

{¶ 22} In reaching this conclusion, we find Grounds’ reliance on the Eleventh District’s

opinion in Clark to be misplaced. The ex-wife in Clark lived in a home that her new fiancé

had built and furnished. After the ex-wife’s divorce became final, her new fiancé transferred

his home into their joint names and purchased the ex-wife a car. They shared a joint

checking account that they used to pay some expenses. The Eleventh District found that the

ex-wife and her new fiancé were virtually married. “Given the reality of the living

arrangement,” the appellate court held that the former husband was entitled to have his

spousal support obligation terminated due to cohabitation.

{¶ 23} Unlike the situation in Clark, Ward performed substantial work for Frost in

exchange for a place to live. She did not co-own Frost’s residence, and they did not share

accounts or comingle assets. Ward also paid for her own vehicle, and Frost did not buy her

one. Based on the record before us, the trial court’s resolution of the cohabitation issue is

not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The second assignment of error is

overruled.

{¶ 24} The third assignment of error states:

The Trial Court erred by failing to recalculate spousal support based

upon the support Appellee receives from her live in paramour.

10 {¶ 25} Even if cohabitation did not exist, Grounds contends the trial court should have

reduced his spousal support obligation in recognition of the financial benefit Ward received

by living with Frost.

{¶ 26} Under R.C. 3105.18(E), the trial court retained jurisdiction to modify the

amount of spousal support because the divorce decree gave it that power. Under

R.C. 3105.18(F), the trial court could have exercised that authority upon finding a substantial

change in Ward’s circumstances that was unaccounted for at the time of the divorce decree

and that made the existing award no longer reasonable and appropriate. Grounds claims

that the reduction in Ward’s living expenses after moving in with Frost met this standard and

warranted a reduction in his spousal support obligation.

{¶ 27} “Even when the evidence does not establish a finding of cohabitation, a trial

court may consider whether the relationship between the spousal support obligee and the

paramour resulted in a change of circumstances sufficient to entitle the spousal support

obligor to some relief.” Carr, 2021-Ohio-2530, at ¶ 27 (2d Dist.). “We review a trial court's

decision regarding modification of spousal support for an abuse of discretion.” Id. at ¶ 29.

{¶ 28} In declining to modify Grounds’ obligation, the trial court cited several relevant

considerations under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1), including “income disparity, duration of marriage,

age, health, earning capacity, and standard of living.” It reasoned:

Robert earns approximately $155,000 annually compared to Marilyn’s

$13,200. The parties’ marriage lasted more than twenty years. Marilyn is older,

has limited historical and current earning ability, and ongoing health

challenges. Her standard of living and ability to prepare for future financial

needs without support would decline drastically. Balancing these

11 considerations, the Court concludes that Marilyn continues to require support,

and the amount of support of $2,400 per month is equitable.

November 3, 2025 Judgment Entry, p. 4.

{¶ 29} Although residing with Frost may have reduced Ward’s expenses below what

the parties anticipated when they divorced, her current income also is substantially lower.

Shortly after the divorce decree, Ward filed an affidavit of financial disclosure listing her 2022

income as $29,000. At that time, she was working for a healthcare company. At the time of

the cohabitation hearing, Ward was unemployed and was receiving social security benefits

of $13,200 annually, whereas Grounds had an annual income of $155,000. Even if Ward

benefited financially by living with Frost, the savings were offset by her vastly reduced

income. Under these circumstances and considering the other factors cited by the trial court,

we see no abuse of discretion in its decision to keep Grounds’ spousal support obligation at

$2,400 per month. The third assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 30} The judgment of the Greene County Common Pleas Court, Domestic

Relations Division, is affirmed.

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LEWIS, P.J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.