UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA _____________________________ ) YEETA L. WARD, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 10-321 (RWR) ) D.C. DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH ) REHABILITATION SERVICES, ) ) Defendant. ) _____________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Yeeta Ward, a correctional officer employed by the
defendant District of Columbia Department of Youth Rehabilitation
Services (“DYRS”) filed a two-count complaint against the DYRS
alleging claims of retaliation and discriminatory hostile work
environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the District of Columbia Human Rights
Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1401.01 et seq..1 The DYRS
moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss
Ward’s complaint. Because Ward elected to file a charge of
discrimination with the District of Columbia Office of Human
Rights (“DCOHR”) regarding the same course of conduct and the
charge reached resolution, her claims under the DCHRA will be
1 Ward also alleged that DYRS violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981, but she has voluntarily dismissed her § 1981 claims. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 9-10.) -2-
dismissed. Because DYRS lacks the capacity to be sued, the
District of Columbia will be substituted as the defendant.
BACKGROUND
The DYRS hired Ward in August 2004. (Compl. ¶ 7.) She
alleges that she thereafter was subjected to gender-based
harassment, insults, and repeated reassignments. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 15-
20, 36, 39.) In March 2008, Ward filed a charge of
discrimination against DYRS with the EEOC and the DCOHR. (Id.
¶ 5.) She complains that as a result, she experienced
retaliation, continued harassment, and a hostile work
environment. (Id. ¶¶ 25-29.)
Ward filed this action in February 2010 under Title VII and
the DCHRA, alleging one count of retaliation and one count of
hostile work environment. The DYRS has moved to dismiss Ward’s
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Ward’s claims under
the DCHRA should be dismissed because Ward elected to file a
charge of discrimination with DCOHR that was resolved, and that
the DYRS lacks the capacity to be sued. Ward opposes dismissal,
arguing that she should be allowed to amend her complaint to
substitute the District of Columbia for the DYRS as the proper
defendant.
DISCUSSION
A complaint can be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) when a
plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be -3-
granted. Peavey v. Holder, 657 F. Supp. 2d 180, 185 (D.D.C.
2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.”
Smith-Thompson v. Dist. of Columbia, 657 F. Supp. 2d 123, 129
(D.D.C. 2009). The complaint must be construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and “the court must assume the truth
of all well-pleaded allegations.” Warren v. District of
Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In deciding a motion
brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a court does not consider matters
outside the pleadings, but a court may consider on a motion to
dismiss “the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached
as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint,”
Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002),
or “documents ‘upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily
relies’ even if the document is produced not by the plaintiff in
the complaint but by the defendant in a motion to dismiss,”
Hinton v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 624 F. Supp. 2d 45, 46 (D.D.C.
2009) (quoting Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir.
1998)).2
2 Ward’s opposition requests that the motion to dismiss be converted to one for summary judgment because the motion attaches two documents purportedly outside of the complaint - - the DCOHR charge of discrimination and the letter of determination from the DCOHR. However, the charge of discrimination is referred to in the complaint (Compl. ¶ 5), a reference that also necessarily incorporates in the complaint the letter of determination resulting from the charge. In any event, the complaint necessarily relies upon the fact of the charge and the letter in -4-
I. DCHRA
Under the DCHRA, plaintiffs are “required ‘to choose between
an administrative or a judicial forum in which to pursue their
claims.’” Adams v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No. 09-2459
(RMU), 2010 WL 3831686, at *11 (D.D.C. September 28, 2010)
(quoting Carter v. Dist. of Columbia, 980 A.2d 1217, 1223 (D.C.
2009)); see D.C. Code § 2-1403.16(a). “A plaintiff, however, may
commence an action in court, notwithstanding his or her prior
filing of a complaint with the DCOHR, if either: (1) the
plaintiff withdraws the DCOHR complaint before the DCOHR renders
a judgment on it; or (2) the DCOHR dismisses the complaint for
‘administrative convenience.’” Adams, 2010 WL 3831686, at *11
(citing D.C. Code § 2-1403.16(a)). “In order to successfully
withdraw a complaint before the DCOHR, and thus, preserve the
right to bring the same claim in court, a complainant must
request withdrawal ‘prior to the completion of the [DCOHR’s]
investigation and findings.’” Adams, 2010 WL 3831686, at *12
(citing D.C. Code § 2-1403.04).
Ward’s opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss does
not address the argument that the claims in Ward’s complaint that
arise under the DCHRA should be dismissed because she filed a
charge of discrimination regarding the same course of conduct
pleading that administrative proceedings were pursued before this action was begun. (See id. at 2.) Thus, the motion need not be converted to one for summary judgment. -5-
with the DCOHR. Therefore, this argument may be deemed
conceded. See Cooper v. Farmers New Century Ins. Co., 607 F.
Supp. 2d 175, 180 (D.D.C. 2009) (granting motion to dismiss as
conceded based on the plaintiff’s failure to respond to arguments
raised in the motion); Bonaccorsy v. Dist. of Columbia, 685 F.
Supp. 2d 18, 24 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v.
Commercial Union Ins.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA _____________________________ ) YEETA L. WARD, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 10-321 (RWR) ) D.C. DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH ) REHABILITATION SERVICES, ) ) Defendant. ) _____________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Yeeta Ward, a correctional officer employed by the
defendant District of Columbia Department of Youth Rehabilitation
Services (“DYRS”) filed a two-count complaint against the DYRS
alleging claims of retaliation and discriminatory hostile work
environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the District of Columbia Human Rights
Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1401.01 et seq..1 The DYRS
moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss
Ward’s complaint. Because Ward elected to file a charge of
discrimination with the District of Columbia Office of Human
Rights (“DCOHR”) regarding the same course of conduct and the
charge reached resolution, her claims under the DCHRA will be
1 Ward also alleged that DYRS violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981, but she has voluntarily dismissed her § 1981 claims. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 9-10.) -2-
dismissed. Because DYRS lacks the capacity to be sued, the
District of Columbia will be substituted as the defendant.
BACKGROUND
The DYRS hired Ward in August 2004. (Compl. ¶ 7.) She
alleges that she thereafter was subjected to gender-based
harassment, insults, and repeated reassignments. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 15-
20, 36, 39.) In March 2008, Ward filed a charge of
discrimination against DYRS with the EEOC and the DCOHR. (Id.
¶ 5.) She complains that as a result, she experienced
retaliation, continued harassment, and a hostile work
environment. (Id. ¶¶ 25-29.)
Ward filed this action in February 2010 under Title VII and
the DCHRA, alleging one count of retaliation and one count of
hostile work environment. The DYRS has moved to dismiss Ward’s
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Ward’s claims under
the DCHRA should be dismissed because Ward elected to file a
charge of discrimination with DCOHR that was resolved, and that
the DYRS lacks the capacity to be sued. Ward opposes dismissal,
arguing that she should be allowed to amend her complaint to
substitute the District of Columbia for the DYRS as the proper
defendant.
DISCUSSION
A complaint can be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) when a
plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be -3-
granted. Peavey v. Holder, 657 F. Supp. 2d 180, 185 (D.D.C.
2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.”
Smith-Thompson v. Dist. of Columbia, 657 F. Supp. 2d 123, 129
(D.D.C. 2009). The complaint must be construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and “the court must assume the truth
of all well-pleaded allegations.” Warren v. District of
Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In deciding a motion
brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a court does not consider matters
outside the pleadings, but a court may consider on a motion to
dismiss “the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached
as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint,”
Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002),
or “documents ‘upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily
relies’ even if the document is produced not by the plaintiff in
the complaint but by the defendant in a motion to dismiss,”
Hinton v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 624 F. Supp. 2d 45, 46 (D.D.C.
2009) (quoting Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir.
1998)).2
2 Ward’s opposition requests that the motion to dismiss be converted to one for summary judgment because the motion attaches two documents purportedly outside of the complaint - - the DCOHR charge of discrimination and the letter of determination from the DCOHR. However, the charge of discrimination is referred to in the complaint (Compl. ¶ 5), a reference that also necessarily incorporates in the complaint the letter of determination resulting from the charge. In any event, the complaint necessarily relies upon the fact of the charge and the letter in -4-
I. DCHRA
Under the DCHRA, plaintiffs are “required ‘to choose between
an administrative or a judicial forum in which to pursue their
claims.’” Adams v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No. 09-2459
(RMU), 2010 WL 3831686, at *11 (D.D.C. September 28, 2010)
(quoting Carter v. Dist. of Columbia, 980 A.2d 1217, 1223 (D.C.
2009)); see D.C. Code § 2-1403.16(a). “A plaintiff, however, may
commence an action in court, notwithstanding his or her prior
filing of a complaint with the DCOHR, if either: (1) the
plaintiff withdraws the DCOHR complaint before the DCOHR renders
a judgment on it; or (2) the DCOHR dismisses the complaint for
‘administrative convenience.’” Adams, 2010 WL 3831686, at *11
(citing D.C. Code § 2-1403.16(a)). “In order to successfully
withdraw a complaint before the DCOHR, and thus, preserve the
right to bring the same claim in court, a complainant must
request withdrawal ‘prior to the completion of the [DCOHR’s]
investigation and findings.’” Adams, 2010 WL 3831686, at *12
(citing D.C. Code § 2-1403.04).
Ward’s opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss does
not address the argument that the claims in Ward’s complaint that
arise under the DCHRA should be dismissed because she filed a
charge of discrimination regarding the same course of conduct
pleading that administrative proceedings were pursued before this action was begun. (See id. at 2.) Thus, the motion need not be converted to one for summary judgment. -5-
with the DCOHR. Therefore, this argument may be deemed
conceded. See Cooper v. Farmers New Century Ins. Co., 607 F.
Supp. 2d 175, 180 (D.D.C. 2009) (granting motion to dismiss as
conceded based on the plaintiff’s failure to respond to arguments
raised in the motion); Bonaccorsy v. Dist. of Columbia, 685 F.
Supp. 2d 18, 24 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 82 F.3d 478, 482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
and Felter v. Salazar, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 n.2 (D.D.C. 2010)).
Moreover, Ward has presented no evidence that she withdrew her
charge of discrimination before the DCOHR, or that her charge of
discrimination was dismissed for administrative convenience.
Thus, Ward’s DCHRA claims will be dismissed.
II. DYRS
The DYRS moves to dismiss Ward’s complaint in its entirety
because the DYRS, as an agency of the District of Columbia, lacks
the capacity to be sued. (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to
Dismiss, at 4-5.) When a plaintiff mistakenly names as a
defendant a District of Columbia agency instead of the District
of Columbia itself, it is appropriate to substitute the District
for its agency. See Hunter v. D.C. Child & Family Servs. Agency,
710 F. Supp. 2d 152, 157 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Ennis v. Lott, 589
F. Supp. 2d 33, 37 (D.D.C. 2008)). Here, the defendant’s motion
to dismiss the complaint against the DYRS will be construed as a
motion to substitute the District of Columbia for the DYRS as the -6-
defendant. See Bennett v. Henderson, Civil Action No. 10-1680
(RWR), 2011 WL 285871, at * 1 (D.D.C. January 28, 2011)
(construing motion to dismiss as one for substitution, and
substituting the District of Columbia for the District of
Columbia Public Schools as defendant). Accordingly, the District
of Columbia will be substituted for the DYRS as the defendant in
this action, and the complaint will be construed as one alleging
claims against the District of Columbia.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Ward filed with the DCOHR a charge of discrimination that
reached resolution regarding the same course of conduct as is
alleged in this action, precluding her from bringing the DCHRA
claims in her complaint here. Therefore, her DCHRA claims will
be dismissed. Since the DYRS is non sui juris, the District of
Columbia will be substituted for the DYRS as the defendant.
Therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that the defendant’s motion [4] to dismiss be, and
hereby is, GRANTED IN PART. Ward’s claims under the DCHRA are
DISMISSED. It is further
ORDERED that the District of Columbia be, and hereby is,
SUBSTITUTED for defendant District of Columbia Youth
Rehabilitation Services. -7-
SIGNED this 7th day of March, 2011.
/s/ RICHARD W. ROBERTS United States District Judge