Ward v. County of San Diego

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 28, 2025
• Docket: 3:23-cv-01819
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Case No.: 23CV1819 BJC (BLM) 11 WILLIAM HOWARD WARD,

12 Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR AN ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 13 v. MOTION TO DISMISS

14 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., [ECF No. 29] 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Benjamin 19 J. Cheeks pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(c) and 72.3(f) of the United 20 States District Court for the Southern District of California. For the following reasons, the Court 21 RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss be DENIED. 22 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 23 On October 2, 2023, William Howard Ward (“Plaintiff” or “Ward”) filed a Complaint 24 (“Compl.”) alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violation 25 of the Bane Civil Rights Act, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against 26 Defendants County of San Diego (“County”), Acting Sheriff Kelly Martinez in her official capacity, 27 and Does 1-50. ECF No. 1. On November 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint 1 (“FAC”) naming the County of San Diego and Acting Sheriff Anthony Ray in his official capacity, 2 and Does 1-50. ECF No. 7. On February 8, 2024, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Anthony Ray. 3 ECF No. 18. The County moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC for failing to state a claim pursuant to 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF 15. Plaintiff filed an Opposition but also requested 5 leave to file an amended complaint. ECF No. 19. On March 26, 2024, United States District 6 Judge Roger Benitez did not reach the merits of the County’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion and instead, 7 permitted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 15(a)(2). ECF No. 22. On April 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) 9 against the County, Stephen Yi, Emiliza Cornejo, Carina Echon, Ozioma Enworom, Classification 10 Does 1 and 8, Deputy Does 2, 5, 6, 9, and 10, Medical Supervisor Doe 3, Medical Doe 4, and 11 Deputy Supervisor Does 7 and 1. ECF No. 23. 12 On May 31, 2024, Defendants County, Echon, and Yi filed a Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) 13 Plaintiff’s SAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 29. Plaintiff filed 14 an Opposition (“Opp’n.”) to which Defendants filed their Reply. ECF Nos. 34, 35. On August 15 15, 2024, Defendants Cornejo and Enworom filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s SAC. None of the Doe 16 Defendants have appeared in the action to date. 17 On December 9, 2024, United States District Judge Linda Lopez referred the matter to 18 this Court. 19 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 20 In September of 2022, Plaintiff experienced an onset of acute psychosis. SAC at 11. He 21 had auditory and visual hallucinations and believed he was being followed. Id. He left his 22 apartment in San Diego, and lost contact with his family and friends. Id. Plaintiff’s parents, 23 who lived out of state, were concerned he had stopped taking his medication and contacted the 24 City of San Diego 911 line, along with the San Diego Police Department (“SDPD”), and the City’s 25 Psychiatric Emergency Response Team (“PERT”). Id. 26 On September 4, 2022, Plaintiff was experiencing an auditory and visual hallucination 27 which caused him to believe a person at the beach was in danger. Id. This led to a brief 1 paramedic and placed on a “5150” hold. Id. at 11-12. At the SDPD Northern Substation he was 2 interviewed by a SDPD detective and Plaintiff “shared details from his paranoia, including his 3 belief that people were trying to break into his apartment.” Id. at 12. The detective stopped 4 the interview due to “Ward’s statements not making any sense.” Id. SDPD officers transported 5 Plaintiff to Scripps Memorial Hospital in La Jolla for treatment of minor injuries and then booked 6 him into the San Diego Central Jail (“SDCJ”). Id. 7 After Plaintiff waited three hours in a holding cell, Plaintiff was “medically screened” by 8 Defendant Stephen Yi (“Yi”), a “registered nurse in the Central Jail Medical Services Division 9 responsible for conducting medical and mental health screening for new inmates in Central Jail.” 10 Id. Plaintiff was showing signs of psychosis, including speaking incoherently, “displayed memory 11 loss, heightened paranoia, and disassociation.” Id. He also had an open laceration on his 12 forehead. Id. Yi failed to document these wounds in violation of policy and merely noted that 13 Plaintiff had been “treated for his wounds.” Id. Yi referred Plaintiff to the medical sick call clinic 14 for the laceration. Id. at 14. Yi did not conduct a mental health screening or make any notes of 15 Plaintiff’s mental condition. Id. Yi included a note for “further assessment by QMPH [Qualified 16 Mental Health Professional].” Id. However, County policy allowed a QMPH up to thirty days to 17 evaluate a psychiatric patient. Id. 18 Yi and Defendant Classification Doe 1, a “classification officer in Central Jail, placed 19 Plaintiff in the Enhanced Observation Housing (“EOH”) but did not put him in a psychiatric or 20 medical unit despite his “obvious and urgent psychosis.” Id. While in the EOH, policy required 21 Plaintiff to be checked on every fifteen minutes and the cell consisted of a room “no bigger than 22 a janitor’s closet” and had only a small window. Id. Defendant Deputy Doe 2 brought Plaintiff 23 to that cell and although he could see that Plaintiff was suffering from a “severe psychosis,” he 24 would not allow Plaintiff to make a phone call which was a violation of San Diego County Sheriff 25 Department (“SDCSD”) policy. Id at 15. 26 In the meantime, Plaintiff’s parents had been trying to locate him and after repeatedly 27 calling various law enforcement agencies, a “missing persons bulletin was issued” for Plaintiff 1 person. Id. Yi then called Plaintiff’s parents who informed Yi of Plaintiff’s mental illness and his 2 need for medication. Id. They also provided Yi with Plaintiff’s medical records and the contact 3 information for his treating psychiatrist in order to follow up with the psychiatrist for medication 4 recommendations. Id. His parents informed Yi that they were concerned that if he did not 5 receive his medication immediately Plaintiff would suffer even more severe psychosis. Id. Yi 6 did not review Plaintiff’s medical records nor did he call Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist. Id. at 7 16. Yi also did not update Plaintiff’s jail medical records to reflect any of the information given 8 by Plaintiff’s parents. Id. Yi did not update Classification Doe 1 about Plaintiff’s medical needs 9 or contact his supervisor Defendant Medical Supervisor Doe 3 to reassess Plaintiff’s housing 10 assignment. Id. 11 From September 4, 2022 to September 9, 2022, Plaintiff was not visited by any nurses 12 or given any medication but was instead left naked in his cell, with no blanket, and not given 13 any water to drink. Id. As a result, he “became dehydrated and severely ill with pneumonia, 14 bacteremia, and a lung infection.” Id. Plaintiff claims he “contracted the haemophiles influenzae 15 bacteria (“H. influenzae”)” which resulted in flu like symptoms including “fever, chest pain, 16 coughing, and difficulty breathing.” Id. at 13. 17 Yi, Medical Supervisor Doe 3, Medical Doe 4, Defendant Nurse Practitioner Emiliza 18 Cornejo1 (“Cornejo”), and Defendant Registered Nurse Carina Echon (“Echon”) were required 19 to conduct assessments on Plaintiff “every twenty-four (24) hours while he was in EOH per SDSD 20 [Medical Services Division (“MSD”)] policy.” Id. at 17. They failed to conduct any assessment 21 for four days, September 5, 6, 7, and 8. Id. They did not visit Plaintiff nor did they make any 22 entries into his medical records during that timeframe. Id. They also failed to order Plaintiff’s 23 prescriptions or contact his treating psychiatrist. Id. at 18. However, when Plaintiff’s parents 24 called the Central Jail on September 5th, they were informed that Plaintiff was being treated by 25 medical staff and Defendant Medical Doe 4 confirmed they had received his outside medical 26 records and prescriptions from the parents. Id. at 17. Medical Doe 4 did not document the call 27 1 in Plaintiff’s records nor did any Defendant reach out to Plaintiff’s parents after September 5th. 2 Id. In addition, Yi, Medical Supervisor Doe 3, Medical Doe 4, Cornejo, and Echon deliberately 3 failed to notify Psychiatrist Janet Medenwald-Hogg, M.D., the QMHP contracted with the San 4 Diego Sheriff’s Department to provide psychiatric evaluations, of Plaintiff’s immediate psychiatric 5 needs. Id. 6 Deputy Does 2, 5, and 6 were all “custodial officers/Deputies” who were responsible for 7 “checking on” Plaintiff. Id. at 18. They viewed his cell from the window of his cell door but 8 never entered his cell to provide clothing, blankets, or give him “adequate food and water.” Id. 9 They did observe Plaintiff was “agitated, speaking incoherently, and physically ailing.” Id. They 10 also observed he was “ill, lethargic, coughing, having trouble breathing,” as well as “moaning in 11 pain.” Id. However, they did not inform Yi, Classification Doe 1, Medical Supervisor Doe 3, 12 Medical Doe 4, or their supervisor Deputy Supervisor Doe 7 of Plaintiff’s deteriorating condition 13 or “summon immediate medical care.” Id. 14 On September 9th, five days after Yi had requested a medical examination for Plaintiff, 15 Cornejo conducted a medical examination on Plaintiff for his “head laceration above his left eye 16 and knee scrape.” Id. at 19. Cornejo did not enter the cell to examine Plaintiff and observed his 17 condition from outside his cell. Id. She reported that Plaintiff was “lying in bed” and noted 18 “NAD” which is an acronym for “no abnormality detected.” Id. Both Cornejo and Deputy Doe 19 observed that Plaintiff was laying on his bed and his “breathing was shallow.” Id. 20 As a result of the lack of medical care, Plaintiff “developed sepsis due to the pneumonia 21 and H. influenzae.” Id. at 20. He was suffering from “acute respiratory failure,” limited oxygen 22 supply, and became “severely ill, feverish, and aspirated on his own vomit.” Id. He also suffered 23 from a pulmonary embolism and “developed metabolic encephalopathy – delirium and loss of 24 consciousness due to toxicity and lack of oxygen to his brain.” Id. 25 Plaintiff then suffered a seizure which resulted in “bilateral posterior shoulder dislocation” 26 which is a “rare occasion where both shoulders are dislocated toward the back of the body” 27 which is “almost always the result of seizures.” Id. Plaintiff had no history of seizures. Id. 1 after Cornejo and Deputy Doe came to his cell. Id. 2 On the afternoon of September 10, Echon found Plaintiff unresponsive on the floor of his 3 cell. Id. He was “exhibiting seizure-like symptoms, foaming at the mouth, and was 4 unresponsive.” Id. Echon checked his vital signs, found them to be abnormal, and Plaintiff was 5 transported to UC San Diego Hospital (“UCSD”) and admitted into the “Surgical Intensive Care 6 Unit (“SICU”) around 2:30 p.m.” Id Plaintiff was paralyzed on his left side, bleeding was found 7 in the left side of his brain, and he had two additional seizures while at UCSD. Id. at 21. 8 While at UCSD, Plaintiff was diagnosed with “complete posterior shoulder dislocation” and 9 a “reverse Hills-Sachs lesion (bone fracture)” which was treated with a “closed shoulder 10 reduction” on September 14. Id. On September 15, a UCSD psychiatrist diagnosed Plaintiff with 11 “schizoaffective disorder and prescribed medication.” Id. It was later discovered his right 12 shoulder was also dislocated and they performed a second “closed shoulder reduction.” Id. The 13 doctors ordered arm slings for Plaintiff due to his increased risk for further dislocations and 14 noted he would need shoulder reconstruction surgery in the future. Id. UCSD updated the 15 Central Jail of Plaintiff’s diagnoses and treatments. Id. 16 On September 20, Plaintiff was transported to Tri-City Medical Center where he stayed 17 until September 27 to “complete IV antibiotics.” Id. While he was at Tri-City he was handcuffed 18 to his bed and SDSD custodial officers were in his room at all times. Id. Plaintiff was discharged 19 back to Central Jail on September 27 to be housed in a “Medical Observation Bed (“MOB”).” Id. 20 at 22. The Central Jail medical staff were aware of Plaintiff’s physical limitations which included 21 “dislocated shoulders, slings, limited Range of Motion (“ROM”), shoulder pain, weakness, 22 inability to get up from the floor by himself, continued infection and need for antibiotics, 23 psychiatric diagnosis, medical and psychiatric prescriptions, and the recommended follow-up 24 care.” Id. 25 Plaintiff was assigned a cell with two cellmates and “given the top (third) bunk.” Id. 26 However, he could not climb up to his bed due to his arms being in slings, “so he had the 27 mattress moved down to the floor and slept there, instead.” Id. Because Plaintiff was unable 1 Plaintiff was evaluated by a QMHP for the first time. Id. The QMHP spoke with Plaintiff’s 2 attorney who informed him of Plaintiff’s mental health needs and prescriptions again. Id. 3 Plaintiff was not given a medical wrist band and as a result, he would not receive his 4 medication when medical staff “made their rounds” dispensing medication. Id. Because of the 5 lack of medication, Plaintiff “experienced increased blood pressure, insomnia, worsened shoulder 6 pain, and declining mental health.” Id. When he asked for his medication, Plaintiff was ignored 7 by medical staff. Id. Two days later he was finally given a medical wrist band. Id. 8 On September 30, Plaintiff was “punched in the face and chest by his cellmate.” Id. at 9 23. After reporting this incident, Plaintiff was removed from his cell and transferred to the 10 George Bailey Detention Facility (“GBDF”). Id. Defendant Nurse Practitioner Ozioma Enworom2 11 (“Enworom”) conducted a “sparse” medical screening of Plaintiff and wrote “inadequate” notes.” 12 Id. Enworom did not refer Plaintiff to the medical or psychiatric units despite his “obvious 13 medical needs” and “documented psychiatric needs.” Id. Enworom did not conduct a mental 14 health screening on Plaintiff. Id. 15 Enworom and Classification Doe 8, a GBDF classification officer, knew Plaintiff had been 16 assaulted by a cellmate and was at risk for further attacks. Id. They also knew of both Plaintiff’s 17 psychiatric and medical needs. Id. Regardless, they assigned Plaintiff to be housed with “violent 18 inmates” instead of housing him in a medical or psychiatric unit. Id. 19 Deputy Doe 9 brought Plaintiff to a “general population dorm-style ‘pod’” where he was 20 “again assigned a top-level bunk.” Id. Plaintiff told Deputy Doe 9 that he could not climb up to 21 the top bunk with his arms in slings and he was told to “lay his mattress on the floor.” Id. 22 Deputy Doe “greenlighted” Plaintiff by “signaling to inmate gang members that they could beat” 23 Plaintiff. Id. at 24. This was done by Deputy Doe 9 purposefully bringing Plaintiff in front of 24 these inmates with his “MOB” wristband, making eye contact with the inmates, and “nodd[ing] 25 his head to the gang members – indicating that they had permission to beat [Plaintiff].” Id. 26 Deputy Doe 9 and Deputy Doe 10 also informed these inmates of the Plaintiff’s alleged crime, 27 1 the altercation at the beach, knowing that they would “want to beat [Plaintiff] for his alleged 2 crime.” Id. These deputies told the inmates that they were permitted to beat Plaintiff and they 3 would not intervene. Id. 4 After the deputies left, one of the inmates “slapped [Plaintiff] across the face, knocking 5 him to the ground.” Id. Several inmates then took Plaintiff into the showers, “backed him in a 6 corner,” “punched him in the jaw several times and then smashed his head into the wall.” Id. 7 Plaintiff suffered a fractured “left mandible” and a “laceration to his right forehead.” Id. Plaintiff 8 believes Deputy Does 9 and 10 “watched” or “deliberately failed to surveil” and “deliberately did 9 not intervene in the beating.” Id. “After the beating, Deputies gathered [Plaintiff] from the 10 showers” and his “slings were soaked with blood,” discarded and not replaced. Id. at 25. Deputy 11 Doe 10 told Plaintiff “next time you’re at the beach, keep your hands to yourself.” Id. 12 Plaintiff was taken to Alvarado Hospital where he received stitches for his laceration. Id. 13 On October 1, Plaintiff was transferred to Scripps Mercy Hospital where he was diagnosed with 14 a fractured left jaw and a “closed reduction” was performed on his mandible. Id. Plaintiff’s jaw 15 was “banded shut, requiring immobility for three (3) weeks.” Id. He was discharged from this 16 hospital on October 5 and a hospital psychiatrist “ordered [Plaintiff] discharged to the jail 17 psychiatric inpatient unit due to [Plaintiff’s] declining mental health, admitted suicidality, 18 and risk of further physical harm from inmates.” Id. 19 Plaintiff returns to the Central Jail where he is screened by a psychiatrist. Id. The 20 psychiatrist recommends placement in the EOH, as well as “prompt psychiatric follow-up and 21 screening . . . prior to release.” Id. at 25-26. However, a Classification Deputy never placed 22 him in the EOH and Plaintiff never received a psychiatric screening prior to his release from the 23 Central Jail. Id. at 26. Instead, he was placed in a MOB. Id. He was still in pain and could not 24 dress without the assistance of his cellmates. Id. Plaintiff repeatedly had to ask for dental wax 25 to protect his gums from the metal implanted in his mouth to wire his jaw shut but he was given 26 only “small bits of dried wax.” Id. Plaintiff was also directed to use a “waterpik” style flosser as 27 his only means to clean his mouth three times a day but was only allowed to use one “sparingly” 1 The hospital prescribed a liquid diet for Plaintiff which included “Ensure nutrition shakes 2 three (3) times per day for proper caloric intake” but the medical staff only provided “gelatin 3 cups and milk for his meals – nutritionally insufficient for his size and needs.” Id. Plaintiff 4 became malnourished and had to file grievances to receive Ensure shakes. Id. He did not receive 5 the prescribed three shakes per day and on one occasion, the deputies split one shake among 6 several inmates. Id. at 27. As a result of the deficient nutrition, Plaintiff lost twenty pounds in 7 six weeks. Id. In addition, medical staff failed to give Plaintiff his pain medication as prescribed 8 and were inconsistent when they did provide him the medication. Id. Medical staff ignored 9 Plaintiff when he asked for his medication causing him to go more than twelve hours without 10 pain medication causing him to suffer pain and lose sleep. Id. While he notified medical staff 11 of the pain in his shoulders, they never gave him slings to wear. Id. at 27-28. 12 After Plaintiff requested x-rays of his shoulders, Deputies brought him to a holding cell 13 where he was left for six hours with no food or water before x-rays were taken on October 10. 14 Id. at 28. Plaintiff believes that he was kept in the holding cell for six hours in retaliation for 15 filing grievances and requesting medical care. Id. Plaintiff never received the results of the x- 16 rays that were taken and he received no follow up medical care for his shoulder pain. Id. Deputy 17 “Jones” told Plaintiff in front of his cellmates “[w]e know you know there’s nothing wrong with 18 your shoulders.” Id. 19 Plaintiff’s criminal defense attorney advocated for his conditional release to a psychiatric 20 facility on October 17, 2022. Id. While at the psychiatric facility, Plaintiff was “given all of his 21 medications, a proper diet, and he felt physically and mentally safe.” Id. The medical doctors 22 at the facility also diagnosed Plaintiff with “infectious ulcers in his mouth and prescribed 23 antibiotics.” Id. at 29. When Plaintiff completed his “court-ordered psychiatric stay on 24 December 9,” he was “released straight into surgery to reconstruct his shoulders.” Id. 25 MOTION TO DISMISS 26 A. Legal Standard 27 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss on 1 to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” 2 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001); Bryan v. City of Carlsbad, 207 F. Supp. 3d 3 1107, 1114 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2018). 4 Because Rule 12(b)(6) focuses on the “sufficiency” of a claim rather than the claim’s 5 substantive merits, “a court may [ordinarily] look only at the face of the complaint to decide a 6 motion to dismiss,” Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002), 7 including the exhibits attached to it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument 8 that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”); Hal Roach Studios, 9 Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Amfac Mortg. 10 Corp. v. Ariz. Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[M]aterial which is properly 11 submitted as part of the complaint may be considered” in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 12 dismiss.) 13 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 14 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 15 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Villa v. 16 Maricopa Cnty., 865 F.3d 1224, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 2017). A claim is facially plausible “when the 17 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 18 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plausibility requires 19 pleading facts, as opposed to conclusory allegations or the “formulaic recitation of the elements 20 of a cause of action,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, which rise above the mere conceivability or 21 possibility of unlawful conduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 22 959-60 (9th Cir. 2013). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 23 mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While a pleading “does not 24 require ‘detailed factual allegations,’” Rule 8 nevertheless “demands more than an unadorned, 25 the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 26 550 U.S. at 555). 27 Therefore, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 1 consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility 2 of entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation and quotes omitted). 3 B. Request for Judicial Notice 4 Defendants seek judicial notice of the claim filed by Plaintiff with the County of San Diego 5 on February 27, 2023 and the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department Medical Services Division 6 Operations Manual, Section E.5.1, dated November 4, 2022 regarding “Mental Health Screen 7 and Evaluation.” ECF No. 29-2. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, judicial notice is 8 appropriate when a fact is not subject to reasonable dispute because it is either generally known 9 within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction or can be accurately and readily determined from 10 sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Plaintiff does not object to 11 Defendants’ request, nor does there appear to be a “reasonable dispute” as to the accuracy of 12 these records. Accordingly, Defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted. 13 C. Doe Defendants 14 Defendants move to dismiss the “doe” defendants in this matter and argue that the 15 Plaintiff’s use of Doe pleadings is improper “especially where a plaintiff alleges constitutional 16 violations under Section 1983.” MTD at 14 (citing Keavney v. Cty. of San Diego, 2020 WL 17 4192286, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. July 21, 2020)). Defendants assert that in actions brought pursuant 18 to Section 1983, the Plaintiff must “allege specific facts showing how each particular doe 19 defendant violated his rights.” Id. Here, Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s SAC lacks specific 20 facts linking individual Doe defendants to the alleged constitutional violations, arguing that 21 “group pleading” or “collective pleading” of defendants’ wrongdoing is not permitted with regard 22 to both state and federal law claims brought in federal court. Id. at 15 (citing Shine v. Fuston, 23 2021 WL 4460885, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2021)). 24 In response, Plaintiff argues that he has properly set forth factual allegations against the 25 Doe defendants with the required specificity. Opp’n at 14. Plaintiff asserts that throughout the 26 SAC there are specific allegations about individual doe defendants and the specific actions they 27 took that allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff maintains that the SAC “gives 1 at 15 (citing Lomeli v. Cnty of San Diego, 627 F.Supp.3d 1046, 1056 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (“[T]he 2 complaint [must] ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the … claim is and the grounds upon 3 which it rests.’”). 4 Generally, the use of Doe pleading is disfavored. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 5 (9th Cir. 1980). However, the Ninth Circuit has established that when the identity of alleged 6 defendants is unknown at the time of filing a complaint, plaintiffs should be given an opportunity 7 through discovery to identify these unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would 8 not uncover the identities or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds. Wakefield 9 v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642); Estate of 10 Osuna v. County of Stanislaus, 392 F.Supp.3d 1162, 1169 (E.D. Cal. June 25, 2019). 11 Defendants rely on a case in which a court in this District dismissed Doe defendants due 12 to the lack of specific identification and the absence of a reasonable expectation that would 13 reveal their identities. Thomas v. Cty. of San Diego, 2021 WL 2715086, at* 3 (S.D. Cal. July 1, 14 2021). In Thomas, the district court found that the plaintiff had named twenty unknown 15 defendants as “Does” and the amended complaint “vaguely claims that all twenty Doe 16 Defendants acted negligently.” Id. Therefore, the district court dismissed these defendants 17 because the plaintiff did “not link any particular negligent act to any specific individual actor.” 18 Id. 19 In this case, however, Plaintiff has identified the Doe defendants with specificity, i.e. 20 Classification Does 1 and 8, Deputy Does, Medical Supervisor Does 3, 7, and 11, and alleged 21 actions taken by them, along with the dates on which these actions allegedly took place. See 22 generally SAC. Plaintiff has provided sufficient detail to allow for the reasonable identification 23 of the Doe defendants and the Court finds that discovery is likely to reveal the identities of these 24 Doe defendants. Moreover, “defendants do not contend that discovery will not uncover the 25 identities of the Doe defendants.” Estate of Osuna, 392 F.Supp.3d at 1169. Accordingly, the 26 Court recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Doe defendants be DENIED. 27 / / / 1 D. First Cause of Action Fourteenth Amendment Deliberate Indifference to 2 Medical Needs/Conditions of Confinement pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 3 Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to support his first cause 4 of action which is a claim for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs under the 5 Fourteenth Amendment. MTD at 16. “[C]laims for violations of the right to adequate medical 6 care ‘brought by pretrial detainees against individual defendants under the Fourteenth 7 Amendment’ must be evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard.” Gordon v. 8 Cty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 9 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016)). Therefore, “the plaintiff must ‘prove more than negligence 10 but less than subjective intent - something akin to reckless disregard.’” Id In addition, “[j]ail 11 officials have a duty to ensure that detainees are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, 12 sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Shorter v. Baca, 895 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 13 2018). 14 Under Gordon, in order to state a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference to a 15 serious medical need claim, a pre-trial detainee such as Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to 16 show that: 17 (i) [each] defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions 18 under which [he] was confined; (ii) those conditions put [him] at substantial risk 19 of suffering serious harm; (iii) [each] defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the 20 circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making 21 the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking 22 such measures, [each] defendant caused [his] injuries. Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125. 23 Defendants Yi and Echon3 argue Plaintiff “asserts various unsupported theories in which 24 individual defendants are clumped together in an attempt to support his claim for deliberate 25

26 27 3 The motion currently before the Court was brought only on behalf of the County of San Diego, Defendant Yi, and Defendant Echon. The other named Defendants have not moved to dismiss 1 indifference” and the “twenty theories” listed in his SAC “do not amount to the strict deliberate 2 indifference standard.” MTD at 17. Defendants also claim Plaintiff’s SAC merely contains 3 “buzzwords and legal conclusions.” Id. 4 The Court disagrees. Plaintiff’s SAC sets forth a number of specific and plausible factual 5 allegations with regard to Defendants Yi and Echon which adequately state a claim for deliberate 6 indifference to his serious medical and mental health care needs. Plaintiff alleges that both 7 Defendants made intentional decisions regarding his medical care, mental health care, and the 8 conditions of his confinement. For example, Plaintiff alleges Yi failed to properly treat him when 9 he first arrived at the Central Jail and did not conduct a mental health screening despite Plaintiff’s 10 apparent mental health crisis. SAC at 13. Both Yi and Echon are alleged to have been required 11 to conduct nursing assessments on Plaintiff every twenty-four hours by jail policy but failed to 12 provide Plaintiff any medical attention for four days. Id. at 17. Yi allegedly did not enter any 13 information into Plaintiff’s jail medical records regarding his mental health condition. Id. at 13. 14 Yi, along with another named Defendant, placed Plaintiff in the EOH rather than a psychiatric 15 unit which, pursuant to the County’s policy, allowed for Plaintiff to potentially wait up to thirty 16 (30) days before being seen by a qualified mental health professional (“QMHP”). Id. at 14. 17 Plaintiff also alleges that these Defendants failed to take reasonable measures to lessen 18 the risk to Plaintiff’s medical and mental health. Yi had a conversation with Plaintiff’s parents in 19 the evening of September 4th where they allegedly informed Yi that Plaintiff had a serious 20 mental illness and needed his medication. Id. at 15. Despite allegedly receiving Plaintiff’s 21 medical records from his parents and contact information for his treating psychiatrist, Yi did not 22 update Plaintiff’s jail medical records with this information or inform any jail medical staff about 23 Plaintiff’s urgent mental health needs. Id. Yi and Echon also allegedly failed to order Plaintiff’s 24 mental health medications which he claims caused him to “suffer from severe psychosis, become 25 gravely ill with pneumonia, and have a seizure.” Id. at 32. Yi and Echon both allegedly failed 26 to “summon medical care in the face of obvious signs that [Plaintiff’s] health was deteriorating 27 dangerously” including “disorganized thinking, confusion, altered thought process, nakedness, 1 Defendants’ alleged inaction, despite allegations of the deterioration of Plaintiff’s medical and 2 mental health, demonstrates a failure to take reasonable measures to abate the risk of harm. 3 Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125. 4 Plaintiff also has plausibly alleged that the deterioration of his medical and mental health 5 condition was directly caused by the actions, or inaction, of Defendants. Id. Plaintiff claims that 6 he was housed in a cell, without adequate blankets or clothes, that was “filthy, collecting 7 garbage and biological waste.” SAC at 16. As a result of the conditions in this cell, he “became 8 dehydrated and severely ill with “pneumonia, bacteremia, and a lung infection.” Id. at 16. 9 Plaintiff seeks to hold Yi and Echon liable because he alleges that they were “responsible for 10 checking” on him and administering his medical care and if they had fulfilled these duties, they 11 would have been aware of the conditions that he was being subjected to and provided necessary 12 care. Id. However, because they allegedly failed in their obligations to monitor Plaintiff, he 13 developed worsening medical conditions arising from the conditions of his confinement. Id. 14 Based on these factual allegations, Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that 15 both Yi and Echon failed to provide adequate mental and medical health care to Plaintiff and 16 were objectively deliberately indifferent to his mental and medical health care needs. Gordon, 17 888 F.3d at 1125. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendant Yi and Echon’s motion 18 to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s mental and 19 medical health needs be DENIED. 20 E. Second Cause of Action Fourteenth Amendment Failure to Protect 21 Defendants County, Yi and Echon move to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment failure to 22 protect claims found in Plaintiff’s second cause of action in the SAC. MTD at 18-19. However, 23 this “cause of action is asserted against George Bailey Defendants DEPUTY DOES 9 and 10 and 24 DEPUTY SUPERVISOR DOE 11.” SAC at 44. Defendants County, Yi, and Echon are not named 25 in this cause of action. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendant County, Yi and 26 Echon’s motion to dismiss this claim be denied without prejudice. 27 / / / 1 F. Qualified Immunity 2 Defendants Yi and Echon argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because 3 “Plaintiff has failed to plead a constitutional violation under the Fourteenth Amendment” and he 4 will be “hard pressed” to “identify clear precedent concerning the same alleged constitutional 5 violations under circumstances similar to his.” MTD at 20-21. 6 “Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct 7 violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 8 have known.’” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 9 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). When presented with a qualified immunity defense, the central 10 questions for the court are: (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to 11 Plaintiff, demonstrate that the Defendants conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right; 12 and (2) whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time it is alleged to have been 13 violated. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Although Saucier originally required the 14 Court to answer these questions in order, the U.S. Supreme Court has since held that “while the 15 sequence set forth [in Saucier] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as 16 mandatory.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 17 A right is “clearly established” when its contours are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable 18 official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id at 202. “The Supreme 19 Court has ‘repeatedly … stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest 20 possible stage of litigation.” Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 21 Hunter v. Bryan , 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)). However, the Ninth Circuit has found that 22 “[d]etermining claims of qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage raises special 23 problems for legal decision making.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2018). 24 “When, as here, defendants assert qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss under Rule 25 12(b)(6), dismissal is not appropriate unless we can determine, based on the complaint itself, 26 that qualified immunity applies.” O’Brien v. Welty, 818 F.3d 920, 936 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation 27 omitted)). 1 Here, because the Court has found that the findings set forth above demonstrate that 2 Plaintiff has alleged plausible allegations sufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim, it 3 would be premature and inappropriate for the Court to find that Defendants are entitled to 4 qualified immunity at this stage. “Once an evidentiary record has been developed through 5 discovery, defendants will be free to move for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.” 6 Id. Moreover, the Court notes that Defendants attempt to frame the factual allegations in the 7 light most favorable to Defendants when they argue “Plaintiff must identify case law concerning 8 an individual who was medically cleared for booking” and “promptly sent to the hospital for 9 treatment upon suffering illness and/or injury, and yet the medical and/or sworn staff were 10 somehow found to have violated the person’s constitutional rights.” MTD at 21. This framing 11 of the factual allegations does not accurately present the facts set forth in the SAC. The standard 12 for a motion to dismiss requires the Court to consider the facts in the light most favorable to 13 Plaintiff, not the Defendants, so the Court declines to adopt the Defendants’ argument. 14 Here, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care as a pretrial 15 detainee was clearly established at the time of Defendants’ actions. See Gordon, 888 F.3d 1118. 16 The Ninth Circuit held that claims for violations of the right to adequate medical care brought 17 by pretrial detainees must be evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard. Id. 18 Moreover, in Sandoval v. County of San Diego, the Ninth Circuit denied qualified immunity based 19 on facts similar to those alleged in this action. Sandoval v. County of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657 20 (9th Cir. 2021). In Sandoval, the Ninth Circuit considered whether under established case law 21 as set forth in Gordon, a reasonable nurse would have understood that “failing to check on the 22 [pretrial detainee] for hours and failing to pass on information about his condition …, ‘presented 23 a substantial risk of harm to [pretrial detainee] that the failure to act was unconstitutional.” Id. 24 at 678. The Ninth Circuit held that the Plaintiff “demonstrated that the available law [Gordon] 25 was clearly established as to the reasonableness of the nurses’ conduct.” Id. Here, both Yi and 26 Echon are alleged to have failed to check on Plaintiff for several days, or at the very least, failed 27 to check on him within a twenty-four hour period which is very similar to the facts in Sandoval, 1 The Court recommends that Defendants Yi and Echon’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC 2 on qualified immunity grounds be denied without prejudice. 3 G. Monell Liability 4 Defendant County of San Diego (“County”) argues that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently 5 allege Monell liability against the County. MTD at 21-23. To state a claim against the County 6 of San Diego, Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right, (2) 7 the County has a policy, custom, or practice which amounted to deliberate indifference to that 8 constitutional right; and (3) the policy, custom, or practice was the moving force behind the 9 constitutional violation. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900–01 (9th Cir. 2011) 10 (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). “[A] local government may not 11 be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell, 436 U.S. 12 at 694. Instead, a local government may be sued when an employee who committed a 13 constitutional violation was “acting pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy, longstanding 14 practice or custom, or as a final policymaker.” Thomas v. Cnty. of Riverside, 763 F.3d 1167, 15 1170 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). 16 A municipal entity is liable under section 1983 only if Plaintiff alleges his constitutional 17 injury was caused by employees acting pursuant to the municipality’s policy or custom. Mt. 18 Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; 19 Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 964 (9th Cir. 2008). The County of San 20 Diego may not be held vicariously liable under section 1983 simply based on allegedly 21 unconstitutional acts of its employees. See Board of Cty. Comm’rs. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 22 (1997); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (“[A] a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it 23 employs a tortfeasor.”); Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 2014). Instead, the 24 municipality may be held liable “when execution of a government’s policy or custom ... inflicts 25 the injury.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Los Angeles Cty., Cal. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 36 (2010). 26 “The ‘first inquiry in any case alleging municipal liability under § 1983 is the question whether 27 there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional 1 (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989)). 2 Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged Monell liability because Plaintiff’s claims 3 are based on alleged unconstitutional policies for incarcerated individuals with mental illnesses 4 but his “alleged injuries or damages as described in his SAC have nothing to do with his mental 5 illness or how he was treated for his mental illness” while housed in the SDCJ and GBDF. MTD 6 at 21. Plaintiff disagrees and cites to the County Policy, Medical Services Division policy E.5.1, 7 which “allowed a thirty (30) day waiting period for Plaintiff to be evaluated by a psychiatrist” or 8 “qualified medical health professional.” Opp’n at 21. Plaintiff alleges that this policy allowing 9 such a lengthy waiting period to be treated for his mental illness was the cause of his 10 “deterioration and illness.” Id. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that the County was well aware of 11 mental health staffing shortages and failed to maintain adequate mental health care staffing 12 levels during his detention. Id. Plaintiff also alleges that the County lacked a policy or policies 13 requiring continuity of care and that mental health prescriptions and medications for new 14 detainees be processed appropriately so the required medication and care is provided to the 15 new detainee in a timely manner. Plaintiff argues that the County’s failures in these regards 16 resulted in him not obtaining his medications and other mental health treatment in a timely 17 manner which caused him to be unable to manage his health leading him to “suffer from severe 18 psychosis, become gravely ill with pneumonia, and have a seizure.” SAC at 32. 19 Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff is unable to allege that his “incident was anything 20 more than a one-off,” is contradicted by Plaintiff’s allegations of similar incidents in the SDCJ 21 involving two inmate deaths due to similar neglect allegedly experienced by Plaintiff. MTD at 22 22, Opp’n at 22. Plaintiff cites to two other actions involving the death of detainees who 23 allegedly “died from urgent medical issues in Central Jail due to Deputies not checking on them, 24 leaving them alone in unsanitary cells, and medical staff deliberately ignoring their obvious 25 illnesses.” Opp’n at 22 citing SAC at 37. The Court finds that these allegations plausibly allege 26 that employees acted pursuant to the County’s policy, practices, and customs which allegedly 27 gave rise to the constitutional violations alleged by Plaintiff. 1 Based on the allegations set forth in Plaintiff’s SAC, the Court finds that Plaintiff has 2 sufficiently alleged a Monell claim against the County and recommends that Defendants’ motion 3 to dismiss this claim be denied. 4 H. Bane Act 5 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s factual allegations do not support a violation of the Bane 6 Act. MTD at 23-24. Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that any 7 of the named Defendants violated his constitutional rights and he must plead “something 8 than deliberate indifference to his medical needs in order to state a Bane Act claim.” Id. at 23 9 (emphasis in original). 10 The Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (“Bane Act”), California Civil Code § 52.1, provides in part: 11 (b) If a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by 12 threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, 13 or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights 14 secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, the Attorney General, or any 15 district attorney or city attorney may bring a civil action for injunctive and other 16 appropriate equitable relief in the name of the people of the State of California, in order to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured. 17 18 (c) Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the Constitution 19 or laws of this state, has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, 20 as described in subdivision (b), may institute and prosecute in their own name and 21 on their own behalf a civil action for damages, including, but not limited to, damages under Section 52, injunctive relief, and other appropriate equitable relief 22 to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured. 23 Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a)–(c). 24 As set forth above, the Court has found that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that 25 Defendants violated his constitutional rights so Defendants’ first argument is not meritorious. 26 Defendants’ second argument is that Plaintiff must allege “something more” than deliberate 27 indifference to state a claim under the Bane Act. MTD at 23 (citing Cisneros v. Vangilder, 2019 1 WL 285800, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2019) (“In light of Allen, the Court must determine whether 2 Plaintiffs have [sufficiently alleged that] there was coercion independent form the alleged 3 deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ serious medical needs”) (quoting Allen v. City of Sacramento, 4 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 68 (2015)). Defendants do not address the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Reese 5 v. County of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018). 6 In Reese, the Ninth Circuit held that “the Bane Act does not require the ‘threat, 7 intimidation[,] or coercion’ element of the claim to be transactionally independent from the 8 constitutional violation alleged’ so long as the plaintiff shows the defendant had a “specific 9 intent” to commit the constitutional violation. Id. As a result, “[m]ultiple district courts have 10 adopted the position that ‘a prisoner who successfully proves that prison officials acted or failed 11 to act with deliberate indifference to his medical needs ... adequately states a claim for relief 12 under the Bane Act.’ ” Galley v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 2023 WL 4534205, at *5–6 (E.D. Cal. July 13 13, 2023) (quoting M.H. v. Cnty. of Alameda, 90 F. Supp. 3d 889, 899 (N.D. Cal. 2013)); 14 Lapachet v. California Forensic Med. Grp., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1195 (E.D. Cal. 2018) 15 (finding “that threats, coercion and intimidation are inherent in deliberate indifference claims” 16 and that “Plaintiffs bringing Bane Act claims for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs 17 must only allege prison officials knowingly deprived them of a constitutional right or protection 18 through acts that are inherently coercive and threatening, such as housing a prisoner in an 19 inappropriate cell, failing to provide treatment plans or adequate mental health care, and failing 20 to provide sufficient observations.”) (quotation omitted). The Court agrees with the reasoning 21 set forth in Reese and the cited district court cases. 22 Here, as discussed above, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for 23 deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Defendants County, Yi, and Echon and 24 the Court finds that the same alleged facts are sufficient to state a claim for a Bane Act violation 25 against the three Defendants. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendants’ motion to 26 dismiss Plaintiff’s claim brought under the Bane Act be DENIED. 27 / / / 1 I. California Government Code Section 845.6 2 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim brought pursuant to California Government 3 Code Section 845.6 which provides in part: 4 Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury proximately caused 5 by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in 6 his custody; but, …, a public employee, and the public entity where the employee is acting within the scope of his employment, is liable if the employee knows or 7 has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he 8 fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care. 9 Cal. Govt. Code § 845.6. 10 “In order to state a claim under § 845.6, a prisoner must establish three elements: (1) 11 the public employee knew or had reason to know of the need (2) for immediate medical care, 12 and (3) failed to reasonably summon such care.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 13 2006). “Liability under section 845.6 is limited to serious and obvious medical conditions 14 requiring immediate care.” Watson v. State, 21 Cal.App.4th 836, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 262, 265 15 (Ct.App.1993). The California Court of Appeal clarified that § 845.6 “is very narrowly written to 16 authorize a cause of action against a public entity for its employees’ failure to summon 17 immediate medical care only, not for a certain employee’s malpractice in providing that care.” 18 Castaneda v. Dep’t of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 212 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1071 (2013). 19 Plaintiff argues that because there is a factual dispute over what constitutes “immediate 20 medical care,” which cannot considered in deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court should not 21 dismiss this claim. Opp’n at 24. Castaneda acknowledges that a “public employee’s knowledge 22 of the need for immediate health care and the reasonableness of his or her actions in summoning 23 care are factual questions for the jury.” Castaneda, 212 Cal.App.4th at 1073. Defendants argue 24 that when Plaintiff was found unresponsive in his cell, there is no dispute that medical attention 25 was “immediately” summoned. MTD at 24. In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendants 26 “ignored Plaintiff’s medical needs for nearly a week” and if they had monitored Plaintiff as they 27 were required, they would have summoned medical attention much sooner. Therefore, 1 When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court is required to consider the alleged facts 2 in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Interpipe Contracting, Inc. v. Becerra, 898 F.3d 879, 3 886-87 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and 4 construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff…”). Doing so here, the Court finds that 5 Plaintiff has adequately alleged facts that could plausibly support a violation of the statute. 6 Accordingly, the Court recommends that the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim 7 brought pursuant to Cal. Govt. Code § 845.6 be DENIED. 8 J. Negligence Claim 9 1. Medical Negligence and Medical Malpractice 10 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action includes “multiple theories, 11 including those related to alleged medical malpractice.” MTD at 25. Defendants move to dismiss 12 Plaintiff’s purported medical malpractice claims as these “specific claims are barred” for allegedly 13 failing to comply with the notice requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure § 346(a) and 14 by the one-year statute of limitation of California Code of Civil Procedure § 340.5. Id. at 25-26. 15 In his Opposition, Plaintiff states “[t]o be clear, Plaintiff does not allege any ‘medical negligence’ 16 or ‘medical malpractice’ claims in his SAC.” Opp’n. at 26. The Court accepts this representation 17 by Plaintiff that he does not assert any medical negligence or medical malpractice claims in this 18 action and recommends denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims as moot. The Court 19 also recommends that based on Plaintiff’s representation, Plaintiff be prohibited from asserting 20 any claims for medical negligence or medical malpractice in this action. 21 2. Immunity 22 Defendants argue that all of the individually named Defendants, and therefore the County 23 as well, are “immune from Plaintiff’s claim that they had a duty to investigate Plaintiff’s obvious 24 mental illness.” MTD at 28 (citing Cal. Govt. Code § 855.8(a)). 25 Under § 855.8(a), both public entities and public employees are generally immune from 26 liability for injuries resulting from diagnosing or failing to diagnose mental illness or addiction, 27 or from failing to prescribe for mental illness. Cal. Gov. Code § 855.8(a). However, there are 1 immune from liability for injuries caused by their negligent or wrongful acts in prescribing or 2 administering treatment for mental illness. As Plaintiff correctly points out in his Opposition, he 3 is not alleging that Defendant “failed to diagnose or prescribe for his mental illness.” Opp’n. at 4 23. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants were made aware of Plaintiff’s pre-existing mental 5 health diagnosis and the need for the medications prescribed by his treating physician and that 6 Defendants were negligent in failing to treat his mental health which is an exception to the 7 immunity provision. Opp’n. at 24. 8 As previously stated, at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court is required to consider the 9 facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Interpipe Contracting, Inc., 898 F.3d at 886- 10 87. Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants were provided notice that Plaintiff had a mental 11 health diagnosis, had a treating psychiatrist, had prescriptions for specific medications, and 12 urgently needed to be given the medication. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants failed to 13 provide the required treatment. As such, Plaintiff has stated facts that negate Defendants’ 14 immunity claim and the Court recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims on 15 immunity grounds be DENIED. 16 K. Negligent Supervision and Training 17 Defendant County moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for negligent 18 supervision and training. MTD at 28. The County argues that they can “only be held liable if 19 there is a ‘mandatory duty imposed by enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of 20 a particular kind of injury’” pursuant to California Govt. Code § 815.6. Id. They further claim 21 that Plaintiff “has not alleged any such mandatory duty, and this claim as to the County must 22 be dismissed.” Id. 23 In response, Plaintiff argues that he has alleged a mandatory duty by alleging in the SAC 24 that Defendants “had a duty to properly train and supervise their employees to summon 25 immediate medical care for detainees whom they knew, or had reason to know, required medical 26 care, pursuant to Cal. Gov. Code § 845.6.” Opp’n. at 25; SAC at 63. Plaintiff contends that 27 “[v]iolation of Cal. Govt. Code § 845.6 by an individual officer supports claims for negligent 1 || Resendiz v. Cty. of Monterey, 2015 WL 3988495, at * 8 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2025.) In Resendiz, 2 court stated that the plaintiff adequately alleged a claim of negligent supervision over the 3 county entity concluding that the plaintiff's claims against the county were “viable under Cal. 4 ||Gov't Code § 845.6 to the extent [pl]laintiffs' claims are based on [d]lefendants' alleged 5 negligence in supervising and training their employees regarding the furnishing of medical care.” 6 2015 WL 3988495, at * 8. Based on Plaintiff’s explicit allegations arising from Cal. Gov. Code 7 ||§ 845.6, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged a mandatory duty on the part of 8 || the County and therefore, has adequately stated a negligent supervision and training claim. The 9 || Court recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim be DENIED. 10 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 11 For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Judge 12 ||issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) denying 13 || Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 14 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report must be filed with 15 || the Court and served on all parties no later than February 11, 2025. The document should 16 captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court 18 served on all parties no later than February 18, 2025. The parties are advised that 19 || failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections 20 appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 21 22 ||Dated: 1/28/2025 sobre Me oe 23 Hon. Barbara L. Major United States Maqistrate Judde 24 25 26 27 28 30