Wang v. Villagomez

• Court: District Court, Northern Mariana Islands
• Decided: January 26, 2024
• Docket: 1:21-cv-00014
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

FILED Clerk District Court 2 JAN 26 2024 3 for the Northern fatiana Islands By LA 4 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT (Deputy Clerk) FOR THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS 6 XIAO PING WANG, Case No. 1:21-cv-00014 7 Plaintiff, Vv. DECISION AND ORDER WALLY VILLAGOMEZ, GEORGIA (1) DENYING DEFENDANT 9 CABRERA, KENNETH CAMACHO, _ CAMACHO’S MOTION FOR 10 | individual and official capacities JUDGMENT ON THE P PLEADINGS, AND 1] Defendants. (2) DENYING PLAINTIFF 12 WANG’S MOTIONS 13 14 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Previously, the Court issued its Screening Order for Plaintiff Xiao Ping Wang’s (“Wang”) 17 | First Amended Complaint (““FAC,” ECF No. 5) determining that Wang’s claim for failure to 18 protect against Defendant Kenneth Camacho passed screening under three theories of liability: 42 19 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, gross negligence, and unintended emotional distress. (Screening Order 1, 20 ECF No. 7.) The FAC is premised upon inmate Josh Martin’s assault of Wang on June 21, 2020. 97 | Ud. at 3.) Because Wang asserted that he was a pretrial detainee at the time of the assault, (FAC 23 || 9), the Court concluded that the FAC sufficiently alleged a Fourteenth Amendment violation of 24 | failure to protect (Screening Order 13). Camacho filed his answer on April 25, 2023. (ECF No. 25 11.) Pursuant to several decisions dismissing claims, the remaining cause of action is Wang’s § 26 1983 claim against Camacho in his personal capacity. (See ECF Nos. 18, 30.) 27 /// 28

1 On July 19, 2023, Camacho filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 24)

2 seeking to dismiss the sole remaining cause of action, which is supported by a memorandum of

3 law (Mot., ECF No. 24-1) and criminal judgment of conviction and sentence order from Wang’s

4 Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (“CNMI”) Superior Court action (ECF Nos. 24- 5 2–24-4). Since Wang failed to file a timely opposition to the instant motion pursuant to Local Rule 6 7 7.1(c)(2), the Court vacated the motion hearing. (ECF No. 32.) Over one month after Camacho

8 filed his motion for judgment on the pleadings, Wang filed a one-page submission that appears to

9 be an opposition to Camacho’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, a motion to strike

10 Camacho’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, a motion for appointment of legal counsel, and

11 a motion for summary judgment. (Opp’n, ECF No. 33.) For the reasons stated herein, the Court

12 DENIES Camacho’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and DENIES Wang’s various motions. 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14

15 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early

16 enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Generally,

17 “pleadings are closed for the purposes of Rule 12(c) once a complaint and answer have been filed, 18 assuming, as is the case here, that no counterclaim or cross-claim is made.” Doe v. United States, 19 419 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). “Judgment on the pleadings is properly 20 granted when there is no issue of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to 21 judgment as a matter of law.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). The standard 22 23 for reviewing a 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is “substantially identical” to the 24 standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 25 granted. Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012). The court must accept the 26 factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the 27 non-moving party. Fleming, 581 F.3d at 925. However, conclusory allegations and “formulaic 28 1 recitations of the elements of a cause of action” are insufficient to state a plausible claim. Chavez,

2 683 F.3d at 1108 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

3 “[J]udgment on the pleadings is improper when the district court goes beyond the pleadings

4 to resolve an issue; such a proceeding must properly be treated as a motion for summary 5 judgment.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 6 7 1989); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). “A court may, however, consider certain materials—documents

8 attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of

9 judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”

10 United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).

III. DISCUSSION 12 Camacho requests judgment on the pleadings because Wang “was an inmate, not a pretrial 13 detainee and therefore the proper inquiry of his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) should be 14

15 under the Eighth Amendment” and his “allegations fail as a matter of law as Wang only speculates

16 that he was at a substantial risk of serious harm and that Officer Camacho was aware of that risk

17 and was deliberately indifferent to it.” (Mot. 2.) Before turning to the merits of Camacho’s motion, 18 the Court first addresses two procedural issues. 19 A. Wang’s Opposition 20 Since Wang is presently proceeding pro se, the Court takes this opportunity to remind him 21 that an opposition to a motion is due fourteen days after service of the motion. LR 7.1(c)(2). This 22 23 is the second time that Wang has filed an opposition after the deadline. When a party files an 24 untimely opposition, the Court may disregard and strike the filing, as well as deem the failure to 25 timely file an opposition as “an admission that the motion is meritorious.” Id. At this time, the 26 Court exercises its discretion and considers Wang’s untimely opposition, which also contains 27 various motions. 28 1 B. Judicial Notice

2 Next, the Court considers whether to take judicial notice of Wang’s CNMI Superior Court

3 proceedings.1 A “court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because

4 it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately 5 and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. 6 7 Evid. 201(b). Other courts’ proceedings, even outside the federal judicial system, may be judicially

8 noticed “if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” Trigueros v. Adams, 658

9 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Here, Wang’s CNMI Superior Court action has

10 a direct relation to the instant case as it dictates whether Wang’s claim is analyzed under the Eighth

11 Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the Court takes judicial notice of Wang’s CNMI

12 Superior Court proceeding, in particular, the judgment of conviction and the sentencing and 13 commitment order (ECF Nos. 24-2–24-4). See Lopez v. Swope, 205 F.2d 8, 9 n.2 (9th Cir. 1953) 14

15 (taking judicial notice of case, “which set forth the indictment, conviction and sentences for escape

16 and assault herein referred to”).

17 C. Camacho’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 18 Even treating Wang as an inmate for the purposes of analyzing his FAC, his claim does not 19 fail under the Eighth Amendment analysis for failure to protect. Prison officials are liable in a 20 failure to protect claim only if two requirements are met: “[f]irst, objectively viewed, the prison 21 official’s act or omission must cause ‘a substantial risk of serious harm’” and “[s]econd, the official 22 23 / / / 24 / / 25

26 1 When Camacho’s counsel first filed his motion for judgment on the pleadings, he cited to these CNMI Superior 27 Court orders, yet neglected to provide the Court with copies. Only after the Court’s request did counsel provide such documents. Camacho’s counsel is reminded that cited cases or authorities unavailable on LexisNexis or Westlaw must 28 be attached as an exhibit to the pleading. See LR 5.2(b). 1 must be subjectively aware of that risk and act with ‘deliberate indifference to inmate health or

2 safety.’” Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511

3 U.S. 825, 834, 839-40 (1994)). As to the first requirement, “it is enough for the inmate to

4 demonstrate that he was exposed to a substantial risk of some range of serious harm.” Lemire v. 5 Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). For example, inadequate 6 7 staffing can create an objective risk of substantial harm that is sufficient to satisfy the objective

8 prong. Id. As to the second requirement, deliberate indifference in this context requires “something

9 more than mere negligence.” Cortez, 776 F.3d at 1050. The subjective inquiry is two-fold: first,

10 the inmate “must demonstrate that the risk was obvious or provide other circumstantial or direct

11 evidence that the prison official[] was aware of the substantial risk” and second, the inmate “must

12 show that there was no reasonable justification for exposing the inmate[] to the risk.” Lemire, 726 13 F.3d at 1078. 14

15 With the instant case, Wang pleads sufficient facts in his FAC to satisfy the first element

16 that there was a substantial risk of serious harm. Previously, this Court found that the FAC did

17 state a claim for a Fourteenth Amendment violation for failure to protect, whose elements include 18 the existence of “conditions [that] put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm.” 19 (See Screening Order 12-13 (emphasis added) (quoting Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 20 1060, 1071 (2016) (en banc)); see also ECF No. 3 (concluding that Camacho’s absence from his 21 duty station during the time of the assault “may constitute an objective risk of substantial harm” 22 23 within context of Eighth Amendment analysis (citing Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1078)).) Camacho has 24 not provided authority to rebut this finding. Instead, Camacho’s cited authority supports, rather 25 than undermines, a conclusion that the FAC adequately pleads a substantial risk of serious harm. 26 / / / 27 / / 28 1 In Bartnett v. Fisher, the court concluded that the violation of a prison’s procedure of escorted

2 trips to and from the dining hall was insufficient to demonstrate a substantial risk of serious harm

3 on the date of the assault as the plaintiff there did not demonstrate that the assaulting inmate “was

4 particularly assaultive or aggressive, or that inmate assaults were commonplace during dining-hall 5 release.” No. 1:17-cv-01361, 2020 WL 7182087, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2020), report and 6 7 recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 598536 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2021). With the instant case,

8 Martin, the assaulter, notified Camacho, various supervisors, and a counselor, and wrote numerous

9 sick calls regarding his anxiety and irritation and that this condition caused him to have “violent

10 outburst”. (Martin Decl., ECF No. 5-1.) Therefore, the Court concludes that Wang has alleged

11 sufficient facts to support a plausible finding that there was an objective risk of substantial harm.

12 The second prong of Wang’s claim necessitates showing that Officer Camacho was 13 subjectively aware of the substantial risk of harm and deliberately indifferent to it. Martin, who 14

15 assaulted Wang, states that he specifically informed Camacho that his medication was “causing

16 me anxiety and irritation” and informed other supervisors and individuals of this risk to no avail,

17 which “caused matters worse as my condition progressed and cause me [sic] violent outburst.” 18 (Martin Decl.) Martin expresses remorse but notes that “the incident could have been prevented 19 had [the CNMI Department of Corrections] heeded my pleas for help.” (Id.) Bearing in mind that 20 pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), 21 that all factual allegations are construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the non-moving 22 23 party in this motion for judgment on the pleadings, Fleming, 581 F.3d at 925, and that this 24 subjective element may be demonstrated through circumstantial evidence and inferences, Lemire, 25 726 F.3d at 1078, the Court finds that the FAC sufficiently alleges deliberate indifference. First, 26 / / / 27 / / 28 1 Camacho was on notice of at least Martin’s anxiety and irritation, and it is reasonable to infer the

2 obvious risks of leaving inmates with mental health issues, such as Martin, unsupervised, Lemire,

3 726 F.3d at 1077-78. Second, Camacho left his duty post station in contravention of Inmates and

4 Correctional Facility Rules and Regulations § 57-20.1-2105, which dictates that “[a]n officer shall 5 not leave a duty station during the shift unless given specific permission to do so by the Chief of 6 7

Corrections or the duty officer.”2 Despite Camacho being aware of the substantial risk that Martin

8 posed, Camacho left Martin unsupervised when he abandoned his post.3 Thus, Wang’s allegations

9 meet the legal standard of deliberate indifference required for an Eighth Amendment claim.

10 In sum, the FAC adequately pleads an Eighth Amendment violation of failure to protect.

11 Thus, Defendant Camacho’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is therefore DENIED.

12 D. Wang’s Motions 13 Because the Court denied Camacho’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, Wang’s 14

15 motion to strike Camacho’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED as MOOT.

16 Moreover, Wang’s motion for additional relief lacks any facts or authority to support the requests.

17 Even liberally construing the submission, the Court is unable to ascertain the basis for the requests. 18 Therefore, the Court DENIES Wang’s motion for summary judgment and motion for appointment 19 of counsel.4 20 / / / 21 22

23 2 The FAC erroneously cites to Inmates and Correctional Facility Rules and Regulations § 57-20.1-2101. (FAC ¶ 9.)

24 3 Contrary to Camacho’s assertion, Wang does not need to demonstrate that Camacho knew that Martin would assault Wang in particular. The Supreme Court has noted that “it does not matter whether the risk comes from a single source 25 or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843. 26 4 Wang previously requested appointment of counsel when he filed his FAC, but the Court denied the motion then as 27 he failed to satisfy the standard for appointment of counsel. (Screening Order 25.) The Court also denies the instant motion for appointment of counsel for similar reasons detailed in its prior decision denying Wang’s prior motion for 28 appointment of counsel. 1 | IV. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Camacho’s motion for judgment on the pleadings ; (ECF No. 24) and DENIES Wang’s motions for various relief (ECF No. 33). IT IS SO ORDERED this 26th day of January 2024. 7 wv NRK AY RAMONA V. Mitek 8 Chief Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28