Wang v . NHBd Reg. in Medicine CV-91-685-B 07/12/94 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
John W . Wang, M.D.
v. N o . 91-685-B
New Hampshire Board of Registration in Medicine, et a l .
O R D E R
Dr. John Wang challenges a decision by the New Hampshire
Board of Registration in Medicine to revoke his medical license.1 Presently before me are the parties' cross motions for summary
judgment. Wang argues that he is entitled to summary judgment
because the revocation hearing was so replete with serious
procedural errors that, as a matter of law, the Board violated
his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. The
Board counters that it is entitled to summary judgment on two
grounds: (1) this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
what is essentially an appeal from the New Hampshire Supreme
Court's decision upholding revocation of Wang's license; see District of Columbia Court of Appeals v . Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983); Rooker v . Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); and
(2) the alleged procedural errors had no bearing on the Board's
1 Wang's remaining claims are against the Board's members in their official capacities. For convenience, I refer to these defendants collectively as the "Board." decision because, by statute, it was entitled to summarily revoke
Wang's license for disciplinary actions taken against him in
another jurisdiction. I find the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Rooker and Feldman dispositive, and accordingly do
not address the parties' other arguments.
I. FACTS
1. State Proceedings
In July 1991, the Board began hearings to determine whether
to revoke Wang's license to practice medicine in New Hampshire.
The hearings concluded in October, and in early March 1992, the
Board issued an order revoking Wang's license. Wang then
appealed the Board's order to the New Hampshire Supreme Court,
alleging that the Board members were biased against him; that the hearings were replete with serious procedural errors; and that,
as a result, the Board's revocation decision violated his
Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural due process and equal
protection, as well as his rights under various provisions of the
New Hampshire Constitution. On August 2 6 , 1992, the supreme
court summarily affirmed the Board's order, stating that "the
agency has issued a decision which the Court does not find unjust
or unreasonable and no substantial question of law is presented on appeal." The Court later denied Wang's motion for
reconsideration.
2. Federal Proceedings Shortly after the Board concluded its hearings, Wang brought
the present action in federal court, alleging that the hearings
were rife with serious procedural errors and that, as a result,
the Board had deprived him of his constitutional rights. Wang
sought a temporary injunction prohibiting the Board from taking
any disciplinary action against him; a declaration that the
Board's actions were fundamentally unfair and violated his due
process rights; a permanent injunction prohibiting the Board from
taking any future action against him based on the conduct at
issue in the present disciplinary proceedings; and an award of money damages and reasonable attorneys fees against the
individual board members. Wang thus alleged claims virtually
identical to those he later raised in his Notice of Appeal to the
New Hampshire Supreme Court.
After Wang filed his federal complaint, the Board issued its
decision. This Court then stayed the present proceedings pending
resolution of Wang's appeal. When the New Hampshire Supreme
Court affirmed the Board's decision, the stay was lifted and
3 defendants filed a motion to dismiss Wang's claims. I granted
the motion with respect to all claims other than Wang's claim for
prospective injunctive relief against the Board members in their
official capacities. This latter claim is the subject of the
parties' present motions.
II. DISCUSSION2
Relying on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Board argues
that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Wang's
claim. I agree.
2 I judge the parties' motions against the following standard. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A "genuine" issue is one "that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because [it] may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v . Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 2 4 2 , 250 (1986); accord Garside v . Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 4 6 , 48 (1st Cir. 1990). A "material issue" is one that "affects the outcome of the suit . . . ." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The burden is upon the moving party to aver the lack of a genuine, material factual issue, Finn v . Consolidated Rail Corp., 782 F.2d 1 3 , 15 (1st Cir. 1986), and the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant, according the non-movant all beneficial inferences discernable from the evidence. Oliver v . Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). If a motion for summary judgment is properly supported, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show that a genuine issue exists. Donovan v . Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1516 (1st Cir. 1983).
4 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that the federal
district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review state
court judgments. Rooker, 263 U.S. 415-16; Feldman, 460 U.S. at
482. Unsuccessful state court litigants are thus precluded from
appealing to federal district court rather than petitioning the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. This holds true
regardless of whether the appeal is de jure or de facto. If the
claims raised in federal district court are "inextricably
intertwined" with the state court's decision, i.e., "if the
federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court
wrongly decided the issues before it," the district court must
dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
regardless of the form of action brought. Feldman, 460 U.S. at
483 n.16; Pennzoil v . Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 , 25 (1987)
(Marshall, J., concurring). Here, Wang requests that I declare the Board's decision
invalid and enjoin its enforcement. To grant his request,
however, I must necessarily conclude that the New Hampshire
Supreme Court wrongly affirmed the Board's decision. Wang's
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Wang v . NHBd Reg. in Medicine CV-91-685-B 07/12/94 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
John W . Wang, M.D.
v. N o . 91-685-B
New Hampshire Board of Registration in Medicine, et a l .
O R D E R
Dr. John Wang challenges a decision by the New Hampshire
Board of Registration in Medicine to revoke his medical license.1 Presently before me are the parties' cross motions for summary
judgment. Wang argues that he is entitled to summary judgment
because the revocation hearing was so replete with serious
procedural errors that, as a matter of law, the Board violated
his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. The
Board counters that it is entitled to summary judgment on two
grounds: (1) this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
what is essentially an appeal from the New Hampshire Supreme
Court's decision upholding revocation of Wang's license; see District of Columbia Court of Appeals v . Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983); Rooker v . Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); and
(2) the alleged procedural errors had no bearing on the Board's
1 Wang's remaining claims are against the Board's members in their official capacities. For convenience, I refer to these defendants collectively as the "Board." decision because, by statute, it was entitled to summarily revoke
Wang's license for disciplinary actions taken against him in
another jurisdiction. I find the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Rooker and Feldman dispositive, and accordingly do
not address the parties' other arguments.
I. FACTS
1. State Proceedings
In July 1991, the Board began hearings to determine whether
to revoke Wang's license to practice medicine in New Hampshire.
The hearings concluded in October, and in early March 1992, the
Board issued an order revoking Wang's license. Wang then
appealed the Board's order to the New Hampshire Supreme Court,
alleging that the Board members were biased against him; that the hearings were replete with serious procedural errors; and that,
as a result, the Board's revocation decision violated his
Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural due process and equal
protection, as well as his rights under various provisions of the
New Hampshire Constitution. On August 2 6 , 1992, the supreme
court summarily affirmed the Board's order, stating that "the
agency has issued a decision which the Court does not find unjust
or unreasonable and no substantial question of law is presented on appeal." The Court later denied Wang's motion for
reconsideration.
2. Federal Proceedings Shortly after the Board concluded its hearings, Wang brought
the present action in federal court, alleging that the hearings
were rife with serious procedural errors and that, as a result,
the Board had deprived him of his constitutional rights. Wang
sought a temporary injunction prohibiting the Board from taking
any disciplinary action against him; a declaration that the
Board's actions were fundamentally unfair and violated his due
process rights; a permanent injunction prohibiting the Board from
taking any future action against him based on the conduct at
issue in the present disciplinary proceedings; and an award of money damages and reasonable attorneys fees against the
individual board members. Wang thus alleged claims virtually
identical to those he later raised in his Notice of Appeal to the
New Hampshire Supreme Court.
After Wang filed his federal complaint, the Board issued its
decision. This Court then stayed the present proceedings pending
resolution of Wang's appeal. When the New Hampshire Supreme
Court affirmed the Board's decision, the stay was lifted and
3 defendants filed a motion to dismiss Wang's claims. I granted
the motion with respect to all claims other than Wang's claim for
prospective injunctive relief against the Board members in their
official capacities. This latter claim is the subject of the
parties' present motions.
II. DISCUSSION2
Relying on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Board argues
that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Wang's
claim. I agree.
2 I judge the parties' motions against the following standard. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A "genuine" issue is one "that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because [it] may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v . Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 2 4 2 , 250 (1986); accord Garside v . Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 4 6 , 48 (1st Cir. 1990). A "material issue" is one that "affects the outcome of the suit . . . ." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The burden is upon the moving party to aver the lack of a genuine, material factual issue, Finn v . Consolidated Rail Corp., 782 F.2d 1 3 , 15 (1st Cir. 1986), and the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant, according the non-movant all beneficial inferences discernable from the evidence. Oliver v . Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). If a motion for summary judgment is properly supported, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show that a genuine issue exists. Donovan v . Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1516 (1st Cir. 1983).
4 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that the federal
district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review state
court judgments. Rooker, 263 U.S. 415-16; Feldman, 460 U.S. at
482. Unsuccessful state court litigants are thus precluded from
appealing to federal district court rather than petitioning the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. This holds true
regardless of whether the appeal is de jure or de facto. If the
claims raised in federal district court are "inextricably
intertwined" with the state court's decision, i.e., "if the
federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court
wrongly decided the issues before it," the district court must
dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
regardless of the form of action brought. Feldman, 460 U.S. at
483 n.16; Pennzoil v . Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 , 25 (1987)
(Marshall, J., concurring). Here, Wang requests that I declare the Board's decision
invalid and enjoin its enforcement. To grant his request,
however, I must necessarily conclude that the New Hampshire
Supreme Court wrongly affirmed the Board's decision. Wang's
federal suit is thus "inextricably intertwined" with the state
5 court's disposition of Wang's appeal.3 That he requests
prospective relief is immaterial. The First Circuit has held
that "insofar as the injunctive relief sought ... would be
tantamount to reversal of the [state court order], 'federal
courts do no review state civil proceedings under the guise of
the Civil Rights Act.'" Malachowski v . City of Keene, 787 F.2d
704, 708 (1st C i r . ) , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 828 (1986). I
therefore dismiss Wang's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.4
3 Although Wang filed suit in district court before the Board rendered its decision, and thus necessarily before the New Hampshire Supreme Court's disposition of the case, this does not affect my decision. "A [plaintiff's] deliberate bypass of those procedures that envisioned (ultimately) a reviewable final state- court judgment, itself under Feldman not subject to federal district court review, should not ... entitle the [plaintiff] to a review of his constitutional claims by a federal district court that would have been unavailable to him if he had pursued his claim to final state court judgment." Thomas v . Kadish, 748 F.2d 276, 282 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 907 (1985). 4 Wang makes two arguments beyond those I have implicitly rejected above. First, he contends that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which explicitly authorizes federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings in limited circumstances. This argument is meritless. Section 1983 creates a cause of action for violation of certain federal rights, but only for those violations over which a federal district court otherwise has subject matter jurisdiction. Second, Wang essentially argues that several exceptions to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply with equal force to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. For example, he argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude his
6 III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Wang's motion for summary
judgment (document n o . 48) is denied. The Board's motion for
summary judgment (document n o . 51) is granted. The Clerk is instructed to issue judgment for the defendants
in accordance with this order and my order of September 2 3 , 1993.
SO ORDERED.
Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge July 1 2 , 1994 cc: Daniel Mullen, Esq. Vincent Martina, Esq.
claim for prospective relief because there is no absolute identity between the claims raised in his federal complaint and those raised in his state appeal, or between the opposing parties in each litigation. These arguments are also unpersuasive. Res judicata and collateral estoppel are defenses, not limitations on the federal district courts' jurisdiction. Buckley v . Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 2 2 4 , 227 (7th Cir. 1993).