Wang v. Esurance Insurance Company

W.D. Washington

Wang v. Esurance Insurance Company

DecidedJanuary 21, 2025

Docket2:24-cv-00447

StatusUnknown

This text of Wang v. Esurance Insurance Company (Wang v. Esurance Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Wang v. Esurance Insurance Company, (W.D. Wash. 2025).

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THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 LINH WANG, CASE NO. C24-0447-JCC 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 ESURANCE INSURANCE COMPANY, 13 Defendant. 14 15 16 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion to compel production of 17 documents from third-parties Marty Rall and Rall & Ortiz, LLC (hereinafter “Rall”) (Dkt. No. 18 21). Having thoroughly considered the briefing and relevant record, the Court hereby GRANTS 19 the motion for the reasons described herein. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 This case arises out of a separate tort lawsuit filed in Snohomish County Superior Court, 22 case number 20-2-04109-31 (hereinafter the “Underlying Lawsuit”). (Dkt. No. 21 at 2.) The 23 Underlying Lawsuit arose out of a two-vehicle accident that occurred on August 25, 2017 24 (hereinafter the “Accident”). (Id.) Plaintiff was a passenger in one of the vehicles; her husband, 25 Celso Wang (hereinafter the “Husband”), was the driver. (Id.) Plaintiff sustained injuries and 26 thus pursued litigation against her Husband and the driver of the other vehicle. (Id.) At the time,

ORDER 1 Plaintiff was insured through a policy issued by Defendant, which included coverage for an 2 underinsured motorist. (Dkt. Nos. 1-2 at 3, 13 at 2.) In turn, Defendant retained Rall to represent 3 the Husband in the Underlying Lawsuit. (Dkt. No. 21 at 2.) That Underlying Lawsuit ultimately 4 resulted in a settlement. (Id.) Then, on February 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed the present action in 5 state court for various extracontractual claims. (Id.; see also Dkt. No. 1-2 at 17–25.) Defendant 6 removed to this Court. (Dkt. No. 1.) The Parties are now in the midst of discovery. 7 This particular discovery dispute arises out of Defendant’s subpoena duces tecum to Rall. 8 (Dkt. No. 21 at 1.) In it, Defendant seeks all relevant and non-privileged materials within Rall’s 9 possession or control related to Plaintiff and/or her Husband for any claims regarding the 10 Accident. (See id.; see also Dkt. No. 22-2) (subpoena at issue). Defendant served its subpoena on 11 August 8, 2024. (Dkt. No. 21 at 1.) Since then, Rall has only provided Defendant with a copy of 12 Plaintiff’s medical records, and nothing more. (See id. at 3.) Defendant has even granted Rall 13 several extensions to comply with the subpoena or provide an explanation as to why compliance 14 is not possible—all to no avail. (See id. at 2–4.) Even after retaining counsel for this limited 15 scope discovery dispute, Rall still has not provided a fulsome response to the subpoena. (See id. 16 at 3–4.) Defendant thus brings its motion to compel. (See generally id.) 17 II. DISCUSSION 18 As the Court so often states, it strongly disfavors discovery motions and prefers that 19 parties resolve such disputes on their own. See, e.g., Larson Motors Inc. v. Gen. Motors LLC, 20 2023 WL 346623, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Wash. 2023); PCF Ins. Serv. Of the West, LLC v. Fritts, 21 2024 WL 3966735, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Wash. 2024). 22 Nevertheless, the Court recognizes the importance of discovery to the litigation process. 23 Indeed, “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strongly favor full discovery.” Exxon Shipping Co. 24 v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 1994). As such, they entitle a party to 25 discover non-privileged information that is (1) relevant to any party’s claims or defenses and (2) 26 proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). This, of course, includes discovery

ORDER 1 by subpoena. Id. 45(3). Relevant information need not be admissible, but it must be reasonably 2 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Id. 26(b)(1); see Surfvivor Media, Inc. 3 v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005). A party responding to the discovery 4 request may then, amongst other options, submit objections to the request. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 45(d)(1)(B), (d)(3). Proper objections include irrelevance, see id. at 26(b)(1), unreasonable 6 amount of time to comply, invasion of privilege, or undue burden, see id. at 45(d)(3)(A). A party 7 who fails to timely object thereby waives any objection to the subpoena, absent “unusual 8 circumstances and for good cause.” Uzzell v. Teletech Holdings, Inc., 2007 WL 4358315, slip op. 9 at 1–2 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 10 If a party inappropriately withholds or fails to answer a discovery request, the requesting 11 party may move for an order compelling discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1); David v. Hooker, 12 Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 418 (9th Cir. 1977). The movant must demonstrate that “the information it 13 seeks is relevant and that the responding party’s objections lack merit.” Hancock v. Aetna Life 14 Ins. Co., 321 F.R.D. 383, 390 (W.D. Wash. 2017). The Court then has broad discretion to decide 15 whether to compel discovery. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). 16 Rall does not object to the subpoena based on relevance, privilege, undue burden, or the 17 like. In fact, it seems that Rall never submitted any objections. (See Dkt. No. 21 at 3–4.) Instead, 18 Rall’s justification for noncompliance is that it has not received the Husband’s express consent to 19 disclose the file related to his case. (Id.) Indeed, Rall argues that Washington Rules of 20 Professional Conduct (“RPC”) 1.15A and 1.15B preclude it from releasing the Husband’s file 21 without his express consent. (Id. at 1.) But those rules only govern an attorney’s duties to 22 safeguard client property—items such as trusts, real estate, and deeds or wills related thereto. See 23 generally Washington RPC 1.15A (“Safeguarding Property”) and 1.15B (“Required Trust 24 Account Records”). That is, those rules govern an attorney’s duties to protect items that 25 generally give rise to or represent the ultimate culmination of an attorney’s representation. They 26 do not apply to items that primarily serve as a record of the attorney’s representation, such as the

ORDER 1 client file at issue here. And, even if they did, the specific authority to which Rall cites is only a 2 “best practice,” not a bright-line rule. (See Dkt. No. 23 at 1) (citing Appendix A, “Best Practices 3 for Client File Retention”). 4 Of course, the Court appreciates that, out of an abundance of caution, it is preferable to 5 have the client’s express consent before producing information about their case. Nevertheless, 6 mere lack of consent, without more, is not a proper objection to a subpoena that is otherwise 7 reasonable and seeks relevant, non-privileged information. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) and 8 45(d)(3) (laying out various grounds for objection); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 9 U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (in the context of privilege 10 objections, the court ruled that “boilerplate objections or blanket refusals . . . to a Rule 34 request 11 for production of documents are insufficient to assert a privilege”). And it is certainly not a valid 12 justification for the lack of any response. See id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P.

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THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 LINH WANG, CASE NO. C24-0447-JCC 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 ESURANCE INSURANCE COMPANY, 13 Defendant. 14 15 16 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion to compel production of 17 documents from third-parties Marty Rall and Rall & Ortiz, LLC (hereinafter “Rall”) (Dkt. No. 18 21). Having thoroughly considered the briefing and relevant record, the Court hereby GRANTS 19 the motion for the reasons described herein. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 This case arises out of a separate tort lawsuit filed in Snohomish County Superior Court, 22 case number 20-2-04109-31 (hereinafter the “Underlying Lawsuit”). (Dkt. No. 21 at 2.) The 23 Underlying Lawsuit arose out of a two-vehicle accident that occurred on August 25, 2017 24 (hereinafter the “Accident”). (Id.) Plaintiff was a passenger in one of the vehicles; her husband, 25 Celso Wang (hereinafter the “Husband”), was the driver. (Id.) Plaintiff sustained injuries and 26 thus pursued litigation against her Husband and the driver of the other vehicle. (Id.) At the time,

ORDER 1 Plaintiff was insured through a policy issued by Defendant, which included coverage for an 2 underinsured motorist. (Dkt. Nos. 1-2 at 3, 13 at 2.) In turn, Defendant retained Rall to represent 3 the Husband in the Underlying Lawsuit. (Dkt. No. 21 at 2.) That Underlying Lawsuit ultimately 4 resulted in a settlement. (Id.) Then, on February 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed the present action in 5 state court for various extracontractual claims. (Id.; see also Dkt. No. 1-2 at 17–25.) Defendant 6 removed to this Court. (Dkt. No. 1.) The Parties are now in the midst of discovery. 7 This particular discovery dispute arises out of Defendant’s subpoena duces tecum to Rall. 8 (Dkt. No. 21 at 1.) In it, Defendant seeks all relevant and non-privileged materials within Rall’s 9 possession or control related to Plaintiff and/or her Husband for any claims regarding the 10 Accident. (See id.; see also Dkt. No. 22-2) (subpoena at issue). Defendant served its subpoena on 11 August 8, 2024. (Dkt. No. 21 at 1.) Since then, Rall has only provided Defendant with a copy of 12 Plaintiff’s medical records, and nothing more. (See id. at 3.) Defendant has even granted Rall 13 several extensions to comply with the subpoena or provide an explanation as to why compliance 14 is not possible—all to no avail. (See id. at 2–4.) Even after retaining counsel for this limited 15 scope discovery dispute, Rall still has not provided a fulsome response to the subpoena. (See id. 16 at 3–4.) Defendant thus brings its motion to compel. (See generally id.) 17 II. DISCUSSION 18 As the Court so often states, it strongly disfavors discovery motions and prefers that 19 parties resolve such disputes on their own. See, e.g., Larson Motors Inc. v. Gen. Motors LLC, 20 2023 WL 346623, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Wash. 2023); PCF Ins. Serv. Of the West, LLC v. Fritts, 21 2024 WL 3966735, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Wash. 2024). 22 Nevertheless, the Court recognizes the importance of discovery to the litigation process. 23 Indeed, “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strongly favor full discovery.” Exxon Shipping Co. 24 v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 1994). As such, they entitle a party to 25 discover non-privileged information that is (1) relevant to any party’s claims or defenses and (2) 26 proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). This, of course, includes discovery

ORDER 1 by subpoena. Id. 45(3). Relevant information need not be admissible, but it must be reasonably 2 calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Id. 26(b)(1); see Surfvivor Media, Inc. 3 v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005). A party responding to the discovery 4 request may then, amongst other options, submit objections to the request. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 45(d)(1)(B), (d)(3). Proper objections include irrelevance, see id. at 26(b)(1), unreasonable 6 amount of time to comply, invasion of privilege, or undue burden, see id. at 45(d)(3)(A). A party 7 who fails to timely object thereby waives any objection to the subpoena, absent “unusual 8 circumstances and for good cause.” Uzzell v. Teletech Holdings, Inc., 2007 WL 4358315, slip op. 9 at 1–2 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 10 If a party inappropriately withholds or fails to answer a discovery request, the requesting 11 party may move for an order compelling discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1); David v. Hooker, 12 Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 418 (9th Cir. 1977). The movant must demonstrate that “the information it 13 seeks is relevant and that the responding party’s objections lack merit.” Hancock v. Aetna Life 14 Ins. Co., 321 F.R.D. 383, 390 (W.D. Wash. 2017). The Court then has broad discretion to decide 15 whether to compel discovery. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). 16 Rall does not object to the subpoena based on relevance, privilege, undue burden, or the 17 like. In fact, it seems that Rall never submitted any objections. (See Dkt. No. 21 at 3–4.) Instead, 18 Rall’s justification for noncompliance is that it has not received the Husband’s express consent to 19 disclose the file related to his case. (Id.) Indeed, Rall argues that Washington Rules of 20 Professional Conduct (“RPC”) 1.15A and 1.15B preclude it from releasing the Husband’s file 21 without his express consent. (Id. at 1.) But those rules only govern an attorney’s duties to 22 safeguard client property—items such as trusts, real estate, and deeds or wills related thereto. See 23 generally Washington RPC 1.15A (“Safeguarding Property”) and 1.15B (“Required Trust 24 Account Records”). That is, those rules govern an attorney’s duties to protect items that 25 generally give rise to or represent the ultimate culmination of an attorney’s representation. They 26 do not apply to items that primarily serve as a record of the attorney’s representation, such as the

ORDER 1 client file at issue here. And, even if they did, the specific authority to which Rall cites is only a 2 “best practice,” not a bright-line rule. (See Dkt. No. 23 at 1) (citing Appendix A, “Best Practices 3 for Client File Retention”). 4 Of course, the Court appreciates that, out of an abundance of caution, it is preferable to 5 have the client’s express consent before producing information about their case. Nevertheless, 6 mere lack of consent, without more, is not a proper objection to a subpoena that is otherwise 7 reasonable and seeks relevant, non-privileged information. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) and 8 45(d)(3) (laying out various grounds for objection); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 9 U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (in the context of privilege 10 objections, the court ruled that “boilerplate objections or blanket refusals . . . to a Rule 34 request 11 for production of documents are insufficient to assert a privilege”). And it is certainly not a valid 12 justification for the lack of any response. See id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(g) (failure to 13 respond to a subpoena, or at least provide an adequate excuse for failure to respond, may result 14 in a contempt order from the district court). In short, Rall’s “objection” (to the extent it may be 15 considered one) lacks merit. 16 Finally, both parties otherwise appear to agree that Defendant’s request for production is 17 reasonable and seeks relevant information. Rall even admitted as much. (Dkt. No. 23 at 2) (“Rall 18 is not otherwise opposed to [Defendant’s] motion”). As such, there does not even seem to be a 19 true discovery dispute here. 20 III. CONCLUSION 21 The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel (Dkt. No. 21).1 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 1 The Court also DENIES Defendant’s request to strike Rall’s untimely response. (See Dkt. No. 26 25 at 1) (request to strike). Though Rall’s response was indeed untimely pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(d)(3), it also informed the Court that there was, in fact, no real discovery dispute. ORDER 1 DATED this 21st day of January 2025. A 2 3 4 John C. Coughenour 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

ORDER

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