Wang v. Dreisbach

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: September 18, 2025
• Docket: 24-2249-pr
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24-2249-pr Wang v. Dreisbach

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of September, two thousand twenty-five.

PRESENT: RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., WILLIAM J. NARDINI, MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, Circuit Judges. ------------------------------------------------------------------ LISHAN WANG,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 24-2249-pr

VICTORIA DREISBACH, DIANA KURLYANDCHIK, MISTY DELCIAMPO, CLARA MEJIAS, JUDY HALL, HEATHER MADISON,

Defendants-Appellees, MIRIAM E. DELPHIN-RITTMON, THOMAS WARD-MCKINLAY, HELENE VARTELAS,

Defendants. ------------------------------------------------------------------

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Lishan Wang, pro se, Suffield, CT

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Mary K. Lenehan, Assistant Attorney General, for William Tong, Attorney General of the State of Connecticut, Hartford, CT

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District

of Connecticut (Jeffrey Alker Meyer, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff Lishan Wang, proceeding pro se, appeals from an August 19, 2024

judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut

(Meyer, J.) granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants-Appellees,

who are staff members of Whiting Forensic Hospital (“Whiting”). Wang brought

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his constitutional rights were violated

when Whiting staff members placed him in restraints and forcibly administered

Benadryl to him in the course of effectuating a state court order to restore his

2 competency to stand trial for murder. The District Court concluded that the

Defendants-Appellees were entitled to qualified immunity and accordingly

dismissed Wang’s claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as

necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We “review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,” and

affirm only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Walker v. Senecal, 130 F.4th 291, 297

(2d Cir. 2025) (quotation marks omitted). “[W]e liberally construe pleadings and

briefs submitted by pro se litigants, reading such submissions to raise the

strongest arguments they suggest.” Id. (quoting Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111,

119 (2d Cir. 2023)). 1

Wang argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment

as to his excessive force and forcible medication claims. We are not persuaded.

Although several facts surrounding the challenged conduct are disputed, we

1 We reject the Defendants-Appellees’ invitation to decline review on the ground that Wang “has failed to make factual or legal arguments to support any of his claims.” Defendants-Appellees’ Br. 19. Although Wang’s submissions are difficult to understand, we will consider them in view of the “liberal[] constru[ction]” afforded to pro se submissions. Walker, 130 F.4th at 297 (quotation marks omitted). 3 agree with the District Court that “the remaining facts that are not in legitimate

dispute are enough on their own . . . to compel a judgment on qualified

immunity grounds” in favor of the Defendants-Appellees. Supp. App’x 14; see

Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., Ltd., 854 F.3d 131, 148 (2d Cir. 2017).

To prevail on an excessive force claim, “a pretrial detainee must show only

that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively

unreasonable.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Kingsley

v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015)). In determining whether decisions

made by medical professionals were reasonable, we afford “appropriate

deference” to their exercise of professional judgment. United States v. Hardy, 724

F.3d 280, 295 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted); see also Youngberg v.

Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322–23 (1982). For example, we recognize that “[t]he forcible

[administration] of medication into a nonconsenting person’s body represents a

substantial interference with that person’s liberty.” Hardy, 724 F.3d at 295

(quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990)). It may be justified,

however, when medicating an inmate is “medically appropriate for the purpose

of reducing the danger he poses.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

4 In urging reversal of the District Court’s summary judgment ruling, Wang

disputes the Defendants-Appellees’ assertion that restraining and medicating

him was necessary because he was verbally aggressive and physically

threatening. But their assertion about Wang’s behavior aligns with his prior

admissions on the record before the District Court. For example, Wang admitted

that he refused to take the medications prescribed in accordance with the state

trial court’s order, that he told Whiting staff that they would “need to carry

[him]” to the treatment room and that he would “protect [him]self,” and that he

declined an opportunity to assure staff that he would not assault anyone if

released from restraints. Supp. App’x 55 ¶ 27, 61 ¶ 38; Appellant’s Br. 10. He

further admitted that he said: “I’m not crazy. You’re crazy. I don’t need med;

you need med. I’ve Chinese Government behind me. I’ll sue you.” Supp. App’x

61 ¶ 38.

Given these particular undisputed facts, “[n]o clear line of federal law

establishes that it [was] a substantial departure from accepted practice” for

Whiting staff to use four-point restraints and forcibly administer Benadryl as a

sedative in order to facilitate the court-ordered administration of antipsychotic

medications to Wang. See Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 76 (2d Cir. 1996)

5 (quotation marks omitted); see also Frost v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 980 F.3d 231, 252

(2d Cir. 2020); Hardy, 724 F.3d at 295. We therefore conclude that the

Defendants-Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity as to Wang’s excessive

force and forcible medication claims.

We have considered Wang’s remaining arguments and conclude that they

are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court

is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court