Wandell v. Murray
This text of 239 F. 847 (Wandell v. Murray) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
November 3, 1911, the canal boat S. G. Meil, laden with wheat arrived at a point just east of lock 37 in the Erie Canal. She was the last of -a tandem tow of three boats bound east from Buffalo to New York City. The boats had to go through the lock separately, and after the first two had passed through a team of horses took hold of the'Meil. Between 8 and 9 p. m., as she was passing a scow lying about 10 feet off the heel bank of the canal and opposite to a 'hoisting derrick belonging to the Acme Engineering & Construction Company, she struck some obstruction on the bottom, which caused her to leak and soon afterwards to sink. The bottom of the canal in this lock is solid rock. The District Judge located the place of the accident in accordance with the testimony of all the witnesses, as above stated.
The District Judge got the impression that the Acme Company was engaged in widening and deepening the canal, and that the stone in [849]*849question must have been thrown up by blasting. Therefore he applied to it the rule laid down by us in Huntley v. Empire Engineering Co.. 211 Fed. 959, 128 C. C. A. 457. This made a very exact analysis of the testimony unnecessary. It was enough that no other cause for the presence of the stone had been shown and the defendant had made no explanation.
In the Huntley Case the defendant was engaged in deepening the canal itself, and was bound to see that the work it was doing did not interfere with navigation. There was no possible explanation for the presence of the obstruction, other than that work. The case was an exceptional one, and the decision not to be extended. Here the defendant had nothing to do with the canal, but was engaged in operations on land on each side of it. The libelant could not rely upon the presumption that, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, he must have caused the obstruction.
The Acme Company and the Lathrop Company were independent contractors; but, as the defendant does not raise the question of his liability for their acts, we do not discuss it. It is enough to say that, when the work going on involves a nuisance, e. g., excavating or obstructing a public street or waterway, quite a different measure of liability may apply from that appropriate to operations which only indirectly and through negligence cause injury. McCafferty v. Railroad Co., 61 N. Y. 178, 19 Am. Rep. 267.
We think the weight of the testimony is that a stone at the place of the accident as fixed by the District Judge could not have been dropped by the derrick of either of these companies, and if the stone said to have been found was within reach of the Lathrop Company’s der[850]*850rick, as Woods says, then the libelant’s boat did not run upon it, because the place of tire accident was much further to the west.
The libelant having failed to prove that the stone which he claims did the injury was dropped by either of the defendant’s subcontractors, the libel should have been dismissed.
The decree is reversed.
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239 F. 847, 152 C.C.A. 633, 1917 U.S. App. LEXIS 2283, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wandell-v-murray-ca2-1917.