Wanda Duggins v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMay 25, 2022
DocketAT-315H-17-0582-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Wanda Duggins v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Wanda Duggins v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wanda Duggins v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

WANDA E. DUGGINS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-315H-17-0582-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: May 25, 2022 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Wendell J. Echols, Sr., Tuskegee, Alabama, for the appellant.

W. Robert Boulware, Esquire, Montgomery, Alabama, for the agency.

BEFORE

Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her probationary termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND ¶2 On January 8, 2017, the agency appointed the appellant to the competitive-service position of WG-06 Motor Vehicle Operator, subject to a 1-year probationary period. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 9. Five months into her appointment, on June 9, 2017, the agency terminated the appellant for unacceptable conduct. Id. at 10-13. ¶3 The appellant filed a Board appeal and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 2, 4. She disputed the merits of her termination, arguing that she demonstrated good performance, and that the agency failed to give her any warning before terminating her. Id. at 6. The administrative judge issued a jurisdictional order, informing the appellant that the Board may not have jurisdiction over her appeal and notifying her of the standard for establishing jurisdiction under both 5 C.F.R. § 315.806 and 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. IAF, Tab 3. The administrative judge ordered the appellant to file evidence and argument to prove that the appeal is within the Board’s jurisdiction. Id. at 4-5. The agency filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, IAF, Tab 5, and the appellant filed a response 3

in opposition, arguing that she has Board appeal rights as a reinstatement eligible, IAF, Tab 6. The administrative judge issued an initial decision, finding that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction and dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction without a hearing. IAF, Tab 7, Initial Decision (ID) at 4. ¶4 The appellant has filed a petition for review, reasserting her argument that she has Board appeal rights as a reinstatement eligible. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 2. The agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 4.

ANALYSIS ¶5 Individuals who are serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment and who have not completed 1 year of current continuous service have no right to appeal their terminations to the Board under the adverse action provisions of 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. McCormick v. Department of the Air Force, 307 F.3d 1339, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In this case, it appears to be undisputed that the appellant lacked 1 year of current continuous service. However, she argues that she has chapter 75 appeal rights on the basis that she was eligible for reinstatement under 5 C.F.R. § 315.401. PFR File, Tab 1. She seems to imply that she completed a probationary period under a previous appointment and that she should therefore not have been required to serve a probationary period during the appointment at issue. Id.; see 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.402(b), .801(a)(2). ¶6 We have considered the appellant’s allegations of fact, but even if they are true, we find them to be immaterial because an agency’s ability to reinstate an employee under 5 C.F.R. § 315.401 is discretionary. Hicks v. Department of the Navy, 33 M.S.P.R. 511, 512-13 (1987). In other words, even if the appellant were eligible for reinstatement, this does not mean that she was, in fa ct, appointed by reinstatement, and there is nothing in the appeal file to indicate that she was. Cf. Armstrong v. Department of the Navy, 6 M.S.P.R. 273, 274-75 (1981). 4

¶7 For the reasons explained in the initial decision, we agree with the administrative judge that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the instant appeal. ID at 2-4. The appellant does not qualify as a competitive-service employee with adverse action appeal rights because she was serving a 1 -year probationary period when she was terminated, and she did not have 1 year of current continuous service under other than a temporary appointment limited to 1 year or less. See 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A); Hurston v. Department of the Army, 113 M.S.P.R. 34, ¶¶ 9-10 (2010). In addition, it is undisputed that the appellant was terminated for postappointment reasons, and she has not alleged that her termination was based on partisan political reasons or marital status. IAF, Tab 5 at 10; see Honea v. Department of Homeland Security, 118 M.S.P.R. 282, ¶¶ 6, 10 (2012), aff’d, 524 F. App’x 623 (Fed. Cir. 2013); 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.804, .806(a)-(b).

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 2 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

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Related

Ann M. McCormick v. Department of the Air Force
307 F.3d 1339 (Federal Circuit, 2002)
Honea v. Merit Systems Protection Board
524 F. App'x 623 (Federal Circuit, 2013)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
Wanda Duggins v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wanda-duggins-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2022.