Wan v. Central Transport LLC

• Court: District Court, D. Delaware
• Decided: May 2, 2025
• Docket: 1:22-cv-01206
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

LILI WAN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. 22-1206 (JLH) ) CENTRAL TRANSPORT LLC, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

At Wilmington, this 2nd day of May, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Lili Wan, having moved for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (D.I. 56), after judgment was entered in Defendant’s favor following a March 2024 Memorandum Opinion and Order (D.I. 50, 51), which concluded that Plaintiff failed to offer or cite to any evidence showing that an employee of Defendant breached a duty of care that caused Plaintiff to suffer damages (see D.I. 50 at 5-6); WHEREAS, on September 25, 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed this Court’s March 4, 2024 judgment in favor of Defendant; WHEREAS, Plaintiff filed the present Rule 60(b) motion on October 7, 2024; WHEREAS, a Rule 60(b) motion “must be made within a reasonable time,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1), and it must be based on one of five specified grounds, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(5), or “extraordinary circumstances,” Martinez-McBean v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d 908, 911 (3d Cir. 1977); WHEREAS, Plaintiff first argues that relief is warranted because the Court did not warn her, as a pro se litigant, of the consequences of failing to properly respond to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (see D.I. 56 at 1); WHEREAS, pro se litigants are required to “comply with the procedures outlined in Rule 56” regardless of Court instruction to do so, Bello v. Romeo, 424 F. App’x 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2011), and the Court in fact notified Plaintiff of the answering brief/response deadline for Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (see D.I. 47); WHEREAS, Plaintiff next argues that relief is warranted under Rule 60(b)(2) because Plaintiff “has obtained a detailed police report and is prepared to present affidavits providing crucial evidence that was not available at the time of the summary judgment ruling” (D.I. 56 at 1); WHEREAS, Rule 60(b)(2) “requires that the new evidence (1) be material and not merely cumulative, (2) could not have been discovered . . . through the exercise of reasonable diligence, and (3) would probably have changed the outcome,” Compass Tech., Inc. v. Tseng Lab., Inc., 71 F.3d 1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 1995), and “[a]ny party requesting such relief bears a heavy burden,” id.; WHEREAS, review of Plaintiff's newly offered evidence (see D.I. 56-2, 56-3, 56-4, 56-5) reveals no evidence of a breach of duty of care by Defendant (apart from Plaintiff's own account of events, which was available prior to summary judgment);! NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion for relief from judgment (D.I. 56) is DENIED.

e Honorable Jexnifer Y. Hall United Sthtes District ddge

' For example, Plaintiff submitted a Delaware State Police report dated December 5, 2021, which summarizes the account of events that Plaintiff provided through a family member translating for her. (D.I. 56-2 at 3.) Even if the report itself could not have been obtained prior to the Court’s grant summary judgment in March 2024, the report points to no evidence, beyond Plaintiff's account, of a breach of care by Defendant.