Souris, J.
On September 6, 1951, defendants Zatkoff entered into an oil and gas lease with Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. The provisions of this lease, pertinent parts of which are set forth in the margin,
gave Panhandle the right to annual extensions of the 'lease through September 5,1961. On April 24,1961, ¡Panhandle and plaintiff Walton made an agreement, whereby Walton was to drill a test well on the Zat'hoff land. Prior to August 31,1961, Walton had filed, with the State supervisor of wells an application for permission to drill a well, posted a bond, paid the' permit fee and received the permit, had the leased1.' premises surveyed and a copy of the survey delivered to the 'State supervisor of wells, attempted to secure; a unitization agreement covering the Zatkoffs’ propk erty and some adjoining property, visited and staked the drill .site, and purchased well-drilling equipment for the purpose of drilling a well on the Zatkoff property. On August 31, 1961, Walton dispatched to the drill site a bulldozer, which checked the level of the property and dug a slush pit. The drill, derrick, and other equipment arrived at the drill site on various dates between September 7 and September 13, 1961, or after the September 5th date specified in the lease. On September 13,1961, defendant Miller Zat
koff sent Walton a letter asking Walton to remove the drilling equipment from his land. The next day Walton filed a bill of complaint asking that defendants be enjoined from interfering with the drilling of a well. By stipulation of the attorneys for all parties, the trial court ordered Panhandle joined as intervenor-plaintiff. By opinion, the trial court held that the lease provision requiring commencement of drilling operations by September 5, 1961, had not heen complied with in that plaintiffs had not actually drilled a well or even placed sufficient equipment on the drill site to complete a well to a depth which would satisfactorily test the land for oil and gas. Plaintiffs have appealed, and by order of this Court on stipulation of the parties, Consumers Power Company, successor in interest to Panhandle, was substituted as intervenor-plaintiff and appellant.
It will be noted from the lease provisions printed in the margin,
supra,
that 2 slightly different phrases are employed to describe the lessee’s duty of exploitation: commencement of “operations for the drilling of a well” and commencement of “drilling operations.” It is defendants’ contention that these phrases are employed precisely and distinctively, and that the latter phrase requires that a drill be in operation and actually have penetrated into the ground. Defendants maintain that as used in paragraph 4, commencement of operations for the drilling of a well is the standard to be employed during the initial lease year in measuring the lessee’s actions during such year but that in later years the assertedly stricter test of “commencement of drilling operations” must be met. Paragraph 5, say defendants, is irrelevant for present consideration, ■since it applies only in case an unproductive well has been first drilled.
We are unable to agree with defendants that this lease indicates that the 2 phrases under considera
tion were intended to be descriptive of different actions required of the lessee. By paragraph 4, the-lessee had until September 5, 1952, to commence-“operations for the drilling of a well,” and if it had: not done so by then a payment of $40 would provide-for it the privilege of “deferring the commencement-of drilling operations for 12 months from said date.”' “Defer” thus equates “drilling operations” to “operations for the drilling of a well.” What is being dé-' f erred is commencement of the latter, and the phrase “drilling operations” is synonymous with, but more succinct than, the longer phrase.
The second sentence of paragraph 5 provides that upon resumption of rental payments paragraph 4 shall continue in force and further says that if lessee shall “commence operations for the drilling of a well within the term of this lease or any extension thereof” lessee should have the right to drill the well to completion. Paragraph 4, which is thus expressly, incorporated into paragraph 5, provides that for extensions without rental payments “drilling operations” must commence, while paragraph 5 itself speaks of “operations for the drilling of a well.” Thus, to hold that the phrases were intended to have a different meaning would be to say that the lease as drafted was self-contradictory, a conclusion which may be avoided by the more reasonable assumption that the shorter phrase is simply a foreshortening of tbu longer.
The construction we adopt is that most consonant with the probable intent of the parties. Thus, in a stipulation signed by the attorneys for all parties, it is stated:
“Delay rentals were paid yearly for the privilege of deferring commencement of operations for the drilling of a well, the last such delay rental paying for such deferral through September 5,1961, at midnight.”
This indicates that defendants’ presently advanced distinction between the 2 phrases is an afterthought 'and is not representative of the actual understanding ■of the parties to the lease.
Although some courts have purported to draw a distinction between phraseology similar to “commencement of operations for the drilling of a well” 'hnd “commencement of drilling operations,”
others have rejected such a distinction,
and it is with the latter jurisdictions that we align ourselves, at least absent persuasive showing that the parties intended a distinction to exist. Such a position is in accord with
Robinson
v.
Gordon Oil Co.,
258 Mich 643, where a lease was placed in escrow to be delivered to plaintiff when a proposed well had attained a depth of 500 feet, provided that “actual work in connection with the drilling of said well had been commenced on or before December 1, 1930.” We held that plaintiff had complied with this provision when prior to December 1, 1930, he had selected the well site, contracted for the drilling, hauled the requisite sand and gravel onto the site, dug a slush pit, erected a
derrick and rig, and installed some machinery. This Court analyzed other cases thusly (pp 646-648):
“In
Terry
v.
Texas Co.
(Tex Civ App), 228 SW. 1019, the lease required the lessee to ‘commence to drill a test well for oil within 8 months.’ The court held, quoting from the syllabus:
“ ‘Lessee, by placing timbers for erection of derrick and machinery, including boiler, on the ground where oil well was to be drilled, complied with provision requiring him to “commence to drill” well within a certain
period;
the word “commence” being defined as “to perform the first act of.” ’
“In the instant case the lease did not require the plaintiff ‘to commence to drill’ by a certain time as the lease did in
Terry
v.
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Souris, J.
On September 6, 1951, defendants Zatkoff entered into an oil and gas lease with Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. The provisions of this lease, pertinent parts of which are set forth in the margin,
gave Panhandle the right to annual extensions of the 'lease through September 5,1961. On April 24,1961, ¡Panhandle and plaintiff Walton made an agreement, whereby Walton was to drill a test well on the Zat'hoff land. Prior to August 31,1961, Walton had filed, with the State supervisor of wells an application for permission to drill a well, posted a bond, paid the' permit fee and received the permit, had the leased1.' premises surveyed and a copy of the survey delivered to the 'State supervisor of wells, attempted to secure; a unitization agreement covering the Zatkoffs’ propk erty and some adjoining property, visited and staked the drill .site, and purchased well-drilling equipment for the purpose of drilling a well on the Zatkoff property. On August 31, 1961, Walton dispatched to the drill site a bulldozer, which checked the level of the property and dug a slush pit. The drill, derrick, and other equipment arrived at the drill site on various dates between September 7 and September 13, 1961, or after the September 5th date specified in the lease. On September 13,1961, defendant Miller Zat
koff sent Walton a letter asking Walton to remove the drilling equipment from his land. The next day Walton filed a bill of complaint asking that defendants be enjoined from interfering with the drilling of a well. By stipulation of the attorneys for all parties, the trial court ordered Panhandle joined as intervenor-plaintiff. By opinion, the trial court held that the lease provision requiring commencement of drilling operations by September 5, 1961, had not heen complied with in that plaintiffs had not actually drilled a well or even placed sufficient equipment on the drill site to complete a well to a depth which would satisfactorily test the land for oil and gas. Plaintiffs have appealed, and by order of this Court on stipulation of the parties, Consumers Power Company, successor in interest to Panhandle, was substituted as intervenor-plaintiff and appellant.
It will be noted from the lease provisions printed in the margin,
supra,
that 2 slightly different phrases are employed to describe the lessee’s duty of exploitation: commencement of “operations for the drilling of a well” and commencement of “drilling operations.” It is defendants’ contention that these phrases are employed precisely and distinctively, and that the latter phrase requires that a drill be in operation and actually have penetrated into the ground. Defendants maintain that as used in paragraph 4, commencement of operations for the drilling of a well is the standard to be employed during the initial lease year in measuring the lessee’s actions during such year but that in later years the assertedly stricter test of “commencement of drilling operations” must be met. Paragraph 5, say defendants, is irrelevant for present consideration, ■since it applies only in case an unproductive well has been first drilled.
We are unable to agree with defendants that this lease indicates that the 2 phrases under considera
tion were intended to be descriptive of different actions required of the lessee. By paragraph 4, the-lessee had until September 5, 1952, to commence-“operations for the drilling of a well,” and if it had: not done so by then a payment of $40 would provide-for it the privilege of “deferring the commencement-of drilling operations for 12 months from said date.”' “Defer” thus equates “drilling operations” to “operations for the drilling of a well.” What is being dé-' f erred is commencement of the latter, and the phrase “drilling operations” is synonymous with, but more succinct than, the longer phrase.
The second sentence of paragraph 5 provides that upon resumption of rental payments paragraph 4 shall continue in force and further says that if lessee shall “commence operations for the drilling of a well within the term of this lease or any extension thereof” lessee should have the right to drill the well to completion. Paragraph 4, which is thus expressly, incorporated into paragraph 5, provides that for extensions without rental payments “drilling operations” must commence, while paragraph 5 itself speaks of “operations for the drilling of a well.” Thus, to hold that the phrases were intended to have a different meaning would be to say that the lease as drafted was self-contradictory, a conclusion which may be avoided by the more reasonable assumption that the shorter phrase is simply a foreshortening of tbu longer.
The construction we adopt is that most consonant with the probable intent of the parties. Thus, in a stipulation signed by the attorneys for all parties, it is stated:
“Delay rentals were paid yearly for the privilege of deferring commencement of operations for the drilling of a well, the last such delay rental paying for such deferral through September 5,1961, at midnight.”
This indicates that defendants’ presently advanced distinction between the 2 phrases is an afterthought 'and is not representative of the actual understanding ■of the parties to the lease.
Although some courts have purported to draw a distinction between phraseology similar to “commencement of operations for the drilling of a well” 'hnd “commencement of drilling operations,”
others have rejected such a distinction,
and it is with the latter jurisdictions that we align ourselves, at least absent persuasive showing that the parties intended a distinction to exist. Such a position is in accord with
Robinson
v.
Gordon Oil Co.,
258 Mich 643, where a lease was placed in escrow to be delivered to plaintiff when a proposed well had attained a depth of 500 feet, provided that “actual work in connection with the drilling of said well had been commenced on or before December 1, 1930.” We held that plaintiff had complied with this provision when prior to December 1, 1930, he had selected the well site, contracted for the drilling, hauled the requisite sand and gravel onto the site, dug a slush pit, erected a
derrick and rig, and installed some machinery. This Court analyzed other cases thusly (pp 646-648):
“In
Terry
v.
Texas Co.
(Tex Civ App), 228 SW. 1019, the lease required the lessee to ‘commence to drill a test well for oil within 8 months.’ The court held, quoting from the syllabus:
“ ‘Lessee, by placing timbers for erection of derrick and machinery, including boiler, on the ground where oil well was to be drilled, complied with provision requiring him to “commence to drill” well within a certain
period;
the word “commence” being defined as “to perform the first act of.” ’
“In the instant case the lease did not require the plaintiff ‘to commence to drill’ by a certain time as the lease did in
Terry
v.
Texas Co., supra.
It required him to do some ‘actual work in connection with the drilling by December 1, 1930.’ Language substantially the same has been construed in other cases where the requirement of the lease was that lessee should ‘begin operations’ in a definite time. For instance, in
Cox
v.
Miller,
206 Mo App 576 (227 SW 652), a mining lease required the lessee ‘to begin operations on said land under this lease within 60 days.’ It was held that preparing the necessary timbers, prospecting, locating shafts, and placing machinery was a sufficient compliance with the terms of the lease.
“In
Fleming Oil & Gas Co.
v.
South Penn Co.,
37 W Va 645 (17 SE 203), the language of the lease was ‘to commence operations for a test well within 1 year,’ et cetera. It was held that locating the well, cutting down timbers for constructing a derrick, making a contract with a party for drilling, and ordering machinery is ‘commencing operations’ for a test well, though neither the timber nor machinery was hauled to the location during the time specified because of the condition of the roads.
“In
Hudspeth
v.
Producers’ Oil Co.,
134 La 1013 (64 So 891), the lease required the lessee ‘to commence operations; on the tract by- drilling-, boring or
mining for oil within 24 months,’ et cetera. Within the time specified the lessee cleared 12 acres of land and sawed timber for the construction of the derricks. It was held that this work was a commencement of operations by ‘drilling, boring and mining’ within' the m’eaning of the lease.
“The theory of these cases is that the work, done in preparation for drilling a well is a necessary part of the drilling.
So in the instant case, assuming but not holding that the lease required the plaintiff to begin drilling on or before December 1, 1930,
he satisfied that requirement of the lease in the preparations he made for drilling. They were a necessary pdrt of the drilling.”
(Emphasis added.)
The effect of the Court’s language in
Robinson
is that' Walton’s activities were sufficient to meet the requirements of the lease. Such is the weight of modern authority as discussed in 2 Summers, The Law of Oil & Gas, § 349 (1959):
■ “The general rule seems to be that actual drilling is unnecessary, but that the location of wells, hauling lumber on the premises, erection of derricks, providing a water supply, moving machinery on the premises and similar acts preliminary to the beginning of the actual work of drilling, when performed with the bona fide intention to proceed thereafter with diligence toward the completion of the well, constitute a commencement or beginning'of a welfor drilling operations within thé meaning of this clause of the lease.”
We hold, therefore, that Walton, acting in behalf of the lessee, had commenced operations for the drilling of a well before the lease had expired and, there being no evidence that he did not intend to proceed lin good faith to actual drilling, we reverse and remand for entry of a decree granting injunctive relief against defendants’ interference with Walton’s proceeding in good faith to drill a well to completion.
•Sever sed. and remanded.- Costs to plaintiffs..
Kavanagh, C. J., and Dethmers, Kelly, Smith, and O’Hara, JJ., concurred.
Black, J., did not sit.
Adams, J., took no part in the decision of this ease.