Walton v. Smith

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: September 13, 2024
• Docket: 3:23-cv-04843
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 DENISHA M WALTON, et al., Case No. 23-cv-04843-MMC

7 Plaintiffs, ORDER DISMISSING SECOND 8 v. AMENDED COMPLAINT

9 KEE ANA SMITH, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 16 10 Defendants.

11 12 By order filed November 14, 2023, the Court granted plaintiffs Denisha Walton and 13 Justin Walton’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 14 § 1915(e)(2), dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim but afforded plaintiffs 15 leave to amend. Now before the Court is plaintiffs’ “Second Amended Complaint” (“SAC”) 16 filed January 24, 2024. (See Doc. No. 16.) 17 Plaintiffs allege that, on March 4, 2022, subsequent to their 16-year-old daughter’s 18 false report that her father, plaintiff Justin Walton, had molested her, plaintiffs lost custody 19 of their children. (See SAC at 17.) Based on these allegations, plaintiffs bring ten claims 20 against twenty defendants, fourteen of whom were defendants to the original complaint 21 (see Compl., Doc. No. 1), and request “that the Court void the lower court orders” and “try 22 all severable issues and facts before a jury.” (See SAC at 76–77.) 23 Where, as here, a party proceeds in forma pauperis, the district court, pursuant to 24 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), must “dismiss the case” if the plaintiff “fails to state a claim on 25 which relief may be granted.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court therefore turns to 26 the question of whether the SAC states a claim on which relief may be granted.1 27 1 A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 2 Where “a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision 3 by a state court and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision, [the] 4 Rooker-Feldman [doctrine] bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal district court.” See 5 Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003). Suits whose “substance challenge[ ] 6 the state court’s [determination] of [a] plaintiff’s parental rights” fall within the ambit of the 7 doctrine, even where, as here, the “operative complaint facially asserts constitutional 8 claims.” See Grimes v. Alameda Cnty. Social Servs., No. C 11–02977 WHA, 2011 WL 9 4948879, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011). 10 Here, the Court, in adopting Magistrate Judge Spero’s Report and 11 Recommendation, dismissed plaintiffs’ initial complaint with leave to amend “to allege 12 facts, including the case number(s) of any state court proceedings involving custody of 13 their children and information about any orders that have been entered in that case, that 14 [may] allow the Court to determine whether any of their claims are sufficiently 15 independent of the state court’s orders to fall outside of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” 16 (See Report and Recommendation (“Rpt. and Rec.”) at 12:27–13:3, Doc No. 8.) Plaintiffs 17 having failed to allege any such facts or provided any information about the state court 18 proceedings, the Court hereby finds plaintiffs’ claims are again subject to dismissal under 19 the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 20 B. Previously Named Defendants 21 The Report and Recommendation set forth in detail the deficiencies as to fourteen 22 defendants named in both the original complaint and the SAC. (See Rpt. and Rec.; SAC 23 24 25 26 27 1 at 2–5.)2 As to eleven of these fourteen defendants,3 plaintiffs have failed to add factual 2 allegations in support of their claims, and, the Court again finds the claims against said 3 defendants are subject to dismissal. 4 With respect to three of the originally named defendants, namely, Mamie Wong, 5 Julia Ten Eyck, and the John Muir Behavioral Health Center, plaintiffs have set forth 6 additional allegations. As discussed below, however, these added allegations are 7 insufficient to cure the previously identified deficiencies. 8 As to defendant Wong, a “[s]ocial [w]orker [s]upervisor,” plaintiffs now allege she 9 “moved the plaintiffs’ children [between] several different foster homes[ ],” thereby forcing 10 plaintiffs to “visit their children in far away locations,” and “made unsubstantiated 11 allegations of drug use” in proceedings before Judge Woods. (See SAC at 28–30.) As 12 discussed in the Report and Recommendation, “social workers are entitled to absolute 13 immunity for the initiation and pursuit of dependency proceedings, including their 14 testimony offered in such proceedings,” as well as “when making post-adjudication 15 custody decisions pursuant to a valid court order.” See Mabe v. San Bernadino Cnty. 16 Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001). Wong’s alleged acts, all 17 of which appear to be in the course of dependency proceedings, fall within the scope of 18 immunity. 19 As to defendant Ten Eyck, who is identified as the “the first court-appointed 20 attorney for the plaintiff[s’] children,” plaintiffs have added in the SAC an allegation as to 21 the date on which said defendant’s actions occurred and cite to “Exhibit 4” to the SAC as 22 23 2 The fourteen defendants named in both the original complaint and the SAC are 24 Kee Ana Smith, Sergeant Dan Kelly, Claudia Sagastume, Donita Carter, Alex Stuckey, Mamie Wong, the City of Tracy, Katya Cornejo, Julia Ten Eyck, Wendy Lee Lowinger, 25 Amy Stoll, Candice Saadian Costa, the John Muir Behavioral Health Center, and Anna Sabio. 26 3 Said eleven defendants are Kee Ana Smith, Sergeant Dan Kelly, Claudia 27 Sagastume, Donita Carter, Alexis Stuckey, the City of Tracy, Dr. Katya Cornejo, Wendy 1 “confirm[ing] maltreatment” of their children. (See SAC at 39.)4 Such additions do not 2 cure the deficiencies identified in the Report and Recommendation, namely, that Ten 3 Eyck owed no duty of care to plaintiffs, who were not her clients, and that plaintiffs fail to 4 allege her acts caused plaintiffs any injury. (See Rpt. and Rec. at 19:16–20:22.) 5 As to defendant John Muir Behavioral Health Center, plaintiffs have added 6 allegations in the SAC that said medical facility is “making . . . diagnoses [to permit] the 7 social worker [to] use[ ] to make a false claim for county and state funds.” (See SAC at 8 35.) Based thereon, plaintiffs purport to bring a claim under the Federal False Claims Act, 9 which claims the Court has dismissed by prior order (see Order, Doc. No. 19 (noting 10 False Claims Act claims cannot be brought by party proceeding pro se)), and which 11 determination remains unchanged. 12 Accordingly, the claims against all previously dismissed defendants are subject to 13 dismissal without further leave to amend. 14 C. Newly Named Defendants 15 In the SAC, plaintiffs bring claims against six defendants not named in the original 16 complaint: Joe Biden, Kamala Harris, Merrick Garland, and Xavier Becerra (collectively, 17 “Federal Defendants”), as well as San Francisco County and Margaret Pendergast. (See 18 SAC at 2–4.) 19 1. Federal Defendants 20 Plaintiffs allege the Federal Defendants “are aware of the constitutional violations 21 being committed but decide to do nothing about it.” (See SAC at 43.) Based on said 22 allegations, plaintiffs bring claims for violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. 23 (See id. at 41.) 24 To the extent plaintiffs’ claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the claims are 25 subject to dismissal. “[F]ederal officials acting under federal authority are generally not 26 considered to be state actors.” See Cabrera v. Martin, 973 F.2d 735, 742 (9th Cir. 1992). 27 1 Although they “may be liable under § 1983 if they are found to have conspired with or 2 acted in concert with state officials to some substantial degree,” see id., in order “[t]o 3 transform a federal official into a state actor, the [plaintiff] must show that there is a 4 ‘symbiotic relationship’ between the federal defendants and the state such that the 5 challenged action can fairly be attributed to the state,” see id. at 742–43 (internal 6 quotation, citation, and alterations omitted). 7 // 8 Here, plaintiffs have failed to allege facts supporting the existence of such a 9 relationship between the Federal Defendants and the state officials; indeed, plaintiffs 10 have alleged no facts suggesting the Federal Defendants knew of any actions taken by 11 the state in the instant case, nor of the state’s understanding of the federal government’s 12 involvement. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to 13 dismissal. See id. at 743 (dismissing claim where federal defendants did not “act in 14 concert” with state officials). 15 To the extent plaintiffs’ claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985–86, said 16 claims likewise fail. Although plaintiffs do not identify which subsection of 42 U.S.C. 17 § 1985 the Federal Defendants allegedly violated, every subsection addresses 18 circumstances wherein “two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire” to 19 deprive a person of a constitutional right. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(1)–(3). Here, plaintiffs 20 have not alleged facts suggesting the federal defendants were aware of the challenged 21 conduct, and, consequently, plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged a conspiracy. See United 22 Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540–41 (9th Cir. 1989) 23 (holding plaintiff, to state claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, “must show an agreement or 24 meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights”). Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claims under 25 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985–86 are subject to dismissal.5 26

27 5 Because liability under § 1986 is derivative of liability under § 1985, plaintiffs’ 1 To the extent plaintiffs seek to hold the Federal Defendants liable in their 2 individual, rather than their official, capacities, the Court construes such claims to be 3 brought under the doctrine set forth in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 4 Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which doctrine applies in only limited 5 circumstances, none of which apply here, see Marquez v. C. Rodriguez, 81 F.4th 1027, 6 1029 (9th Cir. 2023) (discussing three circumstances in which Bivens may be applied; 7 noting Supreme Court has “repeatedly and expressly confined Bivens claims” to said 8 circumstances). Accordingly, plaintiffs’ Bivens claims are subject to dismissal. 9 Lastly, to the extent plaintiffs seek to hold the Federal Defendants liable in their 10 official capacities under their tort causes of action, plaintiffs fail to allege compliance with 11 the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Tritz v. U.S. Postal Service, 721 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th 12 Cir. 2013) (affirming district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint for “failure to comply 13 with the FTCA’s administrative exhaustion requirement”). Accordingly, plaintiffs’ tort 14 claims against the Federal Defendants are subject to dismissal. 15 In sum, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against the Federal Defendants. 16 2. San Francisco County 17 Plaintiffs allege San Francisco County is “the county that detained the children and 18 where plaintiffs attend court” (see SAC at 18), and allege the following acts on the part of 19 the County: it “failed to reprimand [its] employees for misconduct on several occasions”; 20 its employees “failed to behave as professionals and meet the standards of professional 21 conduct because they deliberately did not perform thorough investigations or provide the 22 family and children with assistance that actually helped them”; and it “sen[t] social 23 workers to stalk and harass [plaintiffs] while receiving reproductive services” (see id. at 24 20–21). Based on such allegations, plaintiffs bring claims for: (1) “Constructive 25 Fraud/Fraud”; (2) “Breach of Fiduciary [sic]”; (3) “Negligent Malpractice”; (4) “Fraud Upon 26 the Court”; (5) “Health Care Fraud”; (6) “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress”; 27 1 (7) “Conspiring to Defraud the U.S. Government”; (8) “Making False Claims to the U.S. 2 Government”;6 (9) “Federal Constitution Monell 42 USC 1983, 1985, 1986”; (10) “State 3 Constitutional Violations.” (See SAC at 19.) 4 Under the California Tort Claims Act, “state law tort claims against . . . public entity 5 defendants are barred unless [plaintffs] present them to [the entity] before commencing 6 suit. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t., 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988) 7 citing Cal. Gov’t. Code §§ 905, 945.4, 950.2 (West 1980). Here, plaintiffs have not 8 alleged compliance with the required procedures, and, consequently, all tort claims 9 against San Francisco County are subject to dismissal. 10 Next, plaintiffs’ remaining federal claims against the County, namely their Monell 11 claims, fail. In particular, plaintiffs “must establish that the local government had a 12 deliberate policy, custom, or practice that was the moving force behind the constitutional 13 violation [plaintiffs] suffered.” See AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 14 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012). In so alleging, plaintiffs may not simply “recite the elements of a 15 cause of action,” e.g., the existence of a deliberate policy, but rather, the SAC must 16 “contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the 17 opposing party to defend itself effectively.” See id. at 637. Here, plaintiffs’ allegations 18 against San Francisco County are primarily allegations of isolated wrongdoing. See, e.g. 19 SAC at 20 (alleging “San Francisco failed to reprimand their employees for misconduct 20 on several occasions”). Although plaintiffs allege “other parents . . . have experienced the 21 same misconduct,” they fail to identify the particular wrongdoing so experienced, and 22 their conclusory allegation that “failure to supervise employees is a policy and custom of 23 defendants” (see id.) is unavailing. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 24 (2007) (holding “conclusory allegation . . . does not supply facts adequate” to support 25 claim). 26

27 6 As discussed above, the Court, by prior order, dismissed plaintiffs’ claims under 1 Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claims against San Francisco County are subject to 2 || dismissal. 3 3. Margaret Pendergast 4 Lastly, plaintiffs assert a claim for “professional negligence” against Margaret 5 || Pendergast, who they identify as “[p]arents’ [t]hird [a]ppointed [a]ttorney.” (See SAC at 4, 6 || 49.) Specifically, plaintiffs allege Pendergast, along with five previously dismissed 7 || attorneys, “violated the plaintiff[s’] rights and allowed mistreatment by failing to behave 8 || ethically and report the misconduct.” (See id. at 49.) Plaintiffs’ claim against Pendergast 9 || fails for the same reasons plaintiffs’ claims against their first two appointed attorneys fail, 10 || namely, plaintiffs’ failure to allege conduct that caused them harm. (See Rpt. and Rec. at 11 20:20-22.) 12 CONCLUSION s 13 For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs’ claims against all previously named 14 || defendants are hereby DISMISSED without further leave to amend. As plaintiffs may be 8 15 || able to cure some of the above-discussed deficiencies with respect to the newly named 16 || defendants, plaintiffs’ claims against the newly named defendants are hereby 17 DISMISSED with leave to amend. Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, if any, shall be | filed by November 1, 2024. 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 22 || Dated: September 13, 2024 (rire Chat MAXINE M. CHESNEY 23 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28