Walter v. Rockland Armor & Metal Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Walter v. Rockland Armor & Metal Corp.

140 A.D.2d 335, 528 N.Y.S.2d 82, 1988 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4577

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 2, 1988

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 140 A.D.2d 335 (Walter v. Rockland Armor & Metal Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Walter v. Rockland Armor & Metal Corp., 140 A.D.2d 335, 528 N.Y.S.2d 82, 1988 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4577 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1988).

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Opinion

[336]*336The appellants were only five days in default in answering in this case when they made a motion to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3016 (b). Although the Supreme Court properly denied the motion as being untimely, it was an improvident exercise of discretion to have granted the plaintiffs’ cross motion for leave to enter a default judgment.

In view of the relatively short period of the delay, the absence of any claim of prejudice to the plaintiff, the existence of a possible meritorious defense, the absence of any willfulness on the appellants’ part and the public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits, the Supreme Court should have denied the cross motion and granted the appellants leave to file late answers (see, McNeill v Lasala, 115 AD2d 459). Eiber, J. P., Kooper, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.

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[336]*336The appellants were only five days in default in answering in this case when they made a motion to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3016 (b). Although the Supreme Court properly denied the motion as being untimely, it was an improvident exercise of discretion to have granted the plaintiffs’ cross motion for leave to enter a default judgment.

In view of the relatively short period of the delay, the absence of any claim of prejudice to the plaintiff, the existence of a possible meritorious defense, the absence of any willfulness on the appellants’ part and the public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits, the Supreme Court should have denied the cross motion and granted the appellants leave to file late answers (see, McNeill v Lasala, 115 AD2d 459). Eiber, J. P., Kooper, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

140 A.D.2d 335, 528 N.Y.S.2d 82, 1988 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4577, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walter-v-rockland-armor-metal-corp-nyappdiv-1988.

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