Walter Smith v. Eric A. Johnson, Steven Scott Properties Management, ...

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: December 1, 2025
• Docket: a241827
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A24-1827

Walter Smith, Appellant,

vs.

Eric A. Johnson, et al., Respondents,

Steven Scott Properties Management, Respondent.

Filed December 1, 2025 Affirmed Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CV-23-2742

Walter Smith, St. Paul, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Laurel J. Pugh, Abriter PLLC, St. Louis Park, Minnesota (for respondents Eric A. Johnson and Aeon Properties)

Douglass Turner, Hanbery & Turner, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Steven Scott Properties Management)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and

Cochran, Judge. NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SMITH, TRACY M., Judge

Appellant Walter Smith challenges the district court’s dismissal pursuant to Rules

12.02 and 12.03 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure of his claims for the recovery

of his security deposit, rental assistance, and associated mental-anguish damages from

respondents Eric A. Johnson, Aeon Properties, and Steven Scott Properties Management.

Smith also argues that the district court judge erred by not disqualifying himself due to

bias. We affirm.

FACTS 1

Smith renewed his lease in November 2021 for a St. Paul apartment in a building

called Larpenteur Villa. On February 11, 2022, Smith was approved for public rental

assistance. Later, a fire damaged the apartment building, rendering it uninhabitable. Smith

asserted that the apartment that the landlord offered as substitute was also uninhabitable,

and he subsequently became homeless. Smith attempted to sue his landlord and the

apartment’s property manager. Smith represented himself in the district court and continues

to do so in this appeal.

The summons and complaint named as defendants Aeon Properties, Eric A. Johnson

(Aeon’s CEO), and Steven Scott Properties Management. Aeon apparently owns

1 On review of the dismissal of claims pursuant to rule 12.02 or rule 12.03, appellate courts must assume that the allegations in the complaint are true. See Halva v. Minn. Colls. & Univs., 953 N.W.2d 496, 500 (Minn. 2021) (rule 12.02); Burt v. Rackner, 902 N.W.2d 448, 451 (Minn. 2017) (rule 12.03). When facts are found related to the effectiveness of service, appellate courts apply those factual findings unless clearly erroneous. Shamrock Dev., Inc., v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Minn. 2008).

2 Larpenteur Villa LLC. 2 Steven Scott Management manages Larpenteur Villa. The lease

signed by Smith indicates that Larpenteur Villa LLC is the owner of the apartment building.

The summons and complaint did not name Larpenteur Villa LLC as a defendant. Smith

attempted to utilize the Ramsey County Sheriff’s office to serve the summons but was told

that the sheriff’s office did not have jurisdiction to do so. Smith subsequently personally

delivered the summons and complaint himself to the front desk staff of least one of

respondents’ offices. Smith signed the affidavits of service.

Johnson and Aeon Properties filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the

alternative, summary judgment, arguing that (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction due

to ineffective service of process, (2) the complaint failed to state a legally viable claim

against Johnson in his individual capacity, (3) the complaint failed to state a claim against

them because “Aeon Properties” does not exist, and (4) in the alternative, any claim against

Aeon should be limited to failure to return Smith’s security deposit. Steven Scott Properties

Management filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction

over Scott due to lack of proper service and (2) Smith failed to state a claim because Steven

Scott Properties Management is not a proper defendant.

On December 19, 2023, the case was reassigned to a new district court judge and

the parties were notified. On June 13, 2024, prior to any hearings, Smith filed a motion to

remove the district court judge, alleging bias and prejudice due to the district court’s

determination that the hearing on the motions would be held over Zoom despite Smith’s

2 Although there is nothing in the record regarding ownership of Larpenteur Villa LLC, neither party disputes the district court’s statement that Aeon owns Larpenteur Villa LLC.

3 assertion that he has challenges using technology due to mental disabilities. The district

court denied Smith’s request for removal, stating that the request for removal was not

timely filed and that Smith’s concerns about using the remote-hearing technology could be

ameliorated by assistance available at the courthouse. The Zoom hearing went forward,

with Smith’s participation, and the district court granted respondents’ motions due to lack

of personal jurisdiction over respondents.

This appeal follows.

DECISION

I. The district court properly granted respondents’ motions to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction.

Smith argues that the district court erred by concluding that it lacked jurisdiction

over the case because Smith did not effectively serve respondents with process.

Whether service of process was effective and thus whether the district court has

personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question of law that appellate courts review de

novo. Shamrock Dev., Inc., 754 N.W.2d at 382. If the district court finds facts, an appellate

court must apply those factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. Appellate

courts also review the construction and application of the Minnesota Rules of Civil

Procedure de novo. Id.

A district court obtains personal jurisdiction over a party via effective service of

process. McCullough & Sons, Inc. v. City of Vadnais Heights, 883 N.W.2d 580, 590 (Minn.

2016). “Absent proper service of process or a waiver thereof, the district court must dismiss

the action.” Koski v. Johnson, 837 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation

4 omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 2013). Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 4.02

strictly requires that a nonparty serve the summons: “Unless otherwise ordered by the

court, the sheriff or any other person not less than 18 years of age and not a party to the

action, may make service of a summons or other process.” (Emphasis added.) “Service of

process in a manner not authorized by the rule is ineffective service.” Tullis v. Federated

Mut. Ins. Co., 570 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Minn. 1997). A motion to dismiss may be made based

on lack of personal jurisdiction due to insufficient service of process. Minn. R. Civ. P.

12.02(b), (d).

The parties agree, and the district court found, that Smith himself attempted to serve

the respondents by physically going to at least one of the respondent’s offices and handing

front desk staff the summons. As the plaintiff, Smith was a party to the action, and the rule

therefore barred service by him. Smith did not submit evidence of any other service of

process that was proper.

Smith argues, though, that he should be granted an exception to the nonparty rule

because he was self-represented and had limited options for service and because the

respondents had notice of the suit. The arguments are unpersuasive.

First, courts generally hold self-represented litigants to the “same rules and

standards as attorneys.” Bedner v. Bedner, 946 N.W.2d 921, 927 (Minn. App. 2020).

Although some accommodations may be made for self-represented parties, modification

of procedural rules is not one of those accommodations. Ronay v. Ronay, 369 N.W.2d 12,

14 (Minn. App. 1985); Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001).

Smith suggests that an exception should apply because the Ramsey County Sheriff’s Office

5 lacked jurisdiction to serve respondents and he had limited options for alternative modes

of service. But that argument, too, is unavailing. Minnesota courts cannot retroactively

validate improper service of process. Lewis v. Contracting Nw., Inc., 413 N.W.2d 154, 157

(Minn. App. 1987). “While the results are harsh, there is no exception to the nonparty rule

without authorization by the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id.

Second, notice of a lawsuit does not cure ineffective service of process. Tullis, 570

N.W.2d at 311. “[W]hen service of process is challenged, the plaintiff must submit

evidence of effective service.” DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263, 271

(Minn. 2016). Once the plaintiff does so, the defendant has the burden of showing that the

service was improper. Id. Smith did not submit evidence of effective service. Again,

Minnesota courts cannot retroactively validate improper service of process or grant an

exception to the nonparty rule that is not in the rules of procedure. Lewis, 413 N.W.2d at

157.

Because service was ineffective, the district court did not obtain personal

jurisdiction over respondents and was required to dismiss the action. See Koski, 837

N.W.2d at 742. Because lack of personal jurisdiction is dispositive, we need not address

the alternative grounds for dismissal argued by respondents, including that Smith failed to

state a claim on which relief can be granted. 3

3 We note that, in its order, the district court pointed out that Smith may have had a colorable claim against Larpenteur Villa LLC for the return of his security deposit under Minnesota Statutes section 504B.178, subdivisions 3(a) and 4 (2024). To have validly pursued this claim, however, Smith would have had to initiate a suit against Larpenteur Villa LLC and properly serve process via a nonparty. Because he did not do so in this case, we do not reach the merits of any potential security-deposit claim that Smith may have had.

6 II. The district court judge did not err by not disqualifying himself from the case.

Smith argues the district court judge should have removed himself from the case

due to judicial bias. Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 63.02 provides that “[n]o judge

shall sit in any case if disqualified under the Code of Judicial Conduct.” A judge must

disqualify themself if “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Minn.

Code Jud. Conduct Rule 2.11(A). “The mere fact that a party declares a judge partial does

not in itself generate a reasonable question as to the judge’s impartiality.” State v. Burrell,

743 N.W.2d 596, 601-02 (Minn. 2008). And “[p]revious adverse rulings by themselves do

not demonstrate judicial bias.” Hannon v. State, 752 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2008).

Judicial bias “must be proved in light of the record as a whole.” Id. Appellate courts

presume that a district court judge properly discharged their duties. Id. “Whether a judge

is disqualified from presiding over a case is a question of law, which we review de novo.”

In re Jacobs, 802 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 2011).

Smith makes several arguments related to the district court judge’s alleged bias,

which we address in turn. 4 First, Smith argues that the judge was biased because the district

court did not consider the exhibits and evidence that he submitted before the hearing on

respondents’ motions. Our review reveals that the district court considered the parts of the

record relevant to respondents’ motions. The district court’s decision to limit the scope of

4 Smith does not reassert on appeal the argument raised in his initial motion to remove the district court judge—namely, that the judge was biased because the judge held the motions hearing over Zoom despite Smith’s request for an in-person hearing due to his challenges using technology.

7 the hearing is merely an adverse ruling, and an adverse ruling on its own does not

demonstrate judicial bias. Hannon, 752 N.W.2d at 522.

Second, Smith argues that the judge inappropriately failed to consider his motion to

compel discovery prior to the hearing on the motions to dismiss. Smith’s motion to compel

discovery was denied due to an insufficient filing fee, and its denial thus does not support

a claim of bias.

Third, Smith argues that the judge was biased and vindictive, prejudged his claim,

and acted on respondents’ behalf during the motions hearing. He further argues that the

judge “made a self-serving decision not to be removed.” Based on our review of the record,

the judge’s questioning of Smith at the hearing was limited to clarifying testimony. Judges

may examine witnesses “to clarify the testimony.” Teachout v. Wilson, 376 N.W.2d 460,

465 (Minn. App. 1985) (citing Minn. R. Evid. 614), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 30, 1985).

There is nothing in the record to suggest the judge was prejudiced, biased, or vindictive in

his questioning of Smith. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the judge

had a connection to any of the parties or otherwise acted on the respondents’ behalf or out

of his own self-interest.

In sum, there is no evidence that reasonably raises a question as to the district court

judge’s impartiality for any of the reasons raised by Smith. We conclude that the district

court judge did not err by not disqualifying himself from the case due to bias.

Affirmed.