Walter Sayles v. Sergeants Amaya and Mercado

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: June 26, 2026
• Docket: 3:26-cv-00174
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WALTER SAYLES, Case No.: 26-cv-0174-AJB-JLB CDR #AL-4748 12 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S Plaintiff, 13 MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL v. 14

SERGEANTS AMAYA and MERCADO, 15 [ECF No. 23] Defendants. 16 17 18 19 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Request for Appointment of Counsel. (ECF 20 No. 23.) While the Court is sympathetic to the challenges Plaintiff faces litigating his case 21 pro se, the Court nevertheless DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion WITHOUT PREJUDICE for 22 the reasons set forth below. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 On January 2, 2026, Plaintiff Walter Sayles (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner confined 25 at Pelican Bay State Penitentiary in Crescent City, California, proceeding pro se, filed this 26 civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff claims that he was 27 subjected to excessive use of force while housed at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional 28 Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California. (Id. at 3–6.) On February 11, 2026, the Court 1 granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and dismissed Plaintiff’s 2 Complaint with leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § § 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). (ECF 3 No. 9.) On February 23, 2026, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF 4 No. 11.) On March 4, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion to appoint counsel. (ECF No. 12.) 5 On April 20, 2026, the Court found the First Amended Complaint adequately stated 6 Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Amaya (failure to protect) and Defendant 7 Jane Doe1 (excessive force) and dismissed the Eighth Amendment excessive force claims 8 against Defendants Taylor and Amaya. (ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff was granted leave to either 9 amend the complaint or file a Notice of Intent to Proceed with the two adequately pleaded 10 claims. (Id. at 8–9.) The Court also denied, without prejudice, Plaintiff’s first Motion to 11 appoint counsel. (Id. at 9.) 12 Subsequently, Plaintiff notified the Court of his election to proceed solely on the 13 Eighth Amendment claims that had survived the motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 18, 19, 20.) 14 On May 14, 2026, the District Court issued an order directing the Clerk of Court to 15 issue a summons for Defendant Mercado as to Plaintiff’s FAC and provide Plaintiff with 16 the summons and a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 so that service could be effectuated. 17 (ECF No. 21 at 2.) The order also provided: “Plaintiff must complete the USM Form 285 18 as completely and accurately as possible [] and return the form to the United States 19 Marshal.” Id. Thereafter, the U.S. Marshal was to “serve a copy of the First Amended 20 Complaint and summons upon Defendant” as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285. 21 Id. 22 On May 28, 2026, Plaintiff filed the present Motion to Request for Appointment of 23 Counsel.2 (ECF No. 23.) 24 25 1 Defendant Jane Doe was later identified by Plaintiff as “Sergeant Mercado.” (ECF 26 No. 19.) 27 2 On June 15, 2026, Plaintiff filed a “Notice to Ask for Case” in which Plaintiff asks 28 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 3 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) permits a 4 court to appoint counsel when the person is unable to afford such counsel, but this power 5 should only be exercised under “exceptional circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); 6 Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) 7 (the decision to appoint counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) is within “the sound 8 discretion of the trial court and is granted only in exceptional circumstances.”) (citation 9 omitted); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that only 10 “exceptional circumstances” support such a discretionary appointment). Such exceptional 11 circumstances exist where there is a cumulative showing of both a likelihood of success on 12 the merits and an inability of the pro se litigant to articulate his claims due to their legal 13 complexity. Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970. “Neither of these factors is dispositive and both 14 must be viewed together before reaching a decision on request of counsel . . . .” Wilborn 15 v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). 16 III. DISCUSSION 17 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 18 If a plaintiff fails to provide any evidence supporting his likelihood of success at 19 trial, he or she fails the first factor set forth in Wilborn. Picart v. Gonzalez, No. 3:25-cv- 20 01846-AJB-AHG, 2026 WL 1137973, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2026) (citations omitted); 21

22 23 send me the Mail Box rules.” (ECF No. 24.) It is unclear from this filing if Plaintiff has received, completed or returned the USM Form 285 as directed by the Court. (See ECF 24 No. 21.) On May 23, 2026, a waiver of service of summons was returned executed for 25 Defendants Amaya and Mercado. (ECF No. 25.) It is standard practice in the Southern District of California to send pro se plaintiffs a copy of any docket entry via the United 26 States Postal Service. In order for this to be effective, S.D. Cal. CivLR 83.11 provides: “A 27 party proceeding pro se must keep the Court and opposing parties advised as to current address.” Notwithstanding this courtesy extended by the Court, it is Plaintiff’s 28 1 Bailey v. Lawford, 835 F. Supp. 550, 552 (S.D. Cal. 1993). Allegations made in the 2 pleadings, without further corroboration with supporting evidence thereafter, are 3 insufficient to demonstrate the likelihood of success at trial. Id. 4 Here, Plaintiff offers no evidence demonstrating that he has a likelihood of success 5 on the merits. At this early stage of the proceedings, with discovery not even begun, the 6 Court cannot determine whether or not Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his 7 claims. Id.; see also Stein v. City of San Diego, No. 3:24-cv-00953-DMS-AHG, 2025 WL 8 3241125, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (denying motion for appointment of counsel 9 because it was too early to determine whether any of plaintiff’s claims would be 10 successful). While some of Plaintiff’s claims have survived the motion to dismiss stage, 11 no substantive motions to test Plaintiff’s claims have been filed. Thus, the Court concludes 12 that Plaintiff has not satisfied the first “exception circumstances” factor that would support 13 his request for the appointment of counsel. At this stage of the proceedings, it is simply 14 too soon to tell whether Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of any of his claims. 15 Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103. 16 B. Ability of Plaintiff to Articulate His Claims 17 A litigant must meet a high bar to show that he is unable to “present his case pro se 18 in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Siglar v. Hopkins, 822 Fed. Appx. 19 610, 612 (9th Cir. 2020). A pro se litigant cannot meet this bar merely by showing that he 20 would benefit from appointment of counsel. Id. (“if this were the prevailing standard, pro 21 se civil litigants would be entitled to counsel in all circumstances, not only exceptional 22 ones”) (citation omitted). Rather, the litigant must show that his circumstances and the 23 complexity of his claims render him uniquely unable to articulate his claims. See Fierro 24 v. Smith, No. 19-16786, 2022 WL 2437526, at *1 (9th Cir. July 5, 2022) (holding that the 25 difficulties a pro se prisoner litigant faced did not constitute exceptional circumstances 26 because they were the same circumstances that many pro se prisoner litigants face); see 27 also Jones v. Kuppinger 2:13-CV-0451 WBS AC, 2015 WL 5522290, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 28 1 Sept. 17, 2015). Thus, as long as a pro se litigant is able to articulate his claim, the 2 “exceptional circumstances” that might support the appointment of counsel do not exist. 3 Here, Plaintiff makes two primary arguments as to why he is uniquely unable to 4 present his case pro se. Plaintiff contends that (1) his mental and physical disabilities 5 render him unable to advocate for himself; and (2) he does not “know how to do the next 6 step in [his] case” and therefore cannot litigate his case pro se. (See ECF No. 23.) The 7 Court will address each argument in turn. 8 1. Plaintiff’s Mental and Physical Disabilities 9 First, Plaintiff argues that mental illness and back pain that he alleges stems from 10 the incident in question render him unable to litigate his case pro se.3 (See ECF No. 23.) 11 Generally, “mental illness and disability, do not in themselves establish exceptional 12 circumstances warranting appointment of voluntary civil counsel” because they are 13 “[c]ircumstances common to most prisoners.” Jones, 2015 WL 5522290, at *3–4. To 14 constitute an exceptional circumstance, the litigant’s mental illness or disability must 15 render him completely unable to articulate his arguments and prosecute the case. See 16 Fletcher v. Quin, No. 3:15-CV-2156-GPC-NLS, 2018 WL 840174, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 17 13, 2018); see also Meeks v. Nunez, No. 13-cv-973-GPC (BGS), 2017 WL 476425, at *3– 18 4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017). 19 Plaintiff’s disabilities do not render him unable to articulate his claims or prosecute 20 this case without the effective assistance of counsel. Palmer 560 F.3d at 967, 970 (9th Cir. 21 2009) (holding that severe pain from a recent surgery did not constitute an exceptional 22 circumstance); Meeks, 2017 WL 476425, at *4 (holding that appointment of counsel was 23 not warranted when a plaintiff’s mental illness did not affect his ability to articulate his 24 arguments and prosecute the case). Indeed, despite Plaintiff’s disabilities, Plaintiff has 25

26 27 3 Plaintiff also previously contended that post-traumatic stress disorder and a learning disability warranted appointed counsel. (ECF No. 12.) The Court did not find that these 28 1 successfully navigated his legal proceedings to date and has filed several motions with the 2 Court, including a Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2), a Complaint (ECF No. 1), an 3 Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11), two motions to appoint counsel (ECF Nos. 12 and 23), 4 and a Notice of Intent to Proceed (ECF No. 18). While the Court appreciates the unique 5 challenges Plaintiff faces, his request for assistance of counsel based on his reported 6 disabilities does not meet the “exceptional circumstances” factor at this stage of the case. 7 See, e.g., Ochoa v. Von Lintig, No. 19-CV-00346-MMA-JLB, 2020 WL 2097617, at *3 8 (S.D. Cal. May 1, 2020) (denying a Motion to appoint counsel where an incarcerated pro 9 se Plaintiff successfully filed several motions with the Court). 10 2. Plaintiff’s Uncertainty About Next Steps 11 Next, Plaintiff contends that he should be appointed counsel because he does not 12 “know how to do the next step in [his] case.” (ECF No. 23.) However, the difficulties that 13 an incarcerated pro se litigant faces due to a “lack of legal training and limited access to 14 legal resources” are difficulties common to most prisoners. Fierro, 2022 WL 2437526, at 15 *1. Moreover, the fact that an incarcerated pro se litigant faces challenges litigating their 16 case does not establish that their claims are legally complex. Id. If such difficulties 17 established the complexity of one’s claims, nearly all pro se litigants would be entitled to 18 appointed counsel. See Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331. Plaintiff’s purported uncertainty about 19 what to do next does not demonstrate an inability to articulate his claims without effective 20 assistance of counsel. As already noted above, Plaintiff’s several court filings illustrate 21 that he can articulate the facts and circumstances relevant to his claims. Agyeman, 390 22 F.3d at 1103; see also LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming a 23 district court's denial of request for appointment of counsel where the petitioner had “a 24 good understanding of the issues and the ability to present forcefully and coherently his 25 contentions”). 26 In recognition of the difficulty that people can face when representing themselves in 27 civil cases before a federal court, the District Court for the Southern District of California 28 has created a resource to assist pro se parties. These materials can be accessed through the 1 ||Court’s website by visiting https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/ and clicking on the banner 2 || titled “Representing Yourself.” Pro se litigants who are in custody can look for an 3 ||additional link on the page directing them to a specific information packet regarding 4 || prisoner civil rights litigation. Plaintiff may find it beneficial to consult these resources. 5 || Additionally, Pelican Bay State Prison, where Plaintiff is currently incarcerated, provides 6 ||access to legal research materials through the prison library which Plaintiff can use to 7 ||research his case. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, 8 || Library Services, https://(www.cdcr.ca.gov/rehabilitation/Is/ (last visited June 12, 2026). 9 || Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met the “high bar to show that [his] legal claims are so 10 || complex as to render [him] unable to articulate his claims.” Siglar, 822 Fed. Appx. at 612; 11 || Mascrenas v. Wagner, No. 19CV2014-WQH(BLM), 2020 WL 4436358, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 12 |}Aug. 3, 2020) (denying an incarcerated plaintiffs Motion to appoint counsel when the 13 || plaintiff had access to legal research materials at the prison library and his legal issues were 14 || not especially complex). 15 CONCLUSION 16 While this Court is sympathetic to the difficulties Plaintiff faces litigating his case 17 ||pro se while incarcerated, Plaintiff has not sufficiently demonstrated “exceptional 18 || circumstances” necessitating the appointment of counsel. Accordingly, the Court DENIES 19 || WITHOUT PREJUDICE, Plaintiff's Motion to appoint counsel. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 Dated: June 25, 2026 -

n. Jill L. Burkhardt 23 ited States Magistrate Judge 24 25 26 27 28