Walter R. Reid v. Chance Andes, Warden

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WALTER R. REID, Case No. 8:25-cv-02886-KK-PD 12 Petitioner, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: 13 DISMISSAL OF PETITION v. 14 CHANCE ANDES, Warden, 15 16 Respondent. 17 18

19 On December 22, 2025, Petitioner Walter R. Reid, proceeding pro se, 20 filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody 21 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court issues this order to show cause 22 directed to Petitioner because the Petition appears to be unauthorized second 23 or successive petition. 24 I. Procedural History and Petitioner’s Contentions 25 A. Trial and Direct Appeal 26 In December 1999, an Orange County Superior Court jury found 27 Petitioner guilty of two counts of committing a lewd act upon a child and 28 found that he engaged in substantial conduct with a child and committed the 1 charged crimes against multiple victims. See Dkt. No. 1 at 2; Reid v. Yates, 2 No. 8:06-cv-00744-SVW-VBK, Dkt. No. 12 at 3 (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 11, 2006) 3 (“Reid I”).1 On January 21, 2000, he was sentenced to 15 years to life in state 4 prison. Reid I, Dkt. No. 1 at 3. 5 Petitioner appealed but later voluntarily abandoned his appeal, and on 6 July 13, 2000, the California Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. See id. 7 He did not file a petition for review. See id. Beginning in December 2001, he 8 filed a series of unsuccessful state-court habeas petitions, the last of which 9 was denied on February 29, 2008. See id. at 3-5, 57-58. 10 Over a decade later, Petitioner initiated another series of unsuccessful 11 state-court habeas petitions, the first of which was filed on September 26, 12 2022, and the last of which was denied on October 29, 2025. See id. at 57-59; 13 Cal. App. Cts. Case Info., available at http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/ 14 (search for “Walter” with “Robert” and “Reid”) (last visited Feb. 26, 2026). 15 B. Prior Federal Habeas Petitions 16 This is not the first federal habeas petition that Petitioner has filed 17 challenging his 1999 state-court convictions. On August 11, 2006, he filed his 18 first petition, which was denied with prejudice as untimely. See Reid I, Dkt. 19 Nos. 12, 14-15. On December 18, 2006, he filed a second federal habeas 20 petition challenging his 1999 state-court convictions and sentence, and on 21 March 5, 2007, the District Judge dismissed the petition, finding that it was 22 impermissibly successive. See Reid v. Yates, No. 8:06-cv-01225-PSG-VBK, 23 Dkt. Nos. 10-11. On June 19, 2007, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the 24 Ninth Circuit, see id., Dkt. No. 16, and on September 7, the Ninth Circuit 25

26 1 As related below, Petitioner has previously filed two federal habeas petitions challenging his 1999 state-court conviction. The Court takes judicial notice of those 27 petitions as well as the relevant filings and lodgments in connection with those 28 cases. See Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F. 3d 1126, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2012); Fed. 1 denied a certificate of appealability and dismissed the appeal, see id., Dkt. No. 2 17. 3 C. The Instant Petition 4 On December 18, 2025, Petitioner constructively filed the instant 5 Petition. Liberally construed, see Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 889-90 (9th 6 Cir. 2008) (district courts are obligated to liberally construe pro se litigant 7 filings), the Petition states the following five grounds for relief: 8 (1) Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to argue 9 that Petitioner was statutorily exempt from a life sentence; 10 (2) Petitioner’s sentencing violates due process because he was 11 statutorily exempt from a life sentence; 12 (3) Petitioner’s sentence was unauthorized under California law and, 13 thus, violates due process; 14 (4) Appellate counsel was ineffective in advising Petitioner to 15 voluntarily dismiss his direct appeal; and 16 (5) Petitioner is actually innocent “of the life term” because California 17 law prohibited the trial court from imposing a life term.2 18 Dkt. No. 1 at 16-21. 19 II. Discussion 20 A. Duty to Screen 21 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires the Court to 22 conduct a preliminary review of the Petition. Pursuant to Rule 4, the Court 23 must summarily dismiss a petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the 24 petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” 25 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 2254 Cases; see Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 26 1038, 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.

27 2 Petitioner also identifies “equitable tolling based on delayed discovery” as one of 28 his grounds for relief. See Dkt. No. 1 at 14. However, any argument concerning 1 1990).

2 B. The Petition Appears to Be an Unauthorized Second or 3 Successive Petition 4 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 5 “creates a ‘gatekeeping’ mechanism for the consideration of second or 6 successive applications in district court.” Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657 7 (1996); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 641 (1998). Under this 8 procedure, “[a]n individual seeking to file a ‘second or successive’ application 9 must move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order directing the 10 district court to consider his application.” Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. at 641. 11 Thereafter, the appellate court “may authorize the filing of a second or 12 successive application only if it determines that the application makes a 13 prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of” the 14 AEDPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C) (“The court of appeals may authorize 15 the filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the 16 application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the 17 requirements of this subsection.”); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 531 (9th 18 Cir. 2006). If, however, a petitioner files a second petition without obtaining 19 authorization from the appropriate court of appeals to do so, the district court 20 is “without jurisdiction to entertain [the second petition].” Burton v. Stewart, 21 549 U.S. 147, 157 (2007). 22 “[A] federal habeas petition is second or successive if the facts 23 underlying the claim occurred by the time of the initial petition and if the 24 petition challenges the same state court judgment as the initial petition.” 25 Brown v. Muniz, 889 F.3d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). A 26 petition is not successive if the “factual predicate” for its claims arose “only 27 after the time of the initial petition.” Id. (citation omitted). 28 1 The instant Petition appears to be an unauthorized second or successive 2 petition. It challenges the same state-court judgment that Petitioner 3 challenged in 2006 federal habeas petition, which was denied with prejudice 4 as untimely. See Reid I, Dkt. Nos. 12, 14-15. That denial constituted a 5 decision on the merits. See McNabb v. Yates, 576 F.3d 1028, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 6 2009) (dismissal of habeas petition for untimeliness constitutes merits 7 decision and renders subsequent petitions second or successive (citation 8 omitted)). Petitioner does not allege that he has obtained the requisite 9 authorization from the Ninth Circuit to file a second or successive petition in 10 this Court challenging his 1999 conviction and resulting sentence, and the 11 Ninth Circuit’s docket shows that he has not done so. 12 Moreover, Petitioner could have raised each of the Petition’s claims in 13 his 2006 federal habeas petition. Indeed, he does not allege that any of the 14 claims rely on a new rule of constitutional law, let alone one made retroactive 15 by the Supreme Court. The factual predicate for each of the Petition’s claims 16 arose before Petitioner’s 2006 federal habeas petition was denied with prejudice. Indeed, each of the Petition’s claims concerns facts that occurred 17 either at Petitioner’s trial or during his direct appeal process. That Petitioner 18 may not have realized the significance of those facts until sometime after his 19 first federal habeas petition was denied is inconsequential as to whether his 20 current claims are impermissibly successive. See Harris v. Silva, No. EDCV 21 24-1306-WDK (JPR), 2025 WL 2201373, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2025) 22 (petitioner’s claims were impermissibly successive when they concerned trial 23 errors even though he did not realize significance of facts underlying his 24 claims until fellow inmate advised him that they “were important”), accepted 25 by 2025 WL 2200720 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2025). 26 Accordingly, the Petition appears to be an unauthorized second and 27 successive petition, and, as such, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider it. 28 1 | III. Conclusion 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS Petitioner to show cause 3 || by no later than March 25, 2026, as to why the Petition should not be 4 || dismissed because it is impermissibly successive. 5 Petitioner is admonished that the Court will construe his failure to 6 || comply with this Order by March 25, 2026, as a concession on his part that 7 || the Petition is an unauthorized second or successive petition. In that event, 8 || the Court will recommend that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice for 9 || lack of jurisdiction. 10 1] IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 B DATED: February 26, 2026 , 4 Pale Lena kue_ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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