Walter N. Vance, III, Inc. v. Freeman

610 So. 2d 98, 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 12857, 1992 WL 371351
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedDecember 16, 1992
DocketNo. 91-3300
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 610 So. 2d 98 (Walter N. Vance, III, Inc. v. Freeman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walter N. Vance, III, Inc. v. Freeman, 610 So. 2d 98, 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 12857, 1992 WL 371351 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992).

Opinion

SMITH, Judge.

Walter N. Vance, III, Inc. (Vance) appeals an order denying its motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1989) for legal representation performed in arbitration proceedings.1 We affirm.

The parties entered into a residential construction contract which required them to arbitrate any disputes. Alleging untimely, defective and nonconforming work, the Freemans terminated Vance in January 1990. Vance recorded a lien against the Freeman’s property and brought a foreclosure action in circuit court. The Free-mans obtained an order staying litigation and compelling arbitration of all contract disputes. As a result of the ensuing arbitration, Vance was awarded $39,427.23 plus interest, which the Freemans immediately paid. Thereafter, Vance filed a motion in circuit court seeking attorney’s fees and costs for time spent in arbitration, which was denied. This appeal followed.

It is true that fees can be recovered for representation in arbitration proceedings compelled in insurance disputes relative to certain provisions of the Insurance Code, such as sections 627.428 and 627.756, Florida Statutes. Insurance Co. of North America v. Acousti Engineering Construction Co., 579 So.2d 77 (Fla.1991) approving Fewox v. McMerit Construction Co., 556 So.2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). We have not overlooked appellant’s contention that the policy arguments underlying the award of fees in the cited cases should apply equally in this case. However, as the trial court found, section 713.29 cannot be compared with sections 627.428 and 627.756. Fees are not awardable under former section 713.29 unless a party prevails in an action to enforce a mechanic’s lien. A party who files a mechanic’s lien foreclosure, but then goes to arbitration and receives an award by that means, has not “prevailed in an action to enforce a mechanic’s lien” and is not entitled to have his attorney’s fees paid by the opposing party. Zac Smith & Co. v. Moonspinner [99]*99Condominium Association, Inc., 534 So.2d 739, 742-3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

AFFIRMED.

SHIVERS and KAHN, JJ., concur.

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611 So. 2d 1374 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1993)

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Bluebook (online)
610 So. 2d 98, 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 12857, 1992 WL 371351, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walter-n-vance-iii-inc-v-freeman-fladistctapp-1992.