Walter HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joe S. HOPPER, Commissioner of Alabama Department of Corrections, Defendant-Appellee

Eleventh Circuit

Walter HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joe S. HOPPER, Commissioner of Alabama Department of Corrections, Defendant-Appellee

112 F.3d 1088, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 7571, 1997 WL 185400

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

DecidedApril 17, 1997

Docket97-6306

StatusPublished

Cited by48 cases

This text of 112 F.3d 1088 (Walter HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joe S. HOPPER, Commissioner of Alabama Department of Corrections, Defendant-Appellee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Walter HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joe S. HOPPER, Commissioner of Alabama Department of Corrections, Defendant-Appellee, 112 F.3d 1088, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 7571, 1997 WL 185400 (11th Cir. 1997).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Walter Hill, an Alabama inmate convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death, challenges on appeal the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 assault upon the constitutionality of electrocution as a means of execution. The State of Alabama intends to execute Hill by means of electrocution on May 2, 1997. On March 31, 1997, Appellant Hill filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama charging that the scheduled electrocution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Among other relief, the complaint sought to enjoin Appellee Joe S. Hopper from employing electrocution to carry out Hill’s death sentence. By order dated April 10, 1997, the district court dismissed the complaint as an improper successive habeas petition. We affirm.

In Felker v. Turpin, 101 F.3d 95, 96 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 450, 136 L.Ed.2d 345 (1996), we held that a prisoner may not circumvent the *1089 rules regarding second or successive habeas petitions by filing a § 1983 claim. Appellant Hill acknowledges that he has filed a previous federal habeas petition. See Hill v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1015 (11th Cir.), reh’g and suggestion for reh’g en banc denied, 92 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 967, 136 L.Ed.2d 851 (1997). As Hill’s § 1983 cruel and unusual punishment claim constitutes the “functional equivalent” of a second habeas petition, the district court was subject to the law applicable to successive habeas petitions. Felker, 101 F.3d at 96. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant Hill’s request for relief because Hill had not applied to this Court for permission to file a second habeas petition.

AFFIRMED.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Walter Hill, an Alabama inmate convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death, challenges on appeal the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 assault upon the constitutionality of electrocution as a means of execution. The State of Alabama intends to execute Hill by means of electrocution on May 2, 1997. On March 31, 1997, Appellant Hill filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama charging that the scheduled electrocution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Among other relief, the complaint sought to enjoin Appellee Joe S. Hopper from employing electrocution to carry out Hill’s death sentence. By order dated April 10, 1997, the district court dismissed the complaint as an improper successive habeas petition. We affirm.

In Felker v. Turpin, 101 F.3d 95, 96 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 450, 136 L.Ed.2d 345 (1996), we held that a prisoner may not circumvent the *1089 rules regarding second or successive habeas petitions by filing a § 1983 claim. Appellant Hill acknowledges that he has filed a previous federal habeas petition. See Hill v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1015 (11th Cir.), reh’g and suggestion for reh’g en banc denied, 92 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 967, 136 L.Ed.2d 851 (1997). As Hill’s § 1983 cruel and unusual punishment claim constitutes the “functional equivalent” of a second habeas petition, the district court was subject to the law applicable to successive habeas petitions. Felker, 101 F.3d at 96. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant Hill’s request for relief because Hill had not applied to this Court for permission to file a second habeas petition.

AFFIRMED.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

112 F.3d 1088, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 7571, 1997 WL 185400, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walter-hill-plaintiff-appellant-v-joe-s-hopper-commissioner-of-alabama-ca11-1997.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack