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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT SEATTLE 7 WALTER ANDRES BARRIOS CASE NO. 2:26-cv-00317-JNW Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING IN PART v. 10 PAMELA BONDI et al., 11 Respondents. 12 13 1. INTRODUCTION 14 Petitioner Walter Andres Barrios Osorio, proceeding pro se and in forma 15 pauperis, petitioned the Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Dkt. No. 5. He also filed a 16 motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin his deportation to El Salvador 17 and to allow him two years to pursue “his administrative remedies.” Dkt. No. 2 at 2. 18 The Court GRANTS in part the habeas petition and DENIES the motion for a 19 temporary restraining order, without prejudice. 20 21 2. BACKGROUND 22 Osorio is a citizen of El Salvador. He entered the United States without 23 inspection or admission at an unknown place and time. Dkt. No. 9 ¶ 4. On August 1 26, 2025, federal agents executing a residential search warrant at a home in 2 Edmonds, Washington, encountered Osorio and took him into custody. Dkt. No. 10-1
3 at 3. He was transferred that same day to the Northwest ICE Processing Center 4 (“NWIPC”), where he remains detained. Also that same day, Osorio was issued a 5 Notice to Appear charging him as a “[noncitizen] present in the United States who 6 has not been admitted or paroled.” Dkt. No. 10-2 at 2. The Notice to Appear did not 7 designate Osorio as an “arriving alien.” Id. 8 On November 6, 2025, an immigration judge ordered Osorio removed to El
9 Salvador. Dkt. No. 10-3 at 4. Osorio appealed the removal order to the Board of 10 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). He contends the BIA “has issued a stay of removal,” 11 Dkt. No. 5-1 at 2, while Respondents contend the appeal remains pending. Dkt. No. 12 9 ¶ 14. 13 On December 17, 2025, an immigration judge denied Osorio’s request for a 14 bond hearing, finding the immigration court lacked jurisdiction because Osorio was 15 subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Dkt. No. 10-4. The
16 immigration judge also stated, in the alternative, bond would be denied even if the 17 court had jurisdiction. Id. The order does not identify the basis for this alternative 18 finding—none of the relevant boxes were checked, and no explanation was provided. 19 Id. 20 21
22 23 1 3. DISCUSSION 2 3.1 Osorio is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 3 The central question is which detention statute governs Osorio’s custody. 4 Respondents argue he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), 5 and its implementing regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 235 et seq., which applies to 6 “applicants for admission” to the United States. Dkt. No. 8 at 3–5. Osorio 7 contends—and the Court agrees—that he is detained under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), the 8 default detention provision for noncitizens already present in the United States. 9 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018). Under Section 1226(a), Osorio is 10 eligible for a bond hearing. 11 Section 1225 governs the inspection and processing of noncitizens at the 12 border. Id. at 287. It applies to noncitizens who are “applicants for admission,” and 13 subjects those who are “seeking admission,” but “not clearly and beyond a doubt 14 entitled to be admitted,” to mandatory detention pending removal proceedings. 8 15 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Section 1226(a), by contrast, is the “default rule” for 16 noncitizens present in the United States who are arrested and placed in 17 immigration detention. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. It permits the government to 18 release a detainee on bond during the pendency of removal proceedings. Id. 19 The statutory text of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) requires that a noncitizen be 20 “seeking admission”—a present-tense activity describing the act of presenting 21 oneself at the border and asking to be allowed into the country. The phrases “an 22 alien who is an applicant for admission” and “an alien seeking admission” are not 23 1 synonymous; the first describes a status that may persist over time, while the 2 second describes a current activity. See Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 802 F. Supp.
3 3d 1297, 1327–28 (W.D. Wash. 2025); Torres v. Wamsley, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 4 1270–71 (W.D. Wash. 2025). A noncitizen who has been residing in the United 5 States and is arrested in the interior of the country is not “seeking admission” 6 within the meaning of Section 1225(b)(2)(A). 7 Applying these principles, Osorio is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 § 1225(b). He was arrested at his home in Edmonds, Washington—not a port of
9 entry or the border. Dkt. No. 10-1 at 3. He was residing in the United States, not 10 seeking admission. The Government’s records confirm as much. The Notice to 11 Appear charged Osorio as a noncitizen “present in the United States who has not 12 been admitted or paroled” and expressly declined to classify him as an “arriving 13 alien.” Dkt. No. 10-2 at 2. See Cotoc Yac De Yac v. Hermosillo, 2:25-cv-02593-DGE- 14 TLF, 2026 WL 124334, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 16, 2026) (relying on identical NTA 15 language as evidence noncitizen was not “seeking admission”); Garcia Gabriel v.
16 Hermosillo, 2:25-CV-02594-DGE-GJL, 2026 WL 194233 at * 3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 26, 17 2026) (finding same). 18 Respondents’ reliance on Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, 2026 19 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) is unpersuasive. Buenrostro-Mendez is not 20 binding, and as the dissent acknowledges, “The overwhelming majority of courts in 21 [the Fifth Circuit] and elsewhere have recognized that the government’s position [on
22 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)] is totally unsupported.” 2026 WL 323330, at *10. 23 1 The Court concludes that Osorio is not subject to mandatory detention under 2 Section 1225(b) and is instead detained under Section 1226(a), which entitles him to
3 a bond hearing.1 4 3.2 The Immigration Judge’s bond denial. 5 On December 17, 2025, an immigration judge denied Osorio’s bond request, 6 citing lack of jurisdiction under Section 1225(b)(2). Dkt. No. 10-4. The judge also 7 made an alternative finding that bond would be denied even if jurisdiction existed, 8 but the order provides no explanation for this alternative conclusion. Id. at 2. 9 Federal courts generally lack jurisdiction to review discretionary bond 10 determinations. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). But Section 1226(e) does not preclude judicial 11 review of constitutional claims or legal errors. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 12 1189, 1209 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Although the [immigration judge’s] discretionary bond 13 determination was not reviewable in federal court..., we would have had jurisdiction 14 under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider any error of law in [a noncitizen’s] agency 15 proceedings, including any claimed due process violation.”).
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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT SEATTLE 7 WALTER ANDRES BARRIOS CASE NO. 2:26-cv-00317-JNW Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING IN PART v. 10 PAMELA BONDI et al., 11 Respondents. 12 13 1. INTRODUCTION 14 Petitioner Walter Andres Barrios Osorio, proceeding pro se and in forma 15 pauperis, petitioned the Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Dkt. No. 5. He also filed a 16 motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin his deportation to El Salvador 17 and to allow him two years to pursue “his administrative remedies.” Dkt. No. 2 at 2. 18 The Court GRANTS in part the habeas petition and DENIES the motion for a 19 temporary restraining order, without prejudice. 20 21 2. BACKGROUND 22 Osorio is a citizen of El Salvador. He entered the United States without 23 inspection or admission at an unknown place and time. Dkt. No. 9 ¶ 4. On August 1 26, 2025, federal agents executing a residential search warrant at a home in 2 Edmonds, Washington, encountered Osorio and took him into custody. Dkt. No. 10-1
3 at 3. He was transferred that same day to the Northwest ICE Processing Center 4 (“NWIPC”), where he remains detained. Also that same day, Osorio was issued a 5 Notice to Appear charging him as a “[noncitizen] present in the United States who 6 has not been admitted or paroled.” Dkt. No. 10-2 at 2. The Notice to Appear did not 7 designate Osorio as an “arriving alien.” Id. 8 On November 6, 2025, an immigration judge ordered Osorio removed to El
9 Salvador. Dkt. No. 10-3 at 4. Osorio appealed the removal order to the Board of 10 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). He contends the BIA “has issued a stay of removal,” 11 Dkt. No. 5-1 at 2, while Respondents contend the appeal remains pending. Dkt. No. 12 9 ¶ 14. 13 On December 17, 2025, an immigration judge denied Osorio’s request for a 14 bond hearing, finding the immigration court lacked jurisdiction because Osorio was 15 subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Dkt. No. 10-4. The
16 immigration judge also stated, in the alternative, bond would be denied even if the 17 court had jurisdiction. Id. The order does not identify the basis for this alternative 18 finding—none of the relevant boxes were checked, and no explanation was provided. 19 Id. 20 21
22 23 1 3. DISCUSSION 2 3.1 Osorio is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 3 The central question is which detention statute governs Osorio’s custody. 4 Respondents argue he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), 5 and its implementing regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 235 et seq., which applies to 6 “applicants for admission” to the United States. Dkt. No. 8 at 3–5. Osorio 7 contends—and the Court agrees—that he is detained under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), the 8 default detention provision for noncitizens already present in the United States. 9 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018). Under Section 1226(a), Osorio is 10 eligible for a bond hearing. 11 Section 1225 governs the inspection and processing of noncitizens at the 12 border. Id. at 287. It applies to noncitizens who are “applicants for admission,” and 13 subjects those who are “seeking admission,” but “not clearly and beyond a doubt 14 entitled to be admitted,” to mandatory detention pending removal proceedings. 8 15 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Section 1226(a), by contrast, is the “default rule” for 16 noncitizens present in the United States who are arrested and placed in 17 immigration detention. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. It permits the government to 18 release a detainee on bond during the pendency of removal proceedings. Id. 19 The statutory text of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) requires that a noncitizen be 20 “seeking admission”—a present-tense activity describing the act of presenting 21 oneself at the border and asking to be allowed into the country. The phrases “an 22 alien who is an applicant for admission” and “an alien seeking admission” are not 23 1 synonymous; the first describes a status that may persist over time, while the 2 second describes a current activity. See Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 802 F. Supp.
3 3d 1297, 1327–28 (W.D. Wash. 2025); Torres v. Wamsley, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 4 1270–71 (W.D. Wash. 2025). A noncitizen who has been residing in the United 5 States and is arrested in the interior of the country is not “seeking admission” 6 within the meaning of Section 1225(b)(2)(A). 7 Applying these principles, Osorio is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 § 1225(b). He was arrested at his home in Edmonds, Washington—not a port of
9 entry or the border. Dkt. No. 10-1 at 3. He was residing in the United States, not 10 seeking admission. The Government’s records confirm as much. The Notice to 11 Appear charged Osorio as a noncitizen “present in the United States who has not 12 been admitted or paroled” and expressly declined to classify him as an “arriving 13 alien.” Dkt. No. 10-2 at 2. See Cotoc Yac De Yac v. Hermosillo, 2:25-cv-02593-DGE- 14 TLF, 2026 WL 124334, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 16, 2026) (relying on identical NTA 15 language as evidence noncitizen was not “seeking admission”); Garcia Gabriel v.
16 Hermosillo, 2:25-CV-02594-DGE-GJL, 2026 WL 194233 at * 3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 26, 17 2026) (finding same). 18 Respondents’ reliance on Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, 2026 19 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) is unpersuasive. Buenrostro-Mendez is not 20 binding, and as the dissent acknowledges, “The overwhelming majority of courts in 21 [the Fifth Circuit] and elsewhere have recognized that the government’s position [on
22 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)] is totally unsupported.” 2026 WL 323330, at *10. 23 1 The Court concludes that Osorio is not subject to mandatory detention under 2 Section 1225(b) and is instead detained under Section 1226(a), which entitles him to
3 a bond hearing.1 4 3.2 The Immigration Judge’s bond denial. 5 On December 17, 2025, an immigration judge denied Osorio’s bond request, 6 citing lack of jurisdiction under Section 1225(b)(2). Dkt. No. 10-4. The judge also 7 made an alternative finding that bond would be denied even if jurisdiction existed, 8 but the order provides no explanation for this alternative conclusion. Id. at 2. 9 Federal courts generally lack jurisdiction to review discretionary bond 10 determinations. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). But Section 1226(e) does not preclude judicial 11 review of constitutional claims or legal errors. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 12 1189, 1209 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Although the [immigration judge’s] discretionary bond 13 determination was not reviewable in federal court..., we would have had jurisdiction 14 under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider any error of law in [a noncitizen’s] agency 15 proceedings, including any claimed due process violation.”). “[A] district court has 16 jurisdiction to review an [immigration judge’s] discretionary bond denial where that 17 bond denial is challenged as legally erroneous or unconstitutional.” Kharis v. 18 Sessions, No. 18-CV-04800-JST, 2018 WL 5809432, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2018) 19 (collecting cases). 20 21 1 Because the Court resolves this case on statutory grounds, it need not reach 22 Respondents’ argument that Osorio’s detention has not become unconstitutionally prolonged under the framework set forth in Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 23 1099 (W.D. Wash. 2019). 1 Here, the immigration judge’s main ruling—that the court lacked jurisdiction 2 under Section 1225—was legally erroneous for the reasons detailed above. That
3 error necessarily infected the alternative finding. The record shows that the judge 4 did not consider any of the relevant factors typically considered on a bond 5 determination, “including the individual’s ties to the United States, as well as his 6 employment history, criminal record, history of immigration violations, and manner 7 of entry into this country.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1197 (citing to In re Guerra, 8 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006)). None of the relevant boxes on the form order
9 were checked, and no written findings were made. Dkt. No. 10-4 at 2. 10 Respondents concede that the “the IJ did not provide further explanation,” 11 yet they invite this Court to infer that the alternative denial was justified based on 12 Osorio’s alleged “involvement in a [Drug Trafficking Organization] suspected for 13 illegal distribution of controlled substances.” Dkt. No. 8 at 13–14; Dkt. No. 9 ¶ 5. 14 The Court declines the invitation. An unexplained alternative ruling, made under 15 the wrong legal framework, cannot serve as an independent basis for continued
16 detention. The appropriate remedy is a new bond hearing conducted under the 17 correct statute, at which the government may present whatever evidence of 18 dangerousness or flight risk it chooses. This order does not prejudge the outcome of 19 that hearing. 20 21
22 23 1 3.3 Osorio need not exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief. 2 Respondents contend the Court should deny Osorio’s petition because he did 3 not appeal his bond denial to the BIA. As Respondents acknowledge, the exhaustion 4 of administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for habeas petitions. 5 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017). 6 The Court declines to require prudential exhaustion under the factors set 7 forth in Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007). Those factors favor 8 exhaustion when “(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to 9 generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the 10 requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; 11 and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own 12 mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.” Id. (quoting Noriega–Lopez v. 13 Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003)). None of those conditions are present 14 here. 15 The question presented is purely legal in nature—which detention statute 16 applies to a noncitizen arrested inside the country. An administrative record is not 17 necessary to resolve that question. Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 n.3 (9th 18 Cir. 2011) (holding administrative record was not necessary to decide petitioner's 19 challenge to the constitutionality of procedures). Because the question presented is 20 purely legal and does not require further administrative development, the Court 21 waives the prudential exhaustion requirement. See Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 22 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (a court may waive the prudential exhaustion requirement if 23 1 “administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of 2 administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or
3 the administrative proceedings would be void.”). 4 3.4 Scope of relief. 5 Osorio’s petition requests release under an order of supervision or in the 6 alternative a bond hearing before an immigration judge. Dkt. No. 5-1 at 6. 7 Consistent with the approach taken by courts in this district, the Court finds that 8 the appropriate remedy here is a bond hearing before an immigration judge rather 9 than immediate release. See, e.g., Mitka v. ICE Field Off. Dir., No. C19-193-MJP- 10 BAT, 2019 WL 5901970, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 6, 2019) (“[p]etitioner is not 11 entitled to an order of release, but he is entitled to a bond hearing[,]” and ordering 12 a bond hearing within thirty days); Martinez v. Clark, No. C-18-1669-RAJ-MAT, 13 2019 WL 5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019), adopted, 2019 WL 5962685 14 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2019) (ordering a bond hearing within thirty days). 15 At the bond hearing, Respondents bear the burden of establishing, by clear 16 and convincing evidence, that Osorio presents a flight risk or a danger to the 17 community at the time of the bond hearing. Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208. If Respondents 18 fail to provide Osorio a constitutionally adequate hearing within fourteen days of 19 this order, he must be immediately released. Jimenez v. Wolf, No. 19-CV-07996-NC, 20 2020 WL 1082648, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2020) (ordering the petitioner's 21 immediate release on appropriate conditions where the respondents did not provide 22 23 1 a constitutionally compliant bond hearing after the court granted the petitioner's 2 habeas petition and ordered a bond hearing).
3 3.5 The motion for a temporary restraining order is denied without prejudice. 4 Finally, on January 26, 2026, Osorio filed a motion for a temporary 5 restraining order, seeking to enjoin Respondents from removing him to El Salvador 6 and requesting two years to “perfect[] his administrative remedies.” Dkt. No. 2. 7 Osorio has not alleged sufficient facts showing that Respondents have imminent 8 plans to remove him to El Salvador. He also has not shown why he needs an order 9 granting him two years to pursue his administrative immigration court remedies. 10 Respondents acknowledge that Osorio’s removal order to El Salvador is pending 11 with the BIA and do not assert any immediate plans for removal. On this record, 12 the Court DENIES the motion without prejudice. If Osorio’s circumstances change 13 and removal becomes imminent, he may file a renewed motion. 14 15 4. CONCLUSION 16 Accordingly, the Court orders as follows. 17 1. The Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED in part. Dkt. No. 18 5. 19 2. Within FOURTEEN (14) days of this order, Respondents must either 20 provide Petitioner with a constitutionally adequate bond hearing under 21 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or release him under an appropriate order of 22 supervision. 23 1 3. If the individualized bond hearing is not conducted within fourteen days of 2 this order, Respondents MUST immediately release Petitioner under
3 appropriate conditions of supervised release. 4 4. Respondents are ENJOINED from denying a bond hearing on the basis 5 that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 6 1225(b). Petitioner is not subject to that provision. 7 5. Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order is DENIED without 8 prejudice.
9 6. Because the Court grants the petition, the motion for an extension of time 10 to file the traverse is DENIED as moot. Dkt. No. 11. 11 Dated this 4th day of March, 2026. 12 a 13 Jamal N. Whitehead United States District Judge 14
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