Walsh v. Slocumb Law Firm, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Alabama
DecidedDecember 23, 2020
Docket3:18-cv-00145
StatusUnknown

This text of Walsh v. Slocumb Law Firm, LLC (Walsh v. Slocumb Law Firm, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walsh v. Slocumb Law Firm, LLC, (M.D. Ala. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA EASTERN DIVISION

EUGENE SCALIA, ) Secretary of Labor, ) United States Department of Labor ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Case No. 3:18-cv-145-RAH v. ) (WO) ) SLOCUMB LAW FIRM, LLC, and ) MICHAEL W. SLOCUMB (an ) individual) )

Defendants.

ORDER

This action is brought by Eugene Scalia, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor (“the Secretary” and “the Department,” respectively), against the Defendants pursuant to § 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA” or “the Act”), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., seeking back wages, liquidated damages, and injunctive relief against future violations of the Act. A review of the record reveals that Defendants Slocumb Law Firm, LLC and Michael W. Slocumb (collectively, “Slocumb”) were properly served via publication in accordance with Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 4.3 and were required to serve responsive pleadings to the Complaint no later than November 16, 2020. (Doc. 63-1.) Defendants have failed to plead or otherwise defend as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Clerk of Court, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), entered default against the Defendants on November 24, 2020. (Doc. 65.) Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment against the Defendants. (Doc. 66.) “[B]efore entering a default judgment for damages, the district court must ensure that the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, which are taken as true due to the default, actually state a substantive cause of action and that there is a substantive, sufficient basis in the pleadings for the particular relief sought.” Tyco Fire & Sec., LLC v. Alcocer, 218 F.App’x 860, 863 (11th Cir.

2007); see also Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism and the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1543 (11th Cir. 19850 (finding that court may enter a default judgment without conducting a hearing “if the amount claimed is a liquidated sum or one capable of mathematical calculation,” or where “the record adequately reflects the basis for the award via a ... demonstration by detailed affidavits establishing the necessary facts.”). The Court has undertaken such a review, and concludes that the motion is due to be GRANTED. I. Mike Slocumb and the Slocumb Law Firm are Covered Employers under the FLSA The overtime provisions of the FLSA extend to employees of any “enterprise” with the

requisite connection to interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 207. The Slocumb Law Firm, LLC is an enterprise engaging in interstate commerce and reported an annual gross dollar volume of not less than $500,000 in 2016 through 2018. (Doc. 1, p. 2); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(s)(1)(A)(i) & (ii)). The FLSA provides that an “employer” is “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). A “corporate officer with operational control of a corporation's covered enterprise is an employer along with the corporation, jointly and severally liable under the FLSA for unpaid wages.” Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 637– 38 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1511 (1st Cir. 1983)). Mike Slocumb is the owner of the Slocumb Law Firm, LLC and has operational control

over its employees. (Doc. 1, p. 2.) Mr. Slocumb is an “employer” under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). As an employer, he is jointly and severally liable with the Slocumb Law Firm, LLC for unpaid wages under the FLSA. Patel, 803 F.2d at 637–38. II. Slocumb Violated the FLSA’s Overtime Provisions

The FLSA requires covered employers to pay one and one-half times an employee’s “regular rate” for hours over forty in a work week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). An employee’s regular rate of pay includes “all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee” except for certain statutory exclusions which are not applicable in this case. 29 U.S.C. § 207(e). In addition, an employer covered by the FLSA is required to “make, keep, and preserve” records of the “wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 211. It is the employer’s duty under the FLSA to keep records of the employees’ wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment. Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cty., 495 F.3d

1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007). “The employer is in a superior position to know and produce the most probative facts concerning the nature and amount of work performed and ‘[e]mployees seldom keep such records themselves.’” Id. (citing Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946)). Slocumb violated the FLSA’s provisions in at least one manner. In particular, Slocumb repeatedly violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 215(a)(2) by employing employees for work weeks longer than 40 hours without compensating those employees for overtime pay. (Doc. 1, p. 3.) Based on the Department’s investigation, dozens of Slocumb employees are due unpaid overtime wages totaling $13,248.71. (Doc. 66, p. 2.)

III. Slocumb is Liable for Liquidated Damages An employer who violates the overtime provisions of the FLSA is liable for unpaid wages and an equal amount as liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216. “[I]f the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that [the employer] had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the [FLSA] the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount specified in [29 U.S.C. § 216].” 29 U.S.C. §

260. The employer bears the burden of establishing a good faith defense against liquidated damages. Alvarez Perez v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 515 F.3d 1150, 1163 (11th Cir. 2008). Slocumb has avoided service of process by the Department for over two years. Their office’s antics, as reflected in the record, probably merit serious consideration as to Mr. Slocomb’s future ability to practice in this Court.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Allen v. Board of Public Educ. for Bibb County
495 F.3d 1306 (Eleventh Circuit, 2007)
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.
328 U.S. 680 (Supreme Court, 1946)
Larry Bonner v. City of Prichard, Alabama
661 F.2d 1206 (Eleventh Circuit, 1981)
Sendhabhai Patel v. Dr. Alex Wargo, Etc.
803 F.2d 632 (Eleventh Circuit, 1986)
Humberto Reyes v. Aqua Life Corp
632 F. App'x 552 (Eleventh Circuit, 2015)
Opelika Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Goldberg
299 F.2d 37 (Fifth Circuit, 1962)
Perez v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc.
515 F.3d 1150 (Eleventh Circuit, 2008)
Wirtz v. Ocala Gas Co.
336 F.2d 236 (Fifth Circuit, 1964)
Donovan v. Agnew
712 F.2d 1509 (First Circuit, 1983)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Walsh v. Slocumb Law Firm, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walsh-v-slocumb-law-firm-llc-almd-2020.