Walsh Shea Corridor Construction v. Cal. Occupational etc. CA2/2

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedAugust 26, 2020
DocketB300019
StatusUnpublished

This text of Walsh Shea Corridor Construction v. Cal. Occupational etc. CA2/2 (Walsh Shea Corridor Construction v. Cal. Occupational etc. CA2/2) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walsh Shea Corridor Construction v. Cal. Occupational etc. CA2/2, (Cal. Ct. App. 2020).

Opinion

Filed 8/26/20 Walsh Shea Corridor Construction v. Cal. Occupational etc. CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

WALSH SHEA CORRIDOR B300019 CONSTRUCTORS, (Los Angeles County Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. BS172720)

v.

CALIFORNIA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH APPEALS BOARD,

Defendant and Respondent;

CALIFORNIA DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH,

Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed. Monteleone & McCrory, Diana M. Dron and Patrick J. Duffy for Plaintiff and Appellant. J. Jeffrey Mojcher, Chief Counsel, Aaron R. Jackson, Autumn R. Gonzalez, and Andia Farzaneh, Industrial Relations Counsel for Defendant and Respondent. Division of Occupational Safety & Health, Christopher Grossgart, Rocio Y. Garcia-Reyes, and Eric L. Compere for Real Party in Interest and Respondent. _____________________________ Petitioner and appellant Walsh Shea Corridor Constructors (WSCC) appeals from the judgment entered in favor of respondents California Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board (the Board) and real party in interest California Division of Occupational Safety and Health (the Division) after the trial court denied WSCC’s petition for writ of administrative mandamus. WSCC’s petition sought to vacate the Board’s decision affirming a citation issued by the Division against WSCC for violating title 8, section 1630, subdivision (a) (hereafter § 1630(a)), of the California Code of Regulations.1 We affirm the judgment. BACKGROUND WSCC contracted with the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority to construct the Crenshaw/LAX Transit Corridor Project. The project included construction of a subway station at the corner of Rodeo Road and Crenshaw Boulevard (the Exposition site). Construction at the Exposition site was a “cut-and-cover operation,” defined in the regulations as “subway stations which are both physically connected to ongoing underground construction operations and are covered in such a manner as to create conditions characteristic of underground ____________________________________________________________ 1 All further references are to title 8 of the California Code of Regulations, unless otherwise specified.

2 construction.” (§ 8403, subd. (a)(1).) In this case, the operation involved digging an excavation, constructing a subway station at the invert level, and then backfilling the excavation and replacing the street. Beginning in January 2015, the Division and WSCC discussed the need for a construction passenger elevator as required by section 1630, subdivision (a) (hereafter § 1630(a)), and whether an exception might apply. WSCC maintained that section 1630 did not apply and that the industry standard was to use stair towers as the primary means of ingress and egress to the excavation site. WSCC argued that similar subway stations had been built without use of a construction passenger elevator. As an alternative to a construction passenger elevator, WSCC proposed using an onsite crane with an attachable cage to be used as needed. The Division rejected WSCC’s proposed alternative because it did not provide continuous access. Despite the absence of an approved alternative means of continuous access, WSCC proceeded with the construction without installing a construction passenger elevator.2 The Division conducted an inspection of the Exposition site in September 2015. At that time, the excavation at the construction site was 800 feet long and 60 feet wide for the southernmost two-thirds of its length, increasing to 100 feet wide for the northernmost third of its length. As of September 21, 2015, the excavation was 65 feet deep. No construction passenger elevator had been installed, and approximately 70 employees entered and exited the worksite by means of a stair tower. ____________________________________________________________ 2 WSCC, under protest, installed a construction passenger elevator at the construction site in November 2015.

3 The excavation had pieces of concrete decking covering portions of its top at street level, leaving openings that were used to carry materials and tools in and out of the excavation. The Division’s inspection described the excavation as a box without a top, with the pieces of decking arranged to create openings and to allow cars, trucks, and buses to continue to drive on Crenshaw Boulevard. The decking was not permanent and could be removed and reconfigured as needed. Inside the excavation a weldment of struts and steel walers had been constructed as a shoring system, and slurry walls filled the excavation from street level to the invert level. Following the inspection, the Division issued a citation alleging a willful general violation of section 1630. WSCC appealed the citation, and the matter proceeded to a hearing before Administrative Law Judge Howard Chernin. Witnesses for both WSCC and the Division testified concerning the Exposition site and the applicability of section 1630. WSCC argued that section 1630 did not apply and that another regulation, section 8403, governed instead. On September 5, 2017, ALJ Chernin issued a decision upholding the citation in full. WSCC filed a petition for reconsideration. On February 9, 2018, the Board issued a decision upholding the general violation of section 1630 but removing the willful classification. WSCC then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court. On March 25, 2019, the trial court denied the petition, finding that the Board’s interpretation of section 1630 was not clearly erroneous and was supported by substantial evidence. This appeal followed.

4 DISCUSSION I. Standard of review and general legal principles “‘On appeal from the judgment on a petition for writ of administrative mandate in a case not involving fundamental vested rights, as here, we review the agency’s findings, not the superior court’s decision, for substantial evidence.’ [Citations.] ‘However, insofar as an appeal from an administrative mandamus proceeding presents questions of law, our review is de novo.’ [Citations.]” (State Dept. of Social Services v. Marin (2019) 34 Cal. App.5th 328, 334.) The interpretation of a regulation is a question of law subject to de novo review. (Department of Industrial Relations v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 93, 100 (AC Transit).) A reviewing court accords an administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation great weight and deference, however, unless the interpretation is unauthorized or clearly erroneous. (Lusardi Construction Co. v. California Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 639, 645 (Lusardi).) When interpreting an administrative regulation, the ordinary rules of statutory construction apply. (AC Transit, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 100.) The fundamental goal is to ascertain and effectuate the agency’s intent in promulgating the regulation. (Ibid.) To do so, we look first to the language of the regulation itself, giving the words their plain and ordinary meaning. (Id. at p. 101.) If the language is clear and unambiguous, the inquiry goes no further. “‘“‘[W]here a word of common usage has more than one meaning, the one which will best attain the purposes of the [regulation] should be adopted, even though the ordinary meaning of the word is thereby

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Walsh Shea Corridor Construction v. Cal. Occupational etc. CA2/2, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walsh-shea-corridor-construction-v-cal-occupational-etc-ca22-calctapp-2020.