Walls v. Jeffreys

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedMarch 4, 2024
Docket3:21-cv-01369
StatusUnknown

This text of Walls v. Jeffreys (Walls v. Jeffreys) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walls v. Jeffreys, (S.D. Ill. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

NIRIN WALLS, #R49110,

Plaintiff, Case No. 21-cv-01369-SPM

v.

LANA NALEWAJKA, DOCTOR SHAH, and JODI A. PELEGRIN,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge: This matter is before the Court on the issue of whether Plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative remedies as to his allegations that Defendants Pelegrin and Nalewajka violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to impose a medical hold on him resulting in his transfer and delay of medical care (Count 2) or whether he was prevented from doing so. The Court held a hearing on the issue on February 29, 2024, and heard testimony from Nicole Benitez, the grievance office coordinator at Dixon Correctional Center, and Plaintiff. After hearing from the witnesses and reviewing the record, the Court finds that the administrative process was unavailable, and the motion for summary judgment as to Count 2 against Pelegrin and Nalewajka is denied. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Nirin Walls, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections, is proceeding in this case, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on the following constitutional claims: Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim against Nalewajka, Shah, and Pelegrin for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical condition, which causes urinary, stomach, and testicular pain and causes him to produce blood, white blood cells, and mucus when urinating.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim against Pelgrin and Nalewajka for failing to impose a medical hold on Plaintiff resulting in his transfer and delay of medical care.

(Doc. 16). Plaintiff alleges that in July 2020, while at Centralia Correctional Center (Centralia), he began urinating blood, white blood cells, and mucus. Plaintiff had an appointment with Dr. Shah, but Dr. Shah did not prescribe him any medication. Plaintiff was subsequently seen by Dr. Pelegrin, who treated Plaintiff with ineffective antibiotics. During this time, Plaintiff also complained to Dr. Pelegrin of severe testicular and stomach pain. Dr. Pelegrin prescribed phenazopyridine, but this medication made the urinary bleeding worse. Plaintiff was scheduled to see an outside specialist, Dr. Reagan, on November 24, 2020. Dr. Reagan, however, was unable to exam Plaintiff because proper COVID-19 protocols were not followed prior to the appointment. Dr. Reagan ordered further diagnostic testing. By December, Plaintiff’s pain had increased, but Dr. Pelegrin did not take any action. Dr. Pelegrin did not follow-up with the diagnostic tests recommended by Dr. Reagan and did not prescribe Plaintiff any pain medication or any other medicine for his condition. Dr. Pelegrin and Health Care Unit Administrator Nalewajka allowed Plaintiff to be transferred to Dixon Correctional Center (Dixon) in February 2021, even though he should have had a medical hold in his record. The transfer resulted in further delay in his treatment. On September 20, 2023, the Court issued an order denying Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion. (Doc. 87). The Court found that Plaintiff had exhausted his claims in Count 1 against Defendants Shah and Pelegrin.1 (Doc. 87, p. 9). Plaintiff’s complaints regarding inadequate medical care were ongoing and current when the grievance at

1 Defendant Nalewajka did not argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to Count 1 against her. issue was filed, and therefore, the Administrative Review Board wrongly dismissed his grievance as untimely. (Id.). Additionally, the grievance sufficiently put Centralia officials on notice that Dr. Shah and Dr. Pelegrin were two of the medical providers who were aware of Plaintiff’s medical issues and were not adequately addressing them. (Id.).

As to Count 2, Plaintiff claimed that he filed grievances complaining about the lack of a medical hold and his transfer delaying his care. These grievances, however, went missing, and he never received copies of the grievances despite his requests. The grievances were recorded in the grievance log, but none of the parties submitted copies to the Court. Based on the record, the Court could not say as a matter of law that Defendants had met their burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff had available remedies that he did not utilize. Thus, summary judgment on Count 2 was inappropriate based on the briefs, and a hearing was held on February 29, 2024,2 to resolve these disputed issues. See Pavey v. Conley, 544 F. 3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008). LEGAL STANDARDS Lawsuits filed by inmates are governed by the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (“PLRA”). 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA states, in pertinent part, that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id. The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that “[t]his circuit has taken a strict compliance approach to exhaustion”). However, a prisoner need only exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); a prisoner

2 The Pavey hearing had to be rescheduled twice. The original hearing set for December 11, 2023, was rescheduled because the facility failed to bring Plaintiff to the video conference room on the day of the hearing. (Doc. 116, 119). The following hearing was canceled and reset due to inclement weather. (Doc. 128). “need not exhaust unavailable ones.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016). “A prison’s failure to give an inmate access to grievance forms, or respond to them, can render the process unavailable.” Daniels v. Baldwin, No. 21-1686, 2022 WL 1768857, at *2 (7th Cir. June 1, 2022) (citing Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2004); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833

(7th Cir. 2002)). Whether a claim has been exhausted pursuant to Section 1997e(a) is a determination for a judge—not a jury—to make. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 741-42 (7th Cir. 2008). If a Pavey hearing is held due to an issue of fact about exhaustion of administrative remedies, the court hears evidence, finds facts, and determines credibility. Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2018). The burden of proof is on the defendants to demonstrate that the prisoner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2013). Generally, a defendant will need to do more to carry the burden than plainly allege that no grievance exists, a defendant might meet said burden by submitting additional evidence such as grievance logs, counseling summaries, or evidence about the routine function of the grievance

procedure. See e.g., Daniels v. Prentice, 741 Fed. App’x 342, 343-44 (7th Cir. 2018).

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Related

Curtis L. Dale v. Harley G. Lappin
376 F.3d 652 (Seventh Circuit, 2004)
Dole v. Chandler
438 F.3d 804 (Seventh Circuit, 2006)
Pavey v. Conley
544 F.3d 739 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Gregory Turley v. Dave Rednour
729 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Darreyll Thomas v. Michael Reese
787 F.3d 845 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Ross v. Blake
578 U.S. 632 (Supreme Court, 2016)
Joseph Wilborn v. David Ealey
881 F.3d 998 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)

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Walls v. Jeffreys, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walls-v-jeffreys-ilsd-2024.