Wallingford v. Sallie Mae Bank

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: May 14, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2026-0961
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RAEDEN WALLINGFORD,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 26 - 961 (LLA)

SALLIE MAE BANK,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Raeden Wallingford, proceeding pro se, brought this suit in the Superior Court of

the District of Columbia against Sallie Mae Bank (“Sallie Mae”), alleging false credit reporting of

a delinquent student loan. ECF No. 1-1, at 52-53.1 Pending before the court are Ms. Wallingford’s

motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. ECF Nos. 3, 11. For the

reasons explained below, the court will deny the motions.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Wallingford is a former student at Howard University. ECF No. 1-1, at 52; see ECF

No. 3, at 2. She resides in subsidized housing with her “co-signer” in Raeford, North Carolina.

ECF No. 3, at 2; ECF No. 5-1, at 2. Howard University’s financial portal reflects a total account

balance of $0.00 for Ms. Wallingford’s student account. ECF No. 1-1, at 53; see id. at 58. The

portal does not display any financial history between Howard and Sallie Mae, id. at 58, and

“reports that no documents are available to substantiate and verify the alleged debt,” ECF No. 3,

1 When citing Ms. Wallingford’s filings, the court refers to the CM/ECF-generated numbers at the top of each page rather than any internal pagination. at 2. It also shows Ms. Wallingford’s “[l]egally entitled federal aid (Pell Grant)” as “cancelled or

missing, despite no change in student eligibility.” ECF No. 1-1, at 60. Sallie Mae,

Ms. Wallingford’s loan servicer, reports that Ms. Wallingford owes a debt exceeding $102,000.

ECF No. 3, at 2. Since February 2026, Sallie Mae has pursued collection of Ms. Wallingford’s

“non-existent debt.” ECF No. 5-1, at 4; see ECF No. 5-3 (documenting communications that

Ms. Wallingford and her “co-signer” received from Sallie Mae).

Ms. Wallingford filed suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia on

February 25, 2026, ECF No. 1-1, at 3-12, and amended her complaint on March 4, see id. at 52-53.

In her amended complaint, Ms. Wallingford raises one count of breach of contract, alleging that

Sallie Mae’s “failure to accurately maintain the status quo of a ‘disputed’ account and the threat

of derogatory reporting constitute[] a breach of the loan agreement.” Id. at 53. She seeks a

“judgment declaring [her] account balance as $0.00 and an injunction against false reporting.” Id.

Sallie Mae removed the action to this court on March 19. ECF No. 1.

On March 20, Ms. Wallingford filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a

preliminary injunction, ECF No. 3, and she submitted various exhibits in support of her motion,

see ECF Nos. 5, 7. The court granted Sallie Mae’s motion for an extension of time to respond to

Ms. Wallingford’s amended complaint, ECF No. 4, and directed Sallie Mae to respond to both

Ms. Wallingford’s amended complaint and motion for preliminary relief by April 16, 2026, see

Mar. 26, 2026 Minute Order. The court denied Ms. Wallingford’s motion for reconsideration of

that extension. ECF Nos. 8, 9; see Apr. 10, 2026 Minute Order. On April 8, Ms. Wallingford filed

a renewed motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 11, and

the court directed Sallie Mae to respond to any new arguments in its forthcoming opposition, see

Apr. 14, 2026 Minute Order. Sallie Mae then filed its opposition, ECF No. 13, and moved to

2 dismiss, ECF No. 14. Ms. Wallingford filed a reply, ECF No. 16, and a supplemental declaration

in support of her motion for preliminary relief, ECF No. 17.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are ‘extraordinary remed[ies]

that should be granted only when the party seeking the relief, by a clear showing, carries the burden

of persuasion.’” Lofton v. District of Columbia, 7 F. Supp. 3d 117, 120 (D.D.C. 2013) (alteration

in original) (quoting Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir.

2006)). To receive a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, the moving party

must show (1) “that [she] is likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) “that [she] is likely to suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,” (3) “that the balance of equities tips in [her]

favor,” and (4) “that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

III. DISCUSSION

Ms. Wallingford seeks a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction

enjoining Sallie Mae from “all derogatory credit reporting regarding [Ms. Wallingford] and [her]

co-signer” and ordering Sallie Mae to “retract” the April 6, 2026 reporting and “delete the false

delinquency statuses associated with all loans under” her account. ECF No. 11, at 4; see ECF

No. 3, at 5. The court concludes that Ms. Wallingford has failed to carry her burden to receive a

temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction.

First, Ms. Wallingford has not shown that she is likely to succeed on the merits of her

claim. In her amended complaint, Ms. Wallingford raises one claim of breach of contract, and

while she alleges that Sallie Mae’s inaccurate credit reporting “constitutes a breach of the loan

3 agreement,” ECF No. 1-1, at 53, she does not allege any facts regarding that loan agreement or the

contractual obligation that Sallie Mae allegedly violated. Moreover, Ms. Wallingford’s contract

claim is likely preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.,

which preempts all “claims made under state law concerning the furnishing and correcting of

information to credit reporting agencies.” Asterbadi v. Cenlar Fed. Sav. Bank, No. 25-CV-1847,

2026 WL 158482, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2026) (quoting Pleznac v. Equity Residential Mgmt.,

L.L.C., 320 F. Supp. 3d 99, 107 (D.D.C. 2018)); see 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F). Ms. Wallingford

also asserts in her motions for preliminary relief that Sallie Mae’s actions violate the Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and FCRA. ECF No. 3, at 3; ECF No. 11, at 3. As with her

contract claim, Ms. Wallingford does not allege any facts supporting claims under these statutes.

Specifically, Ms. Wallingford does not allege that Sallie Mae is a “debt collector” for purposes of

the FDCPA, which requires that her loan was in default when Sallie Mae acquired it. See Parker

v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 831 F. Supp. 2d 88, 94 (D.D.C. 2011). And the FCRA does

not provide a basis for the equitable relief Ms. Wallingford seeks. ECF No. 1-1, at 53; see Brown

v. Pa. Higher Educ. Agency, No. 19-CV-979, 2019 WL 2103127, at *2 (D.D.C. May 14, 2019)

(“Nothing in the text of the FCRA ‘allows private litigants to maintain a claim for injunctive relief,’

and ‘courts that have considered [the] issue have overwhelmingly concluded that the FCRA

precludes private litigants from seeking equitable relief.’” (alteration in original) (first quoting

Washington v. CSC Credit Servs. Inc., 199 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 2000); then quoting

Owner-Operator Indep. Driver Ass’n, Inc. v. Usis Com. Servs., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1007

(D. Colo. 2005))). Accordingly, even construing her filings liberally and assuming that she has

asserted claims under the FDCPA and FCRA, the court cannot conclude that Ms. Wallingford is

likely to prevail on her claims. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)

4 (noting that the movant carries the burden of justifying, by a clear showing, her entitlement to

relief).

Ms. Wallingford has also failed to demonstrate that she is likely to suffer irreparable harm

absent preliminary relief. “[P]roving ‘irreparable’ injury is a considerable burden” and requires

“proof that the movant’s injury is ‘certain, great and actual—not theoretical—and imminent,

creating a clear and present need for extraordinary equitable relief to prevent harm.’” Power

Mobility Coal. v. Leavitt, 404 F. Supp. 2d 190, 204 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Wis. Gas Co. v. Fed.

Energy Regul. Comm’n, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). Ms. Wallingford

alleges that Sallie Mae’s derogatory credit reporting “creates an imminent risk of displacement

and homelessness” because it may disqualify her and her co-signer from their subsidized housing,

“where eligibility is strictly credit-dependent.” ECF No. 11, at 2; see ECF No. 3, at 2. In her

renewed motion, Ms. Wallingford alleges that Sallie Mae reported her delinquency to Equifax on

April 6, 2026, meaning the “‘threatened’ harm has become a reality.” ECF No. 11, at 2; see ECF

Nos. 11-5, 11-6. Ms. Wallingford further alleges that her co-signer’s credit score dropped from

the high 600s to 566 following Sallie Mae’s reporting and that, on April 17, her co-signer’s Best

Buy credit card was summarily closed for “credit risk.” ECF No. 17-1 ¶¶ 2, 4-5.

While “impending homelessness” may constitute irreparable harm, Cabrera v. U.S. Dep’t

of Lab., 792 F. Supp. 3d 91, 105 (D.D.C. 2025) (quoting Nat’l Job Corps Ass’n v. Dep’t of Lab.,

788 F. Supp. 3d 642, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)), appeal dismissed, No. 25-5340, 2025 WL 3635881

(D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 2025), Ms. Wallingford has not established that such harm is “certain to occur

in the near future,” Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674. Ms. Wallingford asserts that she could become

ineligible for her subsidized housing because “significant debt that would reduce ability to pay

rent” is a criterion for eligibility. ECF No. 5-1, at 2; see ECF No. 5-2, at 1 (management

5 company’s screening criteria); ECF No. 16, at 6 (arguing that her “housing is contingent upon a

credit profile that [Sallie Mae] is actively damaging with inaccurate reporting”). But this claim of

harm is too attenuated from Sallie Mae’s derogatory reporting and too speculative to justify

preliminary relief. As Sallie Mae points out, Ms. Wallingford has not provided “any evidence—

such as a notice from her housing provider, correspondence regarding an eligibility review, or

documentation of any pending adverse housing action,” ECF No. 13, at 6, demonstrating that she

is likely to lose her eligibility imminently, see Hanson v. District of Columbia, 120 F.4th 223, 245

(D.C. Cir. 2024) (“‘[S]imply showing some possibility of irreparable injury’ is not sufficient to

make the irreparable harm showing needed to obtain preliminary relief.” (quoting Nken v. Holder,

556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009))). The court therefore cannot credit Ms. Wallingford’s conclusory

allegation that loss of housing “is a mathematical certainty.” ECF No. 16, at 4.

Ms. Wallingford also alleges that Sallie Mae’s reporting has recently caused her

co-signer’s credit score to fall and credit line to be summarily closed. ECF No. 17-1 ¶¶ 2, 4. She

asserts that without the credit line, her household is “in a state of ‘financial blackout,’ unable to

access the credit necessary for . . . immediate needs,” id. ¶ 7. The only imminent harm

Ms. Wallingford cites is an inability to “fund schooling supplies for [her] minor brother who

resides with [her].” Id. ¶ 6. While the court is sympathetic to Ms. Wallingford’s financial

difficulties, this alleged harm is insufficient to meet the “considerable burden” of establishing

irreparable injury for purposes of preliminary relief. Power Mobility Coal., 404 F. Supp. 2d at 204.

Because Ms. Wallingford has failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits or

irreparable harm absent preliminary relief, she is not entitled to a temporary restraining order or a

preliminary injunction. See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 297 (explaining that

a “movant’s failure to show any irreparable harm is . . . grounds for refusing to issue a preliminary

6 injunction, even if the other three factors . . . merit such relief); see also Pennsylvania v. DeVos,

480 F. Supp. 3d 47, 68 (D.D.C. 2020) (“Plaintiffs’ inability to show a likelihood of success on the

merits or irreparable harm likely ends the matter there.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Ms. Wallingford’s Motion for a

Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 3, and Renewed Motion for

a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 11, are DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

LOREN L. ALIKHAN United States District Judge Date: May 14, 2026