Walling v. Allied Messenger Service, Inc.

47 F. Supp. 773, 1942 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2153
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 31, 1942
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 47 F. Supp. 773 (Walling v. Allied Messenger Service, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walling v. Allied Messenger Service, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 773, 1942 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2153 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).

Opinion

NEVIN, District Judge.

On April 25, 1941, Philip B. Fleming, Administrator, filed a complaint against the defendants, Allied Messenger Service, Inc., Benjamin Kleinman, Anna Kleinman, Sidney Kleinman, and Joseph H. Kleinman, praying for an injunction to restrain violations of sections 15(a) (1), 15(a) (2), and 15(a) (5) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, c. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. A. § 201 et seq. After the resignation of Philip B. Fleming, and of his successor, Thomas Holland, L. Metcalfe Walling became Administrator in regular succession and was substituted as plaintiff herein by order duly entered.

The complaint alleges in substance that the corporate and individual defendants, under the names of Allied Messenger Service, Inc., Interstate Service, and Allied Service System, are engaged- in the business of supplying messengers, at a fee, to various ■“individuals, firms, companies, and corporations,” which are engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods therefor, or in both; that the defendants have employed and are employing approximately 40 employees who are engaged in interstate commerce and in the production of goods for interstate commerce, and in processes or occupations necessary thereto ; that the businesses of certain individuals, firms, companies, and corporations for which defendants’ employees perform work, involves trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, and communication among the several States or from the State of New York to places outside thereof, and that such individuals, firms, companies, and corporations produce goods — substantial quantities of which goods “produced in and about their places of business have been and are being produced for interstate commerce and have been and are being sold, shipped, transported and delivered in interstate commerce from their places of business in the State of New York to, into and through states other than the State of New York.”

The complaint further alleges that subsequent to October 25, 1939, the defendants failed and refused to pay many of their employees wages at rates not less than 30 cents an hour, in violation of the provisions of sections 6 and 15(a) (2) of the statute; and that the defendants failed and refused to pay employees, for overtime hours worked, wages at not less than one and one-half times their regular hourly rate of pay,-in violation of sections 7 and 15(a) (2) of the Act.

It is further alleged that defendants violated section 15(a) (1) of the Act in that they shipped, delivered and transported in interstate commerce from New York, to, into and through States other than the State of New York, goods produced in the aforesaid places of business in the production of which many of their employees were employed in violation of sections 6 and 7 of the Act. It is also charged that after the promulgation of regulations requiring the keeping of certain records, the defendants violated sections 11(c) and 15(a) (5) of the Act in failing and refusing to make, keep and preserve records as required by the regulations.

The answer denies generally the allegations of the complaint and asserts the following defenses: (1) that the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action; (2) that the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; (3) that the complaint fails to state a claim against the defendants upon which relief may be granted; and (4) that the defendant, Benjamin H. Kleinman, at all of the times mentioned in the complaint, was doing business under the firm name and style of Interstate Messenger Service, and that as such he duly complied with all of the requirements of the statute.

On March 23, 1942, a stipulation was entered into by counsel for the respective parties. That stipulation is now Exhibit No. 1 herein. It provides as follows: “It Is Hereby Stipulated, by and between the parties hereto, that, for the purposes of the trial herein, all of the employees of defendants, employed as messengers during the period beginning October 25, 1939 and continuously thereafter through April 26, 1941, with the exception of Thomas Cook, were paid less than thirty cents (300) an hour; provided that these stipulated facts shall not apply to messengers for the time actually spent by them in performing work for which Benjamin Kleinman, doing business as Interstate Service, tendered bills or made charges for.”

*775 It is agreed that the effect of the stipulation is to withdraw from the case defendants’ denial of the allegations of the complaint to the effect that during the times mentioned in the complaint defendants paid to many of their employees wages at rates less than thirty cents an hour.

The cause came on for hearing before the court on the pleadings, the stipulation and the evidence on June 29, 1942. After an intervening recess (agreed to by the court and counsel) the trial was resumed on August 11, 1942, and thereafter concluded. It is now finally submitted on the record, the exhibits and the briefs and arguments of counsel.

During the examination of the first witness called by plaintiff, counsel for defendant interposed a general objection, on the grounds of irrelevance and immateriality of any testimony offered on behalf of plaintiff having to do with the business activities of any individual, firm or corporation other than the business activities of the defendants and their employees. At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case, the defendants’ counsel renewed his motion to strike all such testimony and moved to dismiss the complaint.

During the trial the court reserved its final ruling on defendants’ objections and motions to strike. As to this the following are pertinent portions of the record: “Mr. Matzkin (Counsel for defendants) : The only way I can see, and I am not suggesting how your Honor is to rule, I think if your Honor could reserve your decision on my motions and objections as made until the termination of the trial, and if your Honor sees they are material and competent that you will allow them, and—

“The Court: That is exactly what I will do, and intended to suggest, that I will at this time overrule your objections and your motions to strike, so that we can proceed with the testimony. If you want to press those objections after we have finished the hearing, either by way of oral argument or on briefs or on trial, I will hear you, and if I ultimately conclude that all of this evidence is not competent and not material, then I would not consider it in deciding the case. If I conclude that it is, then I will overrule your objections, and I would consider the evidence. * * *
“Mr. Reyman (Of counsel for plaintiff) : That is perfectly agreeable.
The Court: Let these objections, then, and motions, follow through on every question, without having to repeat them.”
* * # i}i %
“Mr. Matzkin: I renew my objection to the admission of plaintiff’s exhibits in evidence marked 1 up to and including 1'04-A, B and C, and any subdivisions of the numerals that were stated, on the ground that they are immaterial, incompetent and irrelevant, and on the further ground that they have no bearing on the issues raised by the pleadings.
“The Court: The motions at this time will be overruled, both as to the testimony and as to the exhibits, and counsel for the defendants has his exceptions. * * *

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Bluebook (online)
47 F. Supp. 773, 1942 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2153, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walling-v-allied-messenger-service-inc-nysd-1942.