Waller 802808 v. Richardson

• Court: District Court, W.D. Michigan
• Decided: September 11, 2024
• Docket: 1:23-cv-01224
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

ADAM WALLER,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:23-cv-1224

v. Honorable Robert J. Jonker

UNKNOWN RICHARDSON et al.,

Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On November 29, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 6.) Under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may at any time, with or without motion, add or drop a party for misjoinder or nonjoinder. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Applying this standard regarding joinder, the Court will drop as misjoined Defendants Mygrants, Ferguson, and Ybarro. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the misjoined Defendant without prejudice. Further, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim against Defendant Traylor. The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim regarding the denial of adequate medical care. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Richardson regarding Defendant Richardson’s use of his Taser on November 19, 2020,

remains in the case. Discussion I. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the following ICF staff in their individual and official capacities: Corrections Officers Unknown Richardson, Mygrants, and Ybarro, Inspector Unknown Ferguson, and Assistant Deputy Warden Unknown Traylor. Plaintiff alleges that, on November 19, 2020, Defendant Richardson “aimed and discharged his Taser” at Plaintiff’s face “while breaking up an altercation” despite the opportunity to deploy

his Taser at Plaintiff’s body. (ECF No. 1, PageID.5; ECF No. 1-1, PageID.12.) Plaintiff claims that he was subsequently denied medical care by an unidentified nurse and “medical staff.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.5; ECF No. 1-2, PageID.13.) Plaintiff filed grievances, attempting to resolve “these issues” with Defendant Traylor and various non-parties, but was not successful. (Id., PageID.6.) In one grievance, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Traylor and non-parties “fail[ed] to investigate and respond to [Plaintiff’s] complaints,” and that “MDOC officials” maintain an illegal practice of failing to train, investigate, and supervise employees. (ECF No. 1-3, PageID.14.) On October 4, 2021, Plaintiff was called into the control center and was interviewed by Defendant Ferguson related to a grievance Plaintiff wrote in September 2021. (ECF No. 1, PageID.6; ECF No. 1-4, PageID.15.) Plaintiff does not elaborate on the content of that grievance; however, he does claim that Defendant Ferguson “became defensive, threatened [Plaintiff] and tried to use his position of authority to intimidate [Plaintiff] into signing off the grievance process.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) Plaintiff does not relate this incident to the November 19, 2020, events or

grievances but says that it is “another instance in the pattern of staff corruption and staff retaliation . . .” (Id.) On November 2, 2021, Plaintiff was in the dayroom when Defendant Ybarro took Plaintiff’s shoes. (ECF No. 1-5, PageID.16.) Plaintiff was then “made to walk from the dayroom to the shower in [his] socks” (id.) and “placed into a bloody holding shower without [his] shoes.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment and compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.) II. Misjoinder A. Joinder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) limits the joinder of parties in a single lawsuit, whereas Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) limits the joinder of claims. Rule 20(a)(2) governs

when multiple defendants may be joined in one action: [p]ersons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Rule 18(a) states: “A party asserting a claim . . . may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Courts have recognized that, where multiple parties are named, as in this case, the analysis under Rule 20 precedes that under Rule 18: Rule 20 deals solely with joinder of parties and becomes relevant only when there is more than one party on one or both sides of the action. It is not concerned with joinder of claims, which is governed by Rule 18. Therefore, in actions involving multiple defendants Rule 20 operates independently of Rule 18. . . Despite the broad language of Rule 18(a), plaintiff may join multiple defendants in a single action only if plaintiff asserts at least one claim to relief against each of them that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence and presents questions of law or fact common to all. 7 Charles Allen Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1655 (3d ed. 2001), quoted in Pace v. Timmermann’s Ranch and Saddle Shop Inc., 795 F.3d 748, 754 n.10 (7th Cir. 2015), and Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F. Supp. 2d 743, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2009); see also United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 142–43 (1965) (discussing that joinder of defendants is permitted by Rule 20 if both commonality and same transaction requirements are satisfied). Therefore, “a civil plaintiff may not name more than one defendant in his original or amended complaint unless one claim against each additional defendant is transactionally related to the claim against the first defendant and involves a common question of law or fact.” Proctor, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 778 (internal quotation marks omitted). When determining if civil rights claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence, a court may consider a variety of factors, including, “the time period during which the alleged acts occurred; whether the acts . . . are related; whether more than one act . . . is alleged; whether the same supervisors were involved, and whether the defendants were at different geographical locations.” Id. (citation omitted). Permitting improper joinder in a prisoner civil rights action undermines the purpose of the PLRA, which was to reduce the large number of frivolous prisoner lawsuits that were being filed in the federal courts. See Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 917 (6th Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit has explained that a prisoner like plaintiff may not join in one complaint all the defendants against whom he may have a claim, unless the prisoner satisfies the dual requirements of Rule 20(a)(2): Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass that [a multi]-claim, [multi]-defendant suit produce[s] but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees—for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) . . . . A buckshot complaint that would be rejected if filed by a free person—say, a suit complaining that A defrauded the plaintiff, B defamed him, C punched him, D failed to pay a debt, and E infringed his copyright, all in different transactions— should be rejected if filed by a prisoner. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Brown v. Blaine, 185 F. App’x 166, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2006) (allowing an inmate to assert unrelated claims against new defendants based on actions taken after the filing of his original complaint would have defeated the purpose of the three strikes provision of PLRA). Under these circumstances, to allow Plaintiff to proceed with improperly joined claims and Defendants in a single action would permit him to circumvent the PLRA’s filing fee provisions and allow him to avoid having to incur a “strike” for purposes of § 1915(g), should any of his claims be dismissed as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. Courts are therefore obligated to reject misjoined claims like Plaintiff’s. See Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, Defendant Richardson is the first Defendant identified by name in the factual allegations of the complaint.1 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on November 19, 2020, Defendant Richardson deployed a Taser to Plaintiff’s face “while breaking up an altercation.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.)

1 The analysis of joinder must start somewhere. By accepting the first-named Defendant in Plaintiff’s factual allegations as the foundation for the joinder analysis, the Court is considering the issue of joinder of parties as Plaintiff has presented it in his complaint. Plaintiff’s claim regarding the Defendant Richardson’s November 19, 2020, use of force also implicates Defendant Traylor, who Plaintiff alleges did not address Plaintiff’s complaints regarding the denial of medical care related to the November 19, 2020, Taser incident. (Id., PageID.6.) However, no matter how liberally the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff

has not stated at least “one claim against each [remaining] defendant [that] is transactionally related to the claim against the first defendant and involves a common question of law or fact.” Proctor, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 778 (citations omitted). Specifically, Plaintiff does not specify the nature of his claims against Defendant Mygrants, and Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Ferguson and Ybarro concern discrete events that occurred nearly a year after Defendant Richardson’s use of force. Accordingly, the Court concludes that, while Defendants Richardson and Traylor are properly joined, Plaintiff has improperly joined Defendants Mygrants, Ferguson, and Ybarro. B. Remedy Because the Court has concluded that Plaintiff has improperly joined Defendants Mygrants, Ferguson, and Ybarro to this action, the Court must determine an appropriate remedy. Under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[m]isjoinder of parties is not a ground for

dismissing an action.” Fed. Civ. P. R. 21. Instead, Rule 21 provides two remedial options: (1) misjoined parties may be dropped on such terms as are just; or (2) any claims against misjoined parties may be severed and proceeded with separately. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 572–73 (2004) (“By now, ‘it is well settled that Rule 21 invests district courts with authority to allow a dispensable nondiverse party to be dropped at any time . . . .’” (citation omitted)); DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 845 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Michaels Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A., 848 F.2d 674, 682 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[D]ismissal of claims against misjoined parties is appropriate.”). “Because a district court’s decision to remedy misjoinder by dropping and dismissing a party, rather than severing the relevant claim, may have important and potentially adverse statute-of-limitations consequences, the discretion delegated to the trial judge to dismiss under Rule 21 is restricted to what is ‘just.’” DirecTV, 467 F.3d at 845. At least three judicial circuits have interpreted “on such terms as are just” to mean without “gratuitous harm to the parties.” Strandlund v. Hawley, 532 F.3d 741, 745 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also DirecTV, 467 F.3d at 845. Such gratuitous harm exists if the dismissed parties lose the ability to prosecute an otherwise timely claim, such as where the applicable statute of limitations has lapsed, or the dismissal is with prejudice. Strandlund, 532 F.3d at 746; DirecTV, 467 F.3d at 846–47. Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). The statute of limitations begins to run when the aggrieved party knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his action. Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Ferguson and

Ybarro occurred in October and November 2021, and Plaintiff provides the Court with no detail regarding Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Mygrants. (ECF No. 1, PageID.6–7.) Plaintiff’s complaint provides no indication that the statute of limitations has or will run on Plaintiff’s claims against the misjoined Defendants, and Plaintiff has provided no basis for this Court to conclude that he would suffer gratuitous harm if claims against the misjoined Defendants are dismissed without prejudice. Accordingly, the Court will exercise its discretion under Rule 21 and drop Defendants Mygrants, Ferguson, and Ybarro because they are misjoined, and the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them without prejudice to the institution of new, separate lawsuits.2 See Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997) (“In such a case, the court can generally dismiss all but the first named plaintiff without prejudice to the institution of new, separate lawsuits by the dropped plaintiffs.”).

III. Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility

standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

2 If Plaintiff wishes to proceed with his claims against the misjoined Defendants, he may do so by filing new civil action on the form provided by this Court, see W.D. Mich. LCivR 5.6(a), and paying the required filing fees or applying in the manner required by law to proceed in forma pauperis. As fully discussed in this opinion, Plaintiff is cautioned that he must limit all future actions to Defendants and claims that are transactionally related to one another. The Court may, in its discretion and without further warning, dismiss any future complaint, or part thereof, filed by Plaintiff that contains claims that are misjoined. Plaintiff is advised that simply because separate and discrete events occurred during Plaintiff’s incarceration does mean that all claims arising out these events are properly joined. misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Here, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Richardson regarding his November 19, 2020, use of force, an Eighth Amendment claim regarding the denial of medical care for the symptoms that Plaintiff experienced

after being struck with Defendant Richardson’s Taser, and a claim against Defendant Traylor regarding Defendant Traylor’s lack of response to Plaintiff’s “complaints” and Defendant Traylor’s alleged failure to train, investigate, and supervise employees. A. Official Capacity Claims Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official and individual capacities. A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity; in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). The states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan,

803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous opinions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013); Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 962 (6th Cir. 2013); McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2010). Here, Plaintiff seeks only monetary relief. Official capacity defendants, however, are absolutely immune from monetary damages. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71; Turker v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 157 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1998). Moreover, § 1983 expressly requires that a named defendant be a “person.” See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). But neither the State of Michigan nor the MDOC is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. See Will

v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding a state is not a “person”); Parker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 65 F. App’x 922, 923 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Will and holding that the MDOC is not a “person.”). Therefore, the Court, will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities. B. Eighth Amendment – Use of Force As relevant to excessive force claims, the Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of confinement which, although not physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those that are “totally without penological justification.” Id. However, not every shove or restraint gives rise to a constitutional violation. Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “On occasion, ‘[t]he maintenance of prison security and discipline may require that inmates be subjected to physical contact actionable as assault under common law.’” Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Combs v.

Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2002)). Prison officials nonetheless violate the Eighth Amendment when their “offending conduct reflects an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995)); Bailey v. Golladay, 421 F. App’x 579, 582 (6th Cir. 2011). There is an objective component and a subjective component to this type of Eighth Amendment claim. Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001)). First, “[t]he subjective component focuses on the state of mind of the prison officials.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383. Courts ask “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Second, “[t]he objective component requires the pain inflicted

to be ‘sufficiently serious.’” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9–10 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). The objective component requires a “contextual” investigation that is “responsive to ‘contemporary standards of decency.’” Id. at 8 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). Although the extent of a prisoner’s injury may help determine the amount of force used by the prison official, it is not dispositive of whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). “When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . [w]hether or not significant injury is evident.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Richardson was breaking up “an altercation,” when

he purposely deployed his Taser to Plaintiff’s face. (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) Although Plaintiff’s allegations lack some specificity as to the events leading to Defendant Richardson’s deployment of the Taser, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Richardson on initial review. C. Eighth Amendment – Medical Care The Eighth Amendment is also violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976); Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001). A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective component. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial

risk of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner’s need[] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2008). The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying medical care. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000). Here, Plaintiff fails to provide the Court with any information whatsoever regarding the “medical condition and symptoms” (ECF No. 1, PageID.6) that Plaintiff experienced after being struck by Defendant Richardson’s Taser. Therefore, the Court is unable to conclude that Plaintiff has alleged a sufficiently serious medical need as required to satisfy the objective prong of the deliberate indifference test. However, even if the Court assumes that the injuries Plaintiff sustained are sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component, as to the subjective component, Plaintiff does not allege that the named Defendants had any involvement in Plaintiff’s receipt, or lack

thereof, of medical care. Instead, Plaintiff vaguely states that an unidentified “nurse” and “healthcare staff” refused to provide Plaintiff with adequate medical care. Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim for relief against any named Defendant. Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to allege that any of the named Defendants were involved in Plaintiff’s alleged receipt of inadequate medical care, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims premised upon the lack of such care will be dismissed. D. Claim Against Defendant Traylor Regarding Written Kites and Failure to Train, Supervise, and Investigate Employees Plaintiff alleges that he sent a kite to Defendant Traylor concerning Plaintiff’s “complaints” regarding the November 2020 Taser incident, but that Defendant Traylor did not take any action to investigate or respond. (ECF No. 1, PageID.6; ECF No. 1-3, PageID.14.) He also alleges that “MDOC officials,” including Defendant Traylor, maintain an illegal practice of failing to train, investigate, and supervise employees. (ECF No. 1-3, PageID.14.) Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Traylor are insufficient to give rise to personal liability under § 1983. Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676;

Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a defendant denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that

each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. The Sixth Circuit repeatedly has summarized the minimum required to constitute active conduct by a supervisory official: “[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300, and citing Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008)); see also Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375–76 (1976), and Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)); Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993); Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989). Defendant Traylor’s failure to respond to Plaintiff’s complaints after the fact is not active constitutional behavior. Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting that Defendant Traylor was even aware of any unconstitutional conduct prior to or at the time that such conduct is said to have occurred, much less that Defendant Traylor encouraged or condoned misconduct by any subordinate, or authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in any alleged misconduct that could be said to have caused a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Traylor. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Court will drop as misjoined Defendants Mygrants, Ferguson, and Ybarro. Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants will be dismissed without prejudice. Additionally, having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Defendant Traylor will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)

and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim regarding the denial of adequate medical care. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Richardson regarding Defendant Richardson’s use of his Taser on November 19, 2020, remains in the case. An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: September 11, 2024 /s/ Robert J. Jonker Robert J. Jonker United States District Judge