Wallace v. United States

146 F. Supp. 444, 137 Ct. Cl. 7
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedDecember 5, 1956
DocketNo. 77-53; No. 78-53
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 146 F. Supp. 444 (Wallace v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wallace v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 444, 137 Ct. Cl. 7 (cc 1956).

Opinion

Laramore, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This action is brought to recover income taxes allegedly improperly assessed for the year 1948 against the plaintiffs John M. Wallace and Glenn W. Wallace, jointly as husband and wife, in the amount of $52,982.54, and against the plaintiff Leland S. Swaner in the amount of $36,985.23.

Two issues are involved, only one of which is common to both plaintiffs. First: The Commissioner of Internal Eevenue determined that the plaintiffs’ 1948 income was understated due to his determination that there existed a partnership between the two plaintiffs, John M. Wallace and Leland S. Swaner, and a third party, Zion’s Cooperative Mercantile Institution (hereinafter referred to as Z. C. M. I.), for the purpose of buying and selling interests in the Eeming-ton Small Arms Plant, and that such transactions resulted in a profit to the partnership of $189,919.93, 30 percent of that [9]*9amount being taxable as ordinary income to both Wallace and Swaner as their share of the partnership profits, the third party having a 40 percent interest. Defendant does not rely on the partnership theory as a basis for the additional taxes, but does contend that plaintiffs were enriched in the above amount as the result of compensation or fees charged for services rendered. Thus, the issue is to determine whether or not plaintiffs received any income from transactions relating to the Remington Small Arms Plant whether it be as the result of partnership income, or fees or compensation for services rendered.

Second: The Commissioner determined that the Wallaces’ income was further understated by reason of an exclusion from taxable income by them of 70.93668 percent of a dividend of $20,000 received by Mrs. Wallace from the Excelsior Iron Mining Company during 1948, the exclusion being made on the ground that that portion of the distribution represented dividends paid out of profits, earnings or increases in value accumulated prior to March 1, 1913, the plaintiff relying on section 115 (a) and (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Defendant concedes that 70.93668 percent represents that portion of the dividend not earned in the current year, but argues that since plaintiff had already received under the sections of the Internal Revenue Code applicable in such situations tax exempt income in excess of the cost basis of the stock held by them, and since there was no proof of the cost of the distributing company’s property or of any increase in their value before March 1,1913, any subsequent distribution of that nature must be taxed as a capital gain according to section 115 (d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U. S. C. § 115. Thus, the issue is to determine whether capital gains taxes should be assessed against 70.93668 percent, or $14,187.34, of the $20,000 distribution to taxpayers in 1948, or whether it is completely tax exempt even though tax exempt income in excess of the cost basis of the stock to plaintiffs has been recovered by them.

The issue common to both parties will be discussed first.

The facts reveal that the War Assets Administration, an instrumentality of the United States Government, had for two years, from 1946 to 1948, attempted unsuccessfully to sell [10]*10one of its surplus facilities, the Kemington Small Arms Plant. Apparently the chief reason for the failure to sell was the agency's refusal to sell the property piecemeal. It was aware that various institutions were interested in acquiring parts of the property but, not desiring to be left “holding the bag” with the least desirable or valueless portions of the property, would accept bids only for the entire plant. In accordance with this policy, it suggested that all interested persons and organizations join together and submit a joint bid for the entire property. Pursuant thereto, several organizations and individuals banded together for the purpose of bidding for the plant and purchasing it if the bid was accepted. This group, namely, the Utah Wholesale Grocery Company; Associated Food Stores, Inc.; Utah Power & Light Company; Imperial Upholstering Company; Zion’s Cooperative Mercantile Institution and the plaintiffs, John M. Wallace and Leland S. Swaner, submitted on April 20,1948, a bid for the property in the amount of $1,620,000, which bid was submitted in the name of plaintiff John M. Wallace and two other Salt Lake City residents, Harold H. Bennett representing Z. C. M. I., and Leland B. Swaner, father and representative of plaintiff, Leland S. Swaner, who were selected by the group to act as their representatives.

Each of the above organizations, all of whom had previously expressed an interest in and attempted to acquire part of the plant from the War Assets Administration, orally agreed to pay for the buildings and land they had selected at prices they had fixed thereon. The plaintiffs joined the agreement for the purpose of acquiring for investment the leftover acreage, unselected parts of larger buildings, smaller buildings and other odd pieces of property not desired by the other participants. Plaintiffs, therefore, were to pay the difference between the total bid price and the values affixed by the other participants. Plaintiffs’ share ultimately worked out to $74,077, each to pay one-half. A large part of the remaining land was unimproved and the remaining building space was considered of much less value than the other improved property selected by the above organizations. The entire plant was itself in a rundown state due to the lack of maintenance for over two years.

[11]*11Wallace, Swaner, and Bennett in whose names the bid was submitted, were selected as representatives of the group as the result of a suggestion by the War Assets Administration that representatives be selected. They were to handle all transactions and details incident to the bid. They were to receive title to the property if the bid was accepted and were then to convey the selected parcels of property to the other participants at the agreed prices. It was for this reason, therefore, that title to the property was eventually transferred to them by the War Assets Administration on February 1,1949, after the final installment on the purchase price was paid. Immediately thereafter title was transferred by them to the respective group members according to their previous commitments.

Previous to this, however, the group’s nominees, Wallace, Swaner, and Bennett, had entered into written sales agreements with some of the participating members conveying to that member the particular piece of property it had previously selected. These agreements when taken alone would tend to indicate that the nominees bought the property from the War Assets Administration in their own right for resale to the individual group members. The agreements, however, which listed Wallace, Swaner, and Bennett as “Sellers” and the contracting group member as “Purchaser”, were for no other purpose than to formalize the oral commitments already existing between these participating bidders. The words “Sellers” and “Purchaser” were apparently merely words of convenience since Wallace, Swaner, and Bennett were at all times in question no more than representatives of the group itself.

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146 F. Supp. 444, 137 Ct. Cl. 7, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wallace-v-united-states-cc-1956.