Wallace v. Marten Transport Ltd

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: November 8, 2024
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00872
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 1

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE

10 MALIK WALLACE, DUANE CASE NO. 2:24-cv-00872-RAJ 11 PARTRIDGE, and ANTHONY ROGERS, individually and on behalf of all others ORDER 12 similarly situated,

13 Plaintiffs,

14 v.

15 MARTEN TRANSPORT, LTD., a Foreign Profit Corporation; and DOES 1-10, 16 inclusive;

17 Defendants.

19 I. INTRODUCTION 20 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Malik Wallace, Duane 21 Partridge, and Anthony Rogers (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)’s Motion to Remand this case to 22 state court. Dkt. # 24. 23 Also before the court is Defendant Marten Transport, Ltd. (“Defendant”)’s Motion 24 to Dismiss. Dkt. # 23. 25 For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand 26 and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 27 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 This class action arises out of a labor dispute in which Plaintiffs claim Defendant 3 failed to disclose pertinent salary and other benefit-related information when posting an 4 open employment position, thereby contravening requirements prescribed by Washington 5 law. The facts that precipitated this matter are few and as alleged in Plaintiffs’ Second 6 Amended Complaint. In November of 2023 and February of 2024, Plaintiffs applied for 7 job openings in Washington listed by Defendant that sought commercial truck drivers. Dkt. 8 # 18 at ¶ 11. The job postings did not disclose the wage scale, salary range, or a general 9 description of the benefits and other compensation offered. Id. Plaintiffs have provided 10 the Court with a current driver opportunity job posting on Defendant’s website, which 11 include phrases such as “$1,675 average weekly pay” and “[w]eekly home time [].” Id. at 12 10. The listing also alludes to health, dental, and vision benefits. Id. Plaintiffs claim that 13 “there was and is no range of possible salaries stated, nor was or is there any wage scale of 14 what truck drivers earn included in the job posting.” Id. Plaintiffs allege that they “lost 15 valuable time applying for jobs with Defendant,” and “as a result of their inability to 16 evaluate the pay for positions, negotiate that pay, and compare that pay to other available 17 positions in the marketplace, Plaintiffs and the Class Members were harmed.” Id. at ¶ 11. 18 The Court will also address the procedural posture of this case, as it is relevant to 19 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand. Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit in King 20 County Superior Court on May 9, 2024, and their First Amended Complaint five days later, 21 seeking statutory damages and reasonable attorney’s fees for violations of the Washington 22 Equal Pay and Opportunity Act (“EPOA”), RCW 49.58.110 and RCW 49.58.070. Dkt. # 23 1-2. Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint alleged that Defendant engaged in a systematic 24 scheme of failing to include the wage scale or salary range that would be offered in its job 25 postings, a violation of the EPOA. See id. On June 17, 2024, Defendant removed the case 26 to this Court, asserting that the Court has subject[-]matter jurisdiction over this action 27 pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 1 Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint on June 25, 2024, adding Anthony 2 Rogers as a party. Dkt. # 18. Defendant moves to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, 3 averring that Plaintiffs not only fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, but 4 also lack standing. Conversely, Plaintiffs move to remand this case to King County 5 Superior Court on the supposition that jurisdiction is improper in this Court. 6 III. LEGAL STANDARD 7 A. Motions to Remand 8 Under normal circumstances, district courts have original jurisdiction of all civil 9 actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, 10 and is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). A defendant may remove 11 a civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts have original jurisdiction. 12 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). However, CAFA provides the federal district courts with original 13 jurisdiction to hear a class action if the class has more than 100 members, the parties are 14 minimally diverse, and the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000. 15 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(b)(5). 16 There is a strong presumption against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 17 F.2d 564, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1992). To protect the jurisdiction of state courts, removal 18 jurisdiction is strictly construed in favor of remand, and any doubt as to the right of removal 19 must be resolved in favor of remand. Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 20 698 (9th Cir. 2005); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. The party seeking a federal forum has the 21 burden of establishing that federal jurisdiction is proper. Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. 22 Co., 443 F.3d 676, 682-83 (9th Cir. 2006). 23 The removing party must carry this burden not only at the time of removal, but also 24 when opposing a motion to remand. See Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 25 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). To assess jurisdiction, a court may consider facts in the 26 removal petition and “summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in 27 controversy at the time of removal.” Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 1 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335-36 2 (5th Cir. 1995)). 3 B. Motions to Dismiss 4 i. Lack of standing 5 Federal courts are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and may only hear cases 6 authorized by the Constitution or a statutory grant. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 7 Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction rests 8 upon the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. Once it is determined that a 9 federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, such as for want of standing, the court has 10 no choice but to dismiss the suit. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006); Fed. 11 R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter 12 jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). 13 A party may bring a factual challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction, and in such 14 cases the court may consider materials beyond the complaint. PW Arms, Inc. v. United 15 States, 186 F. Supp. 3d 1137, 1142 (W.D. Wash. 2016) (internal citation omitted); see also 16 McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[m]oreover, when 17 considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) [,] the district court is not 18 restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and 19 testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction.”). 20 ii. Failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint for 22 failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The rule requires the court to assume the 23 truth of the complaint’s factual allegations and credit all reasonable inferences arising from 24 those allegations. Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). A court “need not 25 accept as true conclusory allegations that are contradicted by documents referred to in the 26 complaint.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 27 2008). The plaintiff must point to factual allegations that “state a claim to relief that is 1 plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007). If the plaintiff 2 succeeds, the complaint avoids dismissal if there is “any set of facts consistent with the 3 allegations in the complaint” that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id. at 563; Ashcroft 4 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 5 A court typically cannot consider evidence beyond the four corners of the complaint, 6 although it may rely on a document to which the complaint refers if the document is central 7 to the party’s claims and its authenticity is not in question. Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 8 448 (9th Cir. 2006). A court may also consider evidence subject to judicial notice. United 9 States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). 10 IV. DISCUSSION 11 A. Remand to King County Superior Court 12 The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter and summarily denies 13 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand. “CAFA’s provisions should be read broadly, with a strong 14 preference that interstate class actions should be heard in federal court if properly removed 15 by any defendant.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 16 (international quotation marks and citation omitted). “It suffices to point out that no 17 antiremoval [sic] presumption attends cases invoking CAFA, which Congress enacted to 18 facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in federal court.” Id. (citing Standard Fire 19 Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588, 595 (2013)). 20 As elucidated, supra, CAFA provides federal district courts with original 21 jurisdiction to hear a class action if the class has more than 100 members, the parties are 22 minimally diverse, and the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000. 23 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(b)(5). The Court commences its inquiry into whether 24 jurisdiction is proper by examining Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint in conjunction 25 with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), which applies to class actions. Here, the 26 Court need not tarry into a prolix analysis, as the Second Amended Complaint contains a 27 clear concession that the Court has jurisdiction, alleging, “[t]his Court has subject[-]matter 1 jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims under 28 U.S.C. sections 1332, 1441, 1446, and 1453. 2 The parties are diverse under 28 U.S.C. section 1332 and 28 U.S.C. section 1441, and the 3 amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.” Dkt. # 18 at ¶ 6. To cinch the matter, 4 Plaintiffs allege all the Rule 23(b)(3) and CAFA elements supporting removal, admitting 5 that: (1) “the members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is 6 impractical;” (2) “Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class;” 7 (3) “Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class;” and (4) 8 “[c]ommon questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the class . . . .” Compare 9 id. at ¶¶ 16-19 with Fed. R. Civ. 23(a) (listing the same four elements). 10 The Court must address the trend in which other courts often choose to remand a 11 case when faced with concurrent motions to remand and dismiss. Nonetheless, the 12 interplay between the Motions in this case provides an exception to this inclination. As 13 Defendant aptly posits in its Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand, if the Court is 14 certain that remand would be futile because standing issues would prevent the case from 15 proceeding in state court, dismissal is the appropriate choice. See Bell v. City of Kellogg, 16 922 F.2d 1418, 1425 (“leave to amend should be given freely, but need not be granted 17 when it would be futile in saving the plaintiffs’ case.”) (internal citation omitted). In the 18 proceeding section of its Order, the Court will find that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring 19 this action, thus rendering remand to state court futile. 20 Although not pertinent to its ruling, the Court questions whether Plaintiffs moved 21 to remand this action in good faith. Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Remand a mere two 22 days after Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs have also filed three complaints 23 in this case when including the original state court pleading. It is possible that Plaintiffs 24 are forum-shopping to have this case heard in a jurisdiction with a notice pleading standard, 25 which is a far lower bar to satisfy than that in federal court. 26 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand. Dkt. # 24. 27 1 B. Motion to Dismiss Based on Lack of Standing 2 i. Injury-in-fact 3 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint on two 4 grounds: (1) lack of standing and (2) failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 5 granted. The Court finds that Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring this action, as they 6 are not bona fide job applicants who have suffered an injury-in-fact. 7 To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) it has suffered an injury- 8 in-fact [sic] “that is (a) concreted and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not 9 conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 10 defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be 11 redressed by a favorable decision.” Cal. Sea Urchin Comm’n v. Bean, 883 F.3d 1173, 1180 12 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 526 13 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)). The Ninth Circuit recently developed a two-pronged inquiry to 14 determine whether the violation of a statute constitutes a concrete harm or injury-in-fact: 15 (1) “whether the statutory provisions at issue were established to protect . . . concrete 16 interests (as opposed to purely procedural rights)” and (2) “whether the specific procedural 17 violations alleged in [the] case actually harm, or present a material risk of harm to, such 18 interests.” Magadia v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 999 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2021). “A 19 plaintiff does not automatically satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute 20 grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate 21 that right.” Robins v. Spokeo, Inc. 867 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations 22 marks and citation omitted). 23 The Court is cognizant that the purpose of the EPOA is to protect concrete interests, 24 but it finds that Plaintiffs are parroting the elements of the statute in their factually deprived 25 Second Amended Complaint. The harm Plaintiffs allege they suffered is that they (1) “lost 26 valuable time applying for jobs with Defendant for which the wage scale or salary range 27 was not disclosed to them;” (2) “applied for the jobs in good faith with the genuine intent 1 of gaining employment;” and (3) were unable to “evaluate the pay for positions, negotiate 2 that pay, and compare that pay to other available positions in the marketplace.” Dkt. # 18 3 at ¶¶ 3, 12-13. 4 The final allegation listed above echoes the exact same language of an essential 5 element listed in the EPOA statute that Plaintiffs fail to buttress with any specific facts. 6 See RCW 49.58.110. Moreover, courts in this District have routinely found similar 7 allegations insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See Floyd v. Insight Glob. LLC, 8 No. 2:23-cv-01680, 2024 WL 2133370, at *5 (W.D. Wash. May 10, 2024) (ruling that 9 when the defendant argued the plaintiff made conclusory allegations that he lost time while 10 applying for a job, “a job posting that does not contain compensation information . . . does 11 not harm or create a material risk of harm to any individual’s concrete interest.”); Atkinson 12 v. Aaron’s LLC, No. 2:23-cv-01742, 2024 WL 2133358, at *9 (W.D. Wash. May 10, 2024) 13 (“the Court concludes that a violation of the statutory provision at issue here—a job posting 14 with no compensation information included—is a technical or procedural violation that by 15 itself does not manifest concrete injury but requires a ‘bona fide’ applicant before there is 16 a risk of harm.”). 17 Plaintiffs offers no specific facts demonstrating that they are bona fide job 18 applicants. Because Plaintiffs fail to show that they suffered the type of harm against which 19 the statute intends to protect, they lack standing to bring a claim under RCW 49.58.110. 20 Even if this case were remanded, Plaintiffs would again fail to establish standing, as they 21 would still have to show that a challenged action caused an “injury in fact.” See Dean v. 22 Lehman, 143 Wn.2d 12, 18, 18 P.3d 523, 527 (2001) (listing the requisite elements to 23 establish standing in Washington courts). 24 ii. Leave to amend 25 The Court finds that allowing Plaintiffs further leave to amend their pleading would 26 be futile. Courts should deny leave to amend if “the pleading could not possibly be cured 27 by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., 1 Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). “Where the plaintiff has previously amended its 2 complaint,” courts have broader discretion to grant motions to dismiss without leave to 3 amend. Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004). 4 Here, Plaintiffs have amended their complaint twice in the last two months. It is 5 highly unlikely that allowing Plaintiffs to file a third amended complaint would cure the 6 standing issues previously discussed. Finally, prolonging this litigation would exhaust the 7 resources of both the Court and the parties. 8 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. # 23. 9 V. CONCLUSION 10 Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand 11 and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. ## 24, 23. Plaintiffs’ Second 12 Amended Complaint is dismissed WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk is instructed to close 13 this case. 14 15 Dated this 8th day of November, 2024. A 16 17 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27