In The
Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ____________________ NO. 09-17-00431-CR _______________________
WALLACE RAY JACKSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 1A District Court Jasper County, Texas Trial Cause No. 10418JD
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Wallace Ray Jackson pleaded guilty to
aggravated sexual assault. The trial court deferred further proceedings and placed
Jackson on community supervision for ten years and assessed a $5,000 fine.
Subsequently, the State filed an Amended Motion for Adjudication of Guilt alleging
Jackson violated several conditions of his community supervision.
Jackson pleaded “true” to violations as alleged by the State: that he violated
condition (d) that required him to report weekly to his Supervision Officer by failing 1 to report on certain dates; that he violated conditions (i), (k), (l), and (m) that required
him to pay supervision fees, court costs, restitution, and court-appointed attorney’s
fees by failing to pay; that he violated condition (p) that required him to abstain
from alcohol and illegal controlled substances by testing positive for illegal
controlled substances on some dates; that he violated condition (q) that required him
to submit to substance abuse testing and pay testing fees by refusing to submit to a
urinalysis on October 6, 2016 and failing to pay testing fees; that he violated
condition (r)(2) that required him to attend and participate in Sexual Offender Group
Therapy by failing to attend and participate since February 13, 2017; and that he
violated condition (s) that required him to attend at least one Celebrate Recovery
meeting per week by failing to attend as directed.
Jackson pleaded “not true” to the State’s allegations that he violated condition
(h) requiring him to notify the court if he moved from Jasper County and condition
(n) requiring him to perform 240 hours of community service at the minimum rate
of sixteen hours per month, as well as to condition (r)(7) requiring him to have his
place of residence approved by the Supervision Officer and condition (r)(12)
prohibiting him from possessing or using a computer with access to any on line
computer service without his Community Supervision Officer’s prior written
approval.
2 After the State presented evidence on the allegations to which Jackson pleaded
“not true,” the trial court found that Jackson violated the conditions of his
community supervision, adjudicated him guilty of aggravated sexual assault, and
sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. Jackson appealed.
On appeal, Jackson argues the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked
Jackson’s community supervision (1) by allowing evidence about Jackson’s alleged
Facebook activity and interjecting the trial court’s own knowledge about Facebook
in the hearing; (2) on the allegation that Jackson violated a condition of his
community supervision by not paying fees levied when he had no ability to pay; (3)
on the allegation he had moved without notifying community supervision when he
never moved but temporarily went to Port Arthur after Hurricane Harvey “to help
his wife escape from the rising flood waters[;]” (4) on the allegation that he had not
completed his community service hours or classes assigned as part of his community
supervision even though his probation period had not expired; (5) on the allegation
that he failed to report as directed when he only stopped reporting because his
probation officer advised him not to report; (6) and on the allegation that he failed
drug tests when he was unable to treat his substance abuse issue because he did not
qualify for substance abuse placement due to his felony conviction and because he
was not ordered to other rehabilitation programs that he could have participated in.
3 We review a trial court’s revocation of deferred adjudication community
supervision for abuse of discretion. Staten v. State, 328 S.W.3d 901, 904-05 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.). The State must prove a violation of the terms or
conditions of community supervision by a preponderance of the evidence. Rickels v.
State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The State satisfies this burden
when the greater weight of credible evidence before the trial court creates a
reasonable belief demonstrating it is more probable than not that the defendant has
violated a condition of his community supervision. Staten, 328 S.W.3d at 905. We
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Cardona v.
State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Proof of a single violation will
support revocation. Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
In general, “[a] plea of true, standing alone, is sufficient to support the revocation of
community supervision and adjudicate guilt.” Tapia v. State, 462 S.W.3d 29, 31 n.2
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing Moore, 605 S.W.2d at 926)).
In addition to his pleas of true to several violations, the trial court heard
evidence about several other alleged violations to which Jackson pleaded “not true.”
For example, condition (h) required Jackson to notify the court of any change in
address, and Jackson’s probation officer testified that when Jackson was placed on
probation his address was in Bon Wier. According to the probation officer, she had
4 been on several field visits to the address in Bon Wier, and Jackson’s grandmother
that lives there indicated that Jackson had not been there for a while. The probation
officer also testified that she called the Newton Sheriff’s Department, they went out
to do a check, and notified the probation officer that Jackson was not living at the
Bon Wier address. Jackson’s wife testified that her apartment in Port Arthur flooded
during Hurricane Harvey and that she was taken out by boat and flown to Dallas to
a shelter. According to Jackson’s wife, Jackson stayed in Dallas for about a little
over a week. Jackson testified that he did not move but went to help his wife in Port
Arthur during Hurricane Harvey and then flew to Dallas to the shelter.
As to condition (n) which required Jackson to perform 240 hours of
community service at a rate of 16 hours pers month, Jackson’s probation officer
testified that he worked a total of three hours of community service. Jackson
admitted he “did some hours[]” of his community service but “[n]ot as much as [he]
was supposed to[,]” and Jackson explained that he did not have transportation at the
time.
As to condition (r)(7) which required him to have his place of residence
approved by the Supervision Officer, Jackson’s probation officer testified that she
did not know where Jackson was living after he left his home in Bon Wier. Jackson
testified his residence in Bon Wier was approved and that he never moved.
5 As to condition (r)(12), which prohibited him from possessing or using a
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In The
Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ____________________ NO. 09-17-00431-CR _______________________
WALLACE RAY JACKSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 1A District Court Jasper County, Texas Trial Cause No. 10418JD
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Wallace Ray Jackson pleaded guilty to
aggravated sexual assault. The trial court deferred further proceedings and placed
Jackson on community supervision for ten years and assessed a $5,000 fine.
Subsequently, the State filed an Amended Motion for Adjudication of Guilt alleging
Jackson violated several conditions of his community supervision.
Jackson pleaded “true” to violations as alleged by the State: that he violated
condition (d) that required him to report weekly to his Supervision Officer by failing 1 to report on certain dates; that he violated conditions (i), (k), (l), and (m) that required
him to pay supervision fees, court costs, restitution, and court-appointed attorney’s
fees by failing to pay; that he violated condition (p) that required him to abstain
from alcohol and illegal controlled substances by testing positive for illegal
controlled substances on some dates; that he violated condition (q) that required him
to submit to substance abuse testing and pay testing fees by refusing to submit to a
urinalysis on October 6, 2016 and failing to pay testing fees; that he violated
condition (r)(2) that required him to attend and participate in Sexual Offender Group
Therapy by failing to attend and participate since February 13, 2017; and that he
violated condition (s) that required him to attend at least one Celebrate Recovery
meeting per week by failing to attend as directed.
Jackson pleaded “not true” to the State’s allegations that he violated condition
(h) requiring him to notify the court if he moved from Jasper County and condition
(n) requiring him to perform 240 hours of community service at the minimum rate
of sixteen hours per month, as well as to condition (r)(7) requiring him to have his
place of residence approved by the Supervision Officer and condition (r)(12)
prohibiting him from possessing or using a computer with access to any on line
computer service without his Community Supervision Officer’s prior written
approval.
2 After the State presented evidence on the allegations to which Jackson pleaded
“not true,” the trial court found that Jackson violated the conditions of his
community supervision, adjudicated him guilty of aggravated sexual assault, and
sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. Jackson appealed.
On appeal, Jackson argues the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked
Jackson’s community supervision (1) by allowing evidence about Jackson’s alleged
Facebook activity and interjecting the trial court’s own knowledge about Facebook
in the hearing; (2) on the allegation that Jackson violated a condition of his
community supervision by not paying fees levied when he had no ability to pay; (3)
on the allegation he had moved without notifying community supervision when he
never moved but temporarily went to Port Arthur after Hurricane Harvey “to help
his wife escape from the rising flood waters[;]” (4) on the allegation that he had not
completed his community service hours or classes assigned as part of his community
supervision even though his probation period had not expired; (5) on the allegation
that he failed to report as directed when he only stopped reporting because his
probation officer advised him not to report; (6) and on the allegation that he failed
drug tests when he was unable to treat his substance abuse issue because he did not
qualify for substance abuse placement due to his felony conviction and because he
was not ordered to other rehabilitation programs that he could have participated in.
3 We review a trial court’s revocation of deferred adjudication community
supervision for abuse of discretion. Staten v. State, 328 S.W.3d 901, 904-05 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.). The State must prove a violation of the terms or
conditions of community supervision by a preponderance of the evidence. Rickels v.
State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The State satisfies this burden
when the greater weight of credible evidence before the trial court creates a
reasonable belief demonstrating it is more probable than not that the defendant has
violated a condition of his community supervision. Staten, 328 S.W.3d at 905. We
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Cardona v.
State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Proof of a single violation will
support revocation. Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
In general, “[a] plea of true, standing alone, is sufficient to support the revocation of
community supervision and adjudicate guilt.” Tapia v. State, 462 S.W.3d 29, 31 n.2
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing Moore, 605 S.W.2d at 926)).
In addition to his pleas of true to several violations, the trial court heard
evidence about several other alleged violations to which Jackson pleaded “not true.”
For example, condition (h) required Jackson to notify the court of any change in
address, and Jackson’s probation officer testified that when Jackson was placed on
probation his address was in Bon Wier. According to the probation officer, she had
4 been on several field visits to the address in Bon Wier, and Jackson’s grandmother
that lives there indicated that Jackson had not been there for a while. The probation
officer also testified that she called the Newton Sheriff’s Department, they went out
to do a check, and notified the probation officer that Jackson was not living at the
Bon Wier address. Jackson’s wife testified that her apartment in Port Arthur flooded
during Hurricane Harvey and that she was taken out by boat and flown to Dallas to
a shelter. According to Jackson’s wife, Jackson stayed in Dallas for about a little
over a week. Jackson testified that he did not move but went to help his wife in Port
Arthur during Hurricane Harvey and then flew to Dallas to the shelter.
As to condition (n) which required Jackson to perform 240 hours of
community service at a rate of 16 hours pers month, Jackson’s probation officer
testified that he worked a total of three hours of community service. Jackson
admitted he “did some hours[]” of his community service but “[n]ot as much as [he]
was supposed to[,]” and Jackson explained that he did not have transportation at the
time.
As to condition (r)(7) which required him to have his place of residence
approved by the Supervision Officer, Jackson’s probation officer testified that she
did not know where Jackson was living after he left his home in Bon Wier. Jackson
testified his residence in Bon Wier was approved and that he never moved.
5 As to condition (r)(12), which prohibited him from possessing or using a
computer with access to any on line computer service without his Community
Supervision Officer’s prior written approval, Jackson’s probation officer testified
that someone alerted her to Jackson’s Facebook page and her supervisor printed out
pages from an account in Jackson’s name. The copies of the images from Jackson’s
Facebook page were admitted into evidence. The probation officer testified that the
images depicted Jackson and posts from April, although a year was not specified.
Jackson denied being on Facebook since September of 2015. To the extent Jackson
argues on appeal that the trial court interjected personal knowledge about Facebook,
Jackson did not object at the hearing on this basis. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. And to
the extent Jackson argues on appeal that forbidding Jackson’s access to social media
is a violation of his First Amendment right, the appellate record does not reveal that
he lodged any complaint about the conditions of his community supervision in the
trial court when the conditions were imposed, and therefore, he has waived this
complaint. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Hull v. State, 67 S.W.3d 215, 217 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002); see also Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 764 (Tex. Crim App.
2011) (“[B]ecause Appellant affirmatively accepted and waived any objections to
the conditions [of community supervision], he cannot complain about them for the
first time on appeal.”).
6 As stated above, in general, a plea of true, standing alone, is sufficient to
support revocation of community supervision. Tapia, 462 S.W.3d at 31 n.2. As the
sole trier of fact, the trial court was entitled to judge the credibility of the witnesses
and decide what weight to give the testimony. Brooks v. State, 153 S.W.3d 124, 127
(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, no pet.). In doing so, the trial court could have also
reasonably concluded that Jackson moved without notifying the court of any change
in address, he failed to complete his required community service hours, he failed to
have his place of residence approved by his Supervision Officer, and that he had an
active Facebook page. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling, we conclude that the State proved, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Jackson violated a condition of his community supervision. See
Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763; see also Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493. Because the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Jackson’s unadjudicated community
supervision, we overrule Jackson’s issue on appeal.
We note that the trial court’s judgment adjudicating guilt incorrectly states
that Jackson pleaded “not true” to the State’s Motion to Adjudicate. We modify the
section of the trial court’s judgment entitled “Plea to Motion to Adjudicate” to show
Appellant pleaded true to violating conditions (d), (i), (k), (l), (m), (p), (q), (r)(2),
and (s), and “not true” to violating conditions (h), (n), (r)(7), and (r)(12). See Tex.
7 R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
_________________________ LEANNE JOHNSON Justice
Submitted on January 24, 2019 Opinion Delivered February 20, 2019 Do Not Publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.