Wall v. United States

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: August 21, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-1901
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JESSE WALL, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-01901 (UNA) v. ) ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court for review of Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF

No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The Court

grants the IFP Application, and for the reasons discussed below, it dismisses this matter without

prejudice.

Plaintiff, a resident of the District, sues the United States. See Compl. at 1–2. He asserts

that, on February 26, 2025, he filed an administrative claim with the U.S. Office of Personnel

Management (“OPM”) “outlining negligence, omission, and ongoing sexual harassment” against

a D.C. Superior Court judge who presided over one or more of his cases, and his Complaint goes

on to cite broad examples of the judge’s alleged wrongdoing. See id. at 2–3. OPM apparently

denied the claim, and Plaintiff now contends that the “denial constitutes a waiver of sovereign

immunity under FTCA, as the claim was filed in good faith, timely, and involves conduct within

the scope of federal employment.” See id. at 3. He demands $100 million in damages. Id. at 4.

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. He filed a complaint with OPM challenging the alleged

actions of a D.C. Superior Court judge, but OPM only oversees benefits for federal employees, not

Superior Court judges. See 5 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq. Second, even if Plaintiff had pursued the proper administrative avenue, he has still failed

to state a claim. As here, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements,” are insufficient to state a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). Although a pro se complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted), it still “must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to

infer ‘more than the mere possibility of [defendant’s] misconduct,’” Atherton v. District of

Columbia Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678-79); see Aktieselskabet AF 21. Nov.2001 v. Fame Jeans, Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 16 n.4 (D.C. Cir.

2008) (“We have never accepted ‘legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations’ because

a complaint needs some information about the circumstances giving rise to the claims.” (quoting

Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).

Plaintiff’s Complaint falls well short of this pleading standard. Although he cites quite

generally to the FTCA, the U.S. Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1 see Compl. at 1–3, he has

nonetheless failed to identify any actual wrongdoing by an employee of OPM, save from his mere

disagreement with OPM’s denial of his claim. Put differently, “the mere suggestion of a federal

question is not sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of federal courts[,]” Johnson v. Robinson,

576 F.3d 522, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Bilal v. Kaplan, 904 F.2d 14, 15 (8th Cir.1990) (per

curiam)), and “[e]vents may not have unfolded as Plaintiff wished, but his dissatisfaction[,]”

standing alone, cannot “form a basis” for an actionable federal claim, see Melton v. District of

Columbia, 85 F. Supp. 3d 183, 193 (D.D.C. 2015).

1 Moreover, § 1983 does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law. Settles v. United States Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2005). For all the above stated reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate Order

accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: August 21, 2025 __________/s/_________________ JIA M. COBB United States District Judge