UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA _________________________________________ ) JESSE MICHAEL WALL, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 23-3342 (ABJ) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) _________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on defendant District of Columbia’s Motion to Dismiss
plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 12) and plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 25). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will GRANT the District’s motion and
DISMISS the amended complaint in its entirety. The termination of the case will render plaintiff’s
summary judgment motion to be moot.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff describes himself as a “United States, and US Treaty Holder.” Am. Compl. (ECF
No. 6) ¶ 4. As such, he considers himself beyond the reach of the Superior Court of the District
of Columbia. See id.; see also id. ¶¶ 18, 28, 33-36, 42-43, 45. Nevertheless, it appears that the
Superior Court issued a Civil Protection Order (“CPO”) against him, held criminal contempt
proceedings following his violation of the CPO, accepted his guilty plea, and ordered his detention.
[1] See id. ¶¶ 14-15, 20, 24, 38-39.1
Plaintiff has sued the District of Columbia, the Attorney General of the District of
Columbia, St. Elizabeth’s Hospital and one of its employees, the Chief Judge, two Associate
Judges and one Magistrate Judge of the Superior Court, the United States Marshal for the Superior
Court, and the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency. According to plaintiff,
defendants retaliated against him for having “reported sex crimes, libel, slander, and defamation,
on January 24th, 2023.” Id. ¶ 13.
One alleged form of retaliation was the CPO issued by a Magistrate Judge on May 4, 2023,
see id. ¶¶ 14-15, 20 (referring to 2023 CPO 0001500), and extended by an Associate Judge on
May 8, 2023. See id. ¶ 16. Another alleged retaliation event was the entry of a default judgment
against plaintiff on May 23, 2023. See id. ¶ 18. These acts also amounted to “judicial misconduct”
in plaintiff’s view, see id. ¶¶ 13, 18, as were the acts of a second Magistrate Judge who “did not
give bail amount,” id. ¶ 32, and the Associate Judge who presided over the criminal contempt
proceedings. See id. ¶¶ 24-25, 28.
Plaintiff alleges that defendants defamed him, apparently by way of court documents
submitted to the Superior Court by the Office of the Attorney General in support of a petition for
the CPO, see, e.g., id. ¶ 23, a witness’s testimony, and information included in Superior Court
orders, see id. ¶ 20, claiming plaintiff had committed criminal offenses. See id. ¶¶ 20-21. As a
1 The Court takes judicial notice of the Superior Court’s public docket of the criminal contempt proceedings. See In re Wall, No. 2023 CCC 000027 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed June 23, 2023). It appears that, over the course of criminal contempt proceedings, the Superior Court ordered a mental competency examination, found plaintiff incompetent to stand trial, ordered plaintiff’s transfer to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital for competency restoration and subsequent transfer to the D.C. Jail, accepted plaintiff’s guilty plea and waiver of trial, entered a judgment and commitment order, and sentenced plaintiff to a term of imprisonment. [2] result, plaintiff allegedly lost “possible contract opportunities [worth] billions of dollars” with the
federal government. Id. ¶ 24.
In addition, plaintiff faults other individuals and agencies involved in his arrest,
supervision, conviction and detention. For example, plaintiff alleges that United States Marshals
arrested him without a warrant, see id. ¶ 29, that a doctor with the District’s Department of
Behavioral Health “made erroneous conclusions,” id. ¶ 35, presumably about plaintiff’s
competence to stand trial, and that the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency “coerced
Plaintiff by threats.” Id. ¶ 41.
In this action, plaintiff plainly challenges the authority of the Superior Court. See, e.g., id.
¶¶ 18, 28, 42-43. He demands an order to “vacate . . . sentence and dismiss the charges with full
prejudice . . . and stay . . . prosecution to sovereign from [the Superior Court].” Id. ¶ 45. Plaintiff
demands a judgment in his favor and an award of $60 million, among other relief. See id. ¶ 1; see
also id. at 9 (page number designated by CM/ECF).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)
The District of Columbia (“District” or “defendant”) moves to dismiss the amended
complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that it fails to state a claim
for which relief may be granted. See generally Def. District of Columbia’s Mem. of P. & A. in
Support of its Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Am. Compl. (ECF No. 12, “Def.’s Mem.”) at 5-9 (page
numbers designated by CM/ECF).
A plaintiff need only provide a “short and plain statement of [his] claim showing that [he
is] entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), that “give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the . .
. claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per
[3] curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757–58 (2014).
A facially plausible claim pleads facts that are not ‘“merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability”
but that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see Banneker
Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Plausibility requires more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully[.]”).
The Court must consider the entire complaint, with all factual allegations accepted as true,
“even if doubtful in fact.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v.
Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 2019). The Court cannot, however, “assume the
truth of legal conclusions, nor [does it] ‘accept inferences that are unsupported by the facts set out
in the complaint.’” Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (alteration in original)
(internal citation omitted) (quoting Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 732
(D.C. Cir. 2007)); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (stating that conclusory allegations are “not entitled
to be assumed true”).
In applying these standards to pleadings filed by pro se litigants, the Court must consider
the complaint “in light of all filings, including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss.” Johnson
v. District of Columbia, 927 F.3d 539, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt.
Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In addition, a pro se complaint must “‘be liberally construed’ and ‘held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Bowman v. Iddon, 848 F.3d 1034, 1039 (D.C. Cir.
[4] 2017) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)). Nonetheless, a pro se plaintiff is not excused from complying with
applicable procedural rules and “must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more
than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor,
567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678); see also Jones v. Horne, 634
F.3d 588, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
B. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(1)
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Because federal courts are “forbidden . . . from acting beyond
[their] authority,” NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2008), judges have “an
affirmative obligation ‘to consider whether the constitutional and statutory authority exist for [the
Court] to hear each dispute.’” James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (quoting Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l Corp., 217
F. Supp. 2d 59, 63 (D.D.C. 2002). While the Court must “assume the truth of all material factual
allegations in the complaint and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting [the] plaintiff the
benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged,’” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC,
642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir.
2005)), it need not limit itself to considering the allegations of a complaint, and instead “may
consider such materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate to resolve the question of
whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case.” Scolaro v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections &
[5] Ethics, 104 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000) (citing Herbert, 974 F.2d at 197); see also Jerome
Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Defendant District of Columbia’s Motion to Dismiss2
The amended complaint consists of eight counts, and the District of Columbia moves to
dismiss Counts I, II, IV, VII and VIII. See Def.’s Mem. at 3.
1. Retaliation Claim and 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (Count I)
Count I invokes anti-retaliation and anti-coercion sections of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), which provide:
(a) Retaliation
No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.
(b) Interference, coercion, or intimidation
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 12203. The ADA defines the term “disability” as follows:
The term ‘‘disability’’ means, with respect to an individual—
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment[.]
2 Plaintiff refers to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80, in his complaint and opposition to the District’s motion. See Am. Compl. ¶ 1; Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. Because the Court construes the complaint, as amended, as one bringing claims against District of Columbia defendants, the FTCA does not apply in this case.
[6] 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
The District moves to dismiss Count I for two reasons: plaintiff “has not alleged that he
suffers from a disability within the meaning of the ADA,” and he “fails to plead facts showing he
was engaged in protected activity or opposed practices made unlawful by the ADA, that the District
took an adverse activity against him, or that there as a causal connection between the two.” Def.’s
Mem. at 6.
Plaintiff identifies “GAD,” which he does not describe further or indicate that it is part of
any formal diagnosis he has received, as “an ADA recognized set of symptoms for his disorder.”
Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 24, “Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 1. He also asserts that
“retaliation can occur before any ‘protected activity’ occurs. Id. He appears to identify “filing a
claim of libel and slander” a form of protected activity, id., and issuance of the CPO an act of
retaliation. Id. at 2. This response, to the extent it is intelligible, falls far short of a plausible ADA
claim. While plaintiff may have a disability, he fails to allege facts showing, for example, he has
a mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, or that any Superior Court
proceeding occurred because plaintiff has that disability, or that any defendant interfered in any
way with plaintiff’s exercise of any right under the ADA.
2. Defamation Claim and 28 U.S.C. § 4101(1) (Count VII)
The District argues that “[d]efamation is a matter of state law that does not implicate any
federal question.” Def.’s Mem. at 6, and that the complaint alleges no facts showing that 28 U.S.C.
§ 4101(1) applies. See id. at 7. The Court concurs.
The statute on which plaintiff relies defines the term “defamation” with respect to the
recognition of foreign defamation judgments in domestic courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 4102. Plaintiff
fails to allege facts showing that these federal statutes are applicable here.
[7] There is no defamation claim under federal law. See Jean-Baptiste v. Booz Allen Hamilton,
Inc., 630 F. Supp. 3d 88, 94 (D.D.C. 2022) (concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 4101 “does not create a
federal cause of action for domestic defamation suits”), aff’d in part, No. 22-7128, 2023 WL
2190628 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 22, 2023), and rev’d and remanded on other grounds, No. 22-7128, 2023
WL 3835956 (D.C. Cir. June 2, 2023) (per curiam). Rather, defamation is a common law claim
arising under District of Columbia law, and absent factual allegations demonstrating the existence
of diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), the Court lacks federal question jurisdiction
over it. See Shafi v. McFadden, No. 1:05-cv-1268 (RWR), 2006 WL 1722327, at *1 (D.D.C. June
21, 2006); Mays v. Meeks, No. 1:05-cv-2116 (CKK), 2006 WL 890671, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 5,
2006).
3. Claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1513, 2241, and 2381 (Counts IV, II, III and VIII)
The District correctly argues that plaintiff’s claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1513, and 2381
must be dismissed because “[c]riminal codes do not provide a basis for a private civil action.”
Def.’s Mm. at 7.
None of the statutes on which plaintiff relies establishes a private cause of action. See
Eslick v. Washington, No. 2:21-cv-0282-TOR, 2022 WL 16826164, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8,
2022) (“Section 2 is a general criminal statute establishing criminal liability for those who act as
principals in the commission of a federal crime,” and absent “legislative intent indicating 18 U.S.C.
§ 2 could be used to assert a private cause of action . . . Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on this claim as a matter of law.”); Barrett v. Biden, No. 1:22-cv-02823 (UNA), 2022
WL 16528195, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2022) (“[P]laintiff attempts to bring a claim for treason
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2381, but that is a criminal statute which does not create a private right of
action and, therefore, cannot be relied upon by a civil plaintiff to state a claim for relief.”) (citing
[8] cases); Abou-Hussein v. Mabus, 953 F. Supp. 2d 251, 262 n.5 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[T]o the extent that
the plaintiff intends to raise a claim pursuant to [18 U.S.C.] § 1513, such a claim cannot be
maintained.”); Ghost Bear v. South Dakota Dep’t of Corr., No. 11-cv-5051, 2011 WL 3608569,
at *2 (D.S.D. 2011) (stating there is no private right of redress or private suit for a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1513); Shahin v. Darling, 606 F. Supp. 2d 525, 538–39 (D. Del.) (recognizing no private
right of action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512, 1513), aff’d, 350 F. App’x 605 (3d Cir. 2009) (per
curiam).
In the absence of a statute creating a private cause of action, the Supreme Court is “quite
reluctant to infer a private right of action from a criminal prohibition alone,” and it “ha[s] not
suggested that a private right of action exists for all injuries caused by violations of criminal
prohibitions.” Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
190 (1994).
The amended complaint relies on two additional criminal statutes. Plaintiff cites 18 U.S.C.
§ 208 as a basis for this Court’s jurisdiction, see Am. Compl. ¶ 2, and in Count III, plaintiff purports
to bring a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2241. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57-61. Although the District does
not mention these statutes in its motion, its rationale for dismissal of civil claims based on criminal
statutes applies to them as well. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(“Congress has also adopted criminal statutes that would apply . . . had [defendants] committed
acts of torture, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340A, 2241, 3261, but Congress has not created a corresponding
tort cause of action.”); Jordan v. Cicchi, No. 08-cv-6088 AET, 2010 WL 848809, at *12 (D.N.J.
Mar. 9, 2010) (noting that the “White Slave Traffic Act, 18 U.S.C. 2421, . . . and the related sexual
abuse statutes at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2242, 2244, are criminal statutes and do not give rise to any
private right of action”), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 428 F. App’x 195 (3d Cir.
[9] 2011) (per curiam); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Clinton, 880 F. Supp. 1, 5 n.3 (D.D.C. 1995) (finding
that 18 U.S.C. § 208 (acts affecting personal financial interest) provides no private right of acon),
aff’d, 76 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
B. Claims Against Superior Court Judges
1. Claim Under 28 U.S.C. § 351 (Count V)
In Count V, plaintiff faults the Chief Judge of the Superior Court for her failure to force
the recusal of the judge presiding over the criminal contempt proceedings. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 67-
68. He purports to bring a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 351, which authorizes complaints against
federal circuit, district, bankruptcy, and magistrate judges “alleging that a judge has engaged in
conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, or
alleging that such judge is unable to discharge all the duties of office by reason of mental or
physical disability.” 28 U.S.C. § 351(a). This statute pertains to federal judges, not Superior Court
judges, and even if it applied to defendants in this case, the statute does not create a private right
of action. See Walker v. Walker, No. 1:23-cv-488, 2023 WL 3956549, at *2 (W.D. Mich. May 22,
2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-cv-488, 2023 WL 3949867 (W.D. Mich.
June 12, 2023); Hueter v. Kruse, No. 1:20-cv-3686, 2021 WL 3052034, at *2 (D.D.C. July 2021)
(noting that Section 351 “provides a procedure by which persons ‘may file with the clerk of the
court of appeals for the circuit a written complaint’ about a federal judge’s conduct” and “does not
create a private cause of action”).
[10] 2. Claim Under 28 U.S.C. § 453 (Count VI)
The Court construes Count VI as a claim that defendant judges violated their oath of office,
see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 71-72, set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 453.3 There is no private right of action under
28 U.S.C. § 453 either. See Butler v. City of Tampa Fla., No. 8:22-cv-606-MSS-SPF, 2022 WL
3099017, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 11, 2022) (“Plaintiff lists 28 U.S.C. § 453, which merely states the
oath of U.S. justices and judges. This does not create a private right of action against federal
judges.”), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Butler v. City of Tampa, No. 8:22-cv-
606-MSS-SPF, 2022 WL 3098965 (M.D. Fla. May 31, 2022), adhered to on recons., No. 8:22-cv-
606-MSS-SPF, 2022 WL 9274243 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 7, 2022), appeal dismissed, No. 22-13373-J,
2022 WL 19396510 (11th Cir. Dec. 15, 2022), and appeal dismissed, No. 23-10379-H, 2023 WL
3243474 (11th Cir. Mar. 9, 2023); Lloyd v. Pokorny, No. 2:20-cv-2928, 2020 WL 4436350, at *8
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2020) (dismissing claim under 28 U.S.C. § 453 “for there is no private right of
action allowing suit under th[is] la[w]”); Simon v. Hollis, No. 97-cv-1164-JTM, 1997 WL 542721,
at *6 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 1997) (“Statutes which require state or federal officials to take oaths of
office do not create a private cause of action for acting contrary to the Constitution.”), aff’d sub
nom. Simon v. N. Farms, Inc., 139 F.3d 912 (10th Cir. 1998); Lewis v. Green, 629 F. Supp. 546,
554 n.14 (D.D.C. 1986) (“Neither Article VI, clause 3, which mandates that federal judges swear
3 “Each judge of the Superior Court, when appointed shall take the oath prescribed for judges of courts of the United States.” D.C. Code § 11-905. The oath states:
I, ___ ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.
28 U.S.C. § 453. [11] an oath of allegiance to the Constitution, nor 28 U.S.C. § 453, which sets forth that oath, creates a
substantive cause of action against federal judges for violating that oath by acting contrary to the
Constitution.”).
3. Federal District Court Jurisdiction and Judicial Immunity
At bottom, plaintiff essentially is attacking Associate and Magistrate Judges of the Superior
Court for positions taken, rulings made, and conduct occurring in the course of performing their
judicial duties, granting or extending protection orders, conducting criminal contempt
proceedings, and effecting plaintiff’s detention. “This federal district court lacks jurisdiction to
review another court’s decisions and order it to take any action.” Phillips v. Office of Attorney
General for the District of Columbia, No. 1:22-cv-3810 (UNA), 2023 WL 1070564, at *1 (D.D.C.
Jan. 26, 2023) (citing Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002)) (“The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine prevents lower federal courts from hearing cases that amount to the functional equivalent
of an appeal from a state court.”); United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011)
(district courts “generally lack[ ] appellate jurisdiction over other judicial bodies, and cannot
exercise appellate mandamus over other courts.”) (citing Lewis, 629 F. Supp. at 553).
Consequently, this Court cannot review or overrule any ruling of the Superior Court.
In addition, the defendant judges “are entitled to absolute immunity from suits predicated
on actions taken in their official capacities, unless such actions ‘are taken in the complete absence
of all jurisdiction.’” Miller v. Marriott Int’l LLC, 378 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting
Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993)), aff’d, No. 19-7053, 2019 WL 6492628
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 15, 2019); Jenkins v. Kerry, 928 F. Supp. 2d 122, 134–35 (D.D.C. 2013). “Like
other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from
ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam).
[12] IV. CONCLUSION
The amended complaint fails to state claims upon which relief can be granted, and the
District’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The Court, therefore, DISMISSES the complaint and
this civil action, and DENIES plaintiff’s summary judgment motion as moot. An Order is issued
separately.
DATE: March 31, 2025 /s/ AMY BERMAN JACKSON United States District Judge
[13]