PD-0693-15
PD-0693-5 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 7/8/2015 11:25:08 AM Accepted 7/9/2015 4:14:04 PM ABEL ACOSTA
IN THE CLERK COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
LISA D. WALL, § APPELLANT § V. § NO. PD-0693-15 §
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § APPELLEE §
APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND COURT DISTRICT OF TEXAS IN CAUSE NUMBER 02-13-00552-CR, AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CAUSE NUMBER CR-2012- 01008-D IN COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 4 OF DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS; THE HONORABLE JOE BRIDGES, PRESIDING.
§§§
APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR REVIEW §§§
JASON ZENDEH DEL Lead Counsel for Appellant The Zendeh Del Law Firm 7600 San Jacinto Place, Suite 200 Plano, Texas 75024 Telephone (214) 919-3600 Facsimile (214) 919-3599 Jason@zenlawfirm.com State Bar Number 24044988
July 9, 2015
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
The trial judge was the Honorable Joe Bridges, the presiding judge of
County Criminal Court No. 4 of Denton County, Texas.
Appellant is Lisa D. Wall, who was the Defendant in the below trial court
case. Appellant was represented at trial and on appeal by Jason Zendeh Del of the
Zendeh Del Law Firm. This attorney’s address is 7600 San Jacinto Place, Suite
200, Plano, Texas 75024.
The State of Texas, which is represented by Denton County District
Attorney Paul Johnson, is also a party to this litigation. At trial, the State was
represented by Sarah Wood. On appeal, the State was represented by Catherine
Luft. The address of these attorneys is Denton County District Attorney’s Office,
1450 E. McKinney Street, Denton, Texas 76209.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... v
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT .............................................. 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................ 2
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION .................. 3
QUESTION FOR REVIEW ..................................................................................... 4
STATEMENT OF FACTS ...................................................................................... 5
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................................... 6
I. The Court of Appeals opinion………………………………………….....6
II. Reasonable suspicion in a motion to suppress…………………………..6
Fourth Amendment…………………………………………………...8
III. The court of appeals upheld the conviction, and reversed the trial
court’s judgment, when the evidence did not support the determination that
Officer Padgett possessed reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop.10
CONCLUSION....................................................................................................... 14
PRAYER................................................................................................................. 15
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ...................................................................... 16
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................... 16
COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION........................................................................ 17
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Abney v. State, 394S.W.3d 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).......................................... 7
Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ...................................... 7
Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied, 541
U.S. 974 (2004).................................................................................................... 8
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) ......................................................................... 9
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.433 (1973) ............................................................. 10
Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002......................................... 10
Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ....................................... 6, 7
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ....................................... 7
State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ............................. 11, 13
State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)....................................... 8
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ................................................................... 8, ,9, 13
United States v. Brigmont-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) ........................................... 8
Wall v. State, No. 02-13-00552-CR, 2015 WL 2169307 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
May 7, 2015 ) (memo op.) (not for publication)................................. 3, 6, 10, 11, 14 v!
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) ....................................................... 8, 9
Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ........................................... 9
STATUTES
U.S. Cons. Amend. IV .............................................................................................. 8
Tex. Cons. Art. 1,§10................................................................................................ 8
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IN THE
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
LISA D. WALL, § APPELLANT § V. § NO. PD-0693-15 §
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § APPELLEE §
APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS IN CAUSE NUMBER 02-13-00552-CR, AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CAUSE NUMBER CR-2012-01008-D IN COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 4 OF DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS; THE HONORABLE JOE BRIDGES, PRESIDING.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument is not necessary to resolve the issues raised by this case.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was convicted of the misdemeanor offense of Driving While
Intoxicated (“DWI”). [CR 111] The trial court sentenced Appellant to 300 days
confinement in the Denton County Jail and a $500 fine. [CR 111] However, the
trial court suspended the imposition of the jail sentence and placed Appellant on
fifteen months of community supervision. [CR 111]
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION
On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the unlawful
stop of Appellant’s vehicle. [App. brief at 3]
A panel of judges from the Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s judgment. Wall v. State, No. 02-13-00552-CR, 2015 WL 2169307, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, May 7, 2015) (memo op.) (not for publication). In its
opinion, however, the appellate court sustained Appellant’s issue that the trial court
erred when it found in its findings of fact that the officer had reasonable suspicion
to stop Appellant on the basis of disregarding a control device or making an overly
wide U-turn. Id. at *4. The court of appeals went on to determine that the trial
court did err when it ruled to deny Appellant’s motion to suppress on the basis that
the officer had reasonable suspicion that Appellant was engaged in criminal
activity. Id. at *5. The trial court had made findings of fact, after hearing evidence
at the suppression hearing, that Appellant’s driving was not reasonable suspicion
of DWI. [CR 104] The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s judgment under
this theory.
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QUESTION FOR REVIEW
Did the court of appeals erroneously review and affirm the trial court’s
ruling on the motion to suppress? Specifically, did the appellate court improperly
uphold the motion to suppress on a theory that the trial court had found did not
exist (i.e., that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant’s vehicle and
initiate a temporary detention) in its findings of fact and conclusions of law?
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 18, 2011, Appellant was driving her pickup truck1 in Denton
County, Texas. [2 RR 7-9] At approximately 2:00 a.m., Corey Padgett, a police
officer with the Denton Police Department, pulled his patrol car behind
Appellant’s vehicle at the intersection of Fulton and University. [2 RR 7-9] He
stated that Appellant was travelling eastbound. [2 RR 10] Officer Padgett testified
that the light at the intersection was flashing yellow, which indicated that cars were
to proceed with caution through the light. [2 RR 9] He stated that Appellant,
however, was completely stopped at the light for a longer than normal period. [2
RR 9, 12]
Officer Padgett then testified that Appellant proceeded through the light and
approached a second flashing yellow light at Alice and University. [2 RR 13]
There, Appellant slowed down significantly in the middle of the intersection, but
she did not completely stop her vehicle. [2 RR 13] He then stated that after
proceeding through the intersection, Appellant changed lanes, got into the left-
hand lane, and made a U-turn. [2 RR 14] At that point, Officer Padgett turned on
his overhead patrol lights and Appellant pulled her vehicle into a Kroger parking
lot. [2 RR 25-26]
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1 Appellant will refer to her truck as a “vehicle” throughout the brief.
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DISCUSSION
I. The Court of Appeals’ opinion.
The Fort Worth court of appeals determined that the trial court’s finding that
the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant’s vehicle on the
basis of DWI was not supported by the evidence. Id. at 5. The appellate court
upheld Appellant’s conviction under this theory. Id. However, the court of
appeals agreed with Appellant and went on to state in its opinion that the trial
court’s findings that Appellant committed traffic offenses (i.e., making an
improper U-turn and disregarding a traffic control device) were not supported by
evidence. Wall, 2015 WL 2169307, at *4.2
II. Reasonable suspicion in a motion to suppress.
“To suppress evidence on an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, the
defendant bears the initial burden of producing some evidence that rebuts the
presumption of proper police conduct.” Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005). When a defendant meets the burden by establishing that the
search or seizure occurred without a warrant, the burden shifts to the State to prove
that the search or seizure was prompted by reasonable suspicion that an individual
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 2 !Appellant’s brief will not focus on this theory because the court of appeals held that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant’s vehicle on the basis of committing a traffic offense. However, Appellant will brief this issue if this Court so requests.
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was violating the law. Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 547 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013); see also Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Here, at the beginning of the suppression hearing, the State stipulated that
this case involves a warrantless arrest. [2 RR 7] Therefore, this stipulation shifted
the burden to the State to establish the reasonableness of the warrantless detention.
See Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492.
A court of appeals reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress
under a bifurcated standard of review to evaluate the totality of the circumstances
and determine whether reasonable suspicion exists. See Abney, 394 S.W.3d at 547;
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The court of appeals
will give “almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical
facts, especially when the trial court’s findings are based on an evaluation of
credibility and demeanor.” Abney, 394 S.W.3d at 547; see also Guzman, 955
S.W.2d at 89.
The court of appeals will then review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo
unless its explicit fact findings that are supported by the record are also dispositive
of the legal ruling. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 493. The appellate court must uphold the
trial court’s ruling if it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of
law applicable to the case even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its
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ruling. State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007);
!Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied,
541 U.S. 974 (2004).
Fourth Amendment
The United States Constitution protects persons against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Cons. amend. IV. The United States and Texas
Constitutions proclaim that law enforcement personnel may not search an
individual absent a warrant based on probable cause. Id.; Tex. Cons. art. 1,§10. It
has long been the rule, however, that a temporary investigative detention and pat
down search for possible weapons or contraband without a warrant is permissible
provided the officer has a reasonable belief the individual has been engaged in
criminal activity or is armed. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
A seizure under the Fourth Amendment must be objectively reasonable in
light of the particular circumstances of the case. See id. at 21-22. Whether a
traffic stop is reasonable depends on “a balance between the public interest and the
individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
enforcement.” United States v. Brigmont-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). A
seizure based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause will generally be
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reasonable. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996); Terry, 392 U.S. at
21-23.
For an officer to initiate a traffic stop, the officer must have more than a
mere hunch. Whren, 517 U.S. at 818. The officer must be able to articulate
objective facts and circumstances that demonstrate he or she reasonably believed
the Defendant was engaged in criminal activity. See, eg., Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (to detain, officers must “have a reasonable suspicion, based on
objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity”); Terry, 392
U.S. at 30 (reasonable suspicion exists only where policeman reasonably
concludes, inter alia, “that criminal activity may be afoot”).
The law does provide, however, that if a police officer objectively has
reasonable suspicion or probable cause that an offense has been committed then he
or she may reasonably seize an individual through the exercise of his community
caretaking function. Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151-52 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999). This is the so-called community caretaking function and is the exception to
the warrant requirement. Id. at 151.
An integral part of a police officer’s duty is to “serve and protect.” Id. As
part of this duty, a police officer can approach and assist an individual whom he or
she believes is in need of help. Id. An officer will act reasonable “when he
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stopped the vehicle out of concern for the welfare of the [Defendant]” and not to
investigate the Defendant. Id.
This doctrine necessarily examines the intent of the officer when he or she
invokes the doctrine. Importantly, both the United States Supreme Court and the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas have held that the “community caretaking
function, however, is ‘totally divorced from the detention, investigation, or
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973); Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 276-77
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002). That is, a police officer cannot cloak his intent to conduct
a criminal investigation, by invoking the community caretaking function. Corbin,
85 S.W.3d at 276-77. Thus, an officer’s subjective intent is paramount in those
cases. Id.
III. The court of appeals upheld the conviction, and reversed the trial court’s judgment, when the evidence did not support the determination that Officer Padgett possessed reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop.
As stated above, the appellate court affirmed Appellant’s conviction on the
theory that Officer Padgett had reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant’s vehicle on
the basis of DWI. Wall, 2015 WL 2169307, at *5-6. In doing so, the court of
appeals reversed the trial court’s finding and conclusion that Officer Padgett did
not have reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain Appellant on this theory. Id.
The trial court made the following relevant findings of fact:
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The Court finds the driving of the defendant is not reasonable suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Caution in entering an intersection is proper. The Defendant sat at the intersection for 26 seconds that the [sic] Officer Padgett could observe and that is not obstructing a highway.
But the court finds the defendant could be stopped for disregarding the traffic control device and making a wide turn over the white line. Holt v. State, 724 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987). The Court is finding that the Video showing the action is sufficient without the officer testifying that he saw this or was relying on it. [CR 104-05]
The appellate court, however, citing State v. Kerwick on the basis that
“reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law that is reviewed de novo on
appeal,” determined that the trial court’s findings were not supported by the record
and that Officer Padgett did possess reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant’s
vehicle on the basis of suspected DWI. 393 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013); Wall, 2015 WL 2169307, at *5. The appellate court based its determination
on (1) Appellant’s “prolonged stop” at one flashing yellow light, (2) delayed
response to brake and subsequently almost complete stop in the middle of the
another flashing yellow light intersection, (3) Officer Padgett’s testimony that he
had made previous DWI stops at a flashing yellow light at the exact location that
Appellant’s vehicle was travelling, and (4) Officer Padgett’s testimony that
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Appellant was driving her vehicle at approximately 2:00 a.m. on a weekend in an
area that bars are located. Id.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Padgett testified as follows:
[State]: And at what point did you suspect the driver to be intoxicated?
[Officer]: Upon contact with them and after speaking with them.
[State]: And what about their driving habits led you to suspect them for DWI?
[Officer]: I’ve had DWIs before where somebody stops at a flashing yellow light on University; at that exact area, actually. So stopping at flashing yellow lights is not normal. The time of the day. It’s 2:00 a.m. Bars close. It’s when most of our DWIs happen.
.... [Appellant]: And on that occasion, and also in your report, you listed two very specific reasons as to why you pulled over Ms. Wall, why you indicated that traffic stop; is that correct?
[Officer]: Yes.
[Appellant]: And those two very specific reasons are she, one, disregarded a traffic control device; and, two, you wanted to do a welfare check. Is that correct?
[Officer]: I believe that’s in the reason part of the LEADRS, but it also – in the PC narrative, it also states the possible intoxication.
....
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[Appellant]: And at a prior hearing, when you testified under oath, we talked about this case and you gave two reasons that you stopped Ms. Wall; disregarding a traffic control device and checking on her welfare. Is that correct?
[Officer]: Yes.
[Appellant]: And as a matter of fact, I specifically asked you, “Were there any other reasons to stop her?” And you stated, “No.” Do you recall that?
[Officer]: I believe so.
[Appellant]: Okay. I also asked you precisely when did this incident turn into a DWI investigation. And your response then was only after you made contact with her and you went into your – your clues of intoxication, odor, that type of thing. Do you recall that?
[Officer]: Yes.
[2 RR 15, 17-18]
Here, the record clearly supports the trial court’s finding that Appellant’s
driving was not reasonable suspicion of DWI. [CR 104-05] During his testimony
at the suppression hearing, Officer Padgett testified that he did not have reasonable
suspicion that Appellant was driving while intoxicated. 2 RR 15, 17-18]
Therefore, when the appellate court viewed the evidence in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the court should have affirmed the trial court’s
finding. See Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d at 273.
As stated in Terry v. Ohio, reasonable suspicion only exists when a police
officer reasonably concludes that “criminal activity may be afoot.” 392 U.S. at 30.
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Officer Padgett stated under examination from both the State and Appellant that he
did not suspect DWI until he stopped Appellant’s vehicle and made contact with
her. [2 RR 15, 17-18] The officer testified that the only reasons he listed for
stopping Appellant’s vehicle were (1) disregarding a traffic control device and (2)
welfare check. [2 RR 17-18] Only after further examination from the prosecutor
did Officer Padgett state Appellant’s driving habits led him to suspect DWI. [2 RR
15] Clearly, based on his own testimony, Officer Padgett did not have reasonable
suspicion to stop Appellant’s vehicle on the basis of DWI. Although the court of
appeals pointed out that Officer Padgett testified to the factors that he considered
justified his stop of Appellant’s vehicle on suspicion of DWI, this testimony came
after Officer Padgett stated that he did not suspect DWI until after he approached
her vehicle. [2 RR 15]
As such, the appellate court erroneously determined that when viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling that the trial court’s
determination that Officer Padgett did not possess reasonable suspicion to stop
Appellant’s vehicle was not supported by the record. Wall, 2015 WL 2169307, at
*5.
CONCLUSION
The Second District Court of Appeals erroneously determined that Officer
Padgett had reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant’s vehicle on the basis of DWI.
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First, after reviewing the evidence, the trial court found that the evidence did not
support the reasonable suspicion argument. Second, the evidence presented at the
trial court does not support a determination by the appellate court that the officer
had reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain Appellant. The trial court’s
findings of fact are supported by the record and therefore, should be dispositive of
the ruling. See Ford, 158 S.W. 3rd at 493. This Court should reverse the Fort
Worth Court of Appeal’s opinion and hold that the trial court’s finding that the
officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant’s vehicle on the basis
of DWI was correct and supported by the record.
PRAYER
Appellant prays that her petition be granted and that the Court of Appeals’
judgment be reversed in part as it applies to the officer having reasonable suspicion
of DWI to stop Appellant’s vehicle and render the judgment that the lower court
should have rendered (i.e., reversing Appellant’s conviction). Alternatively,
Appellant prays that the court of appeals’ judgment affirming the trial court’s
judgment be reversed.
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Respectfully submitted,
___________________________
Jason A. Zendeh Del Lead Counsel for Appellant The Zendeh Del Law Firm 7600 San Jacinto Place, Suite 200 Plano, Texas 75024 Telephone (214) 919-3600 Facsimile (214) 919-3599 Jason@zenlawfirm.com State Bar Number 24044988
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this document contains 3,494 words.
___________________________
Jason A. Zendeh Del
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy of Appellant’s petition for discretionary review has been sent to
Denton County District Attorney’s Office, Attn: Appellate Division, via fax (940)
349-2601, on the dame date as filing.
___________________________
Jason A. Zendeh Del
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APPENDIX- COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION
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2015 WL 2169307
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
SEE TX R RAP RULE 47.2 FOR DESIGNATION II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL AND SIGNING OF OPINIONS. BACKGROUND3
DO NOT PUBLISH TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(B) Officer Corey Padgett, driving his patrol unit, approached Court of Appeals of Texas, an intersection where he observed Wall stopped at a Fort Worth. flashing yellow light. Wall remained stopped for several seconds, and cross-traffic, which had a flashing red light, Lisa D. Wall, Appellant drove warily through the intersection when Wall did not.
v. After a few seconds, Wall drove through the intersection, The State of Texas, State and Officer Padgett followed her.
NO. 02–13–00552–CR | DELIVERED: May 7, 2015 As Wall approached another intersection with a flashing yellow light, she braked hard but late, coming to an FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 4 OF almost complete stop in the middle of the intersection. DENTON COUNTY, TRIAL COURT NO. CR–2012– Before her vehicle completely stopped, Wall accelerated 01008–D through the intersection, changed lanes, and made a U-
turn. Based on Wall’s curious driving behavior, Officer Attorneys and Law Firms Padgett initiated a traffic stop.
Jason Zendeh Del, Plano, TX, for Appellant.
When Officer Padgett began talking with Wall, he Paul Johnson, Dist Atty., Catherine Luft, Asst. Dist. Atty., observed that her eyes were glassy and red, her speech Denton, TX, for State. was slurred, and that she had a slight smell of alcohol.
Officer Padgett administered standard field sobriety tests, PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; WALKER and GABRIEL, and Wall displayed six clues of intoxication on the JJ. horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Officer Padgett arrested Wall for driving while intoxicated, and a subsequent blood draw revealed that Wall had a blood alcohol MEMORANDUM OPINION1 concentration of .16.
Wall filed a motion to suppress evidence seized as a result SUE WALKER, JUSTICE of Officer Padgett’s traffic stop, arguing that Officer Padgett lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle. At the suppression hearing, Officer Padgett testified that Wall’s reaction to the two lights had made him suspect that she was intoxicated. He explained that stopping at a I. INTRODUCTION2
flashing yellow light is not normal, even if it is not a traffic violation to do so. From his training, Officer *1 Appellant Lisa D. Wall appeals her conviction for Padgett knew that intoxicated drivers often fail to follow driving while intoxicated. After the trial court denied her traffic signals, and he considered a driver’s inability to motion to suppress evidence, Wall pleaded no contest. The trial court assessed her punishment at 300 days’ respond properly to a flashing yellow light to be a big confinement, which the court suspended; the trial court indicator of intoxication. In fact, Officer Padgett had made prior DWI stops at a flashing yellow light “at that placed Wall on community supervision for fifteen exact area” of the road that Wall was travelling. Given months. Wall perfected this appeal.
Wall’s driving behavior and the fact that it was around 2:00 a.m. on a weekend day in a neighborhood with many In her sole issue, Wall argues that the trial court erred by bars, Officer Padgett suspected that Wall was intoxicated.
denying her motion to suppress. The State raises a cross- point, asserting that although the trial court correctly *2 The trial court admitted and reviewed a video denied Wall’s motion to suppress, the denial was proper recording of the traffic stop. After the hearing, the trial on an alternative ground rejected by the trial court—that court denied Wall’s suppression motion. In its findings of the stop of Wall’s vehicle was justified based on the arresting officer’s reasonable suspicion that Wall was fact and conclusions of law, the trial court determined that driving while intoxicated. Because we sustain Wall’s Wall’s driving did not give rise to reasonable suspicion that she was driving while intoxicated. But the trial court issue but also sustain the State’s cross-point, we will concluded that Officer Padgett could have stopped Wall affirm the trial court’s judgment.
for either of the two traffic violations that Officer Padgett had observed: Wall’s disregard of a traffic control device 18!
and Wall’s U-turn, which the trial court considered too novo unless its explicit fact findings that are supported by wide because Wall allegedly straddled the turning lane’s the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. Id. at white line in the turn. 818. We must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable to the case even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its ruling. State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Armendariz v. State, 123 III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex.Crim.App.2003), cert. denied,541 U.S. 974 (2004).
A. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. Amador B. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 Statutory construction is a question of law that we review (Tex.Crim.App.1997). In reviewing the trial court’s de novo. Yazdchi v. State, 428 S.W.3d 831, 837 decision, we do not engage in our own factual review. (Tex.Crim.App.2014). In construing a statute, we seek to Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 effectuate the collective intent or purpose of the (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Best v. State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 legislators who enacted the legislation. Id. We look first (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial judge is to the statute’s literal text, and we read words and phrases the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the in context and construe them according to the rules of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. grammar and common usage unless they have acquired Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 technical or particular meaning. Id. When statutory (Tex.Crim.App.2007); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 language is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to its (Tex.Crim.App.2000), modified on other grounds byState plain meaning unless to do so would lead to absurd v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). consequences that the legislature could not have possibly intended. Id. at 837–38.
Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court’s determination of those facts was not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an IV. THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS AND evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 CONCLUSIONS S.W.3d at 673; Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108– 09 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d *3 The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of 644, 652–53 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). Concerning questions law included the following: of historical fact, even when a video tape of the stop exists, the trial court’s factual determinations are entitled The Court finds the driving of the defendant is not to almost total deference so long as they are supported by reasonable suspicion of driving while intoxicated. the record. SeeTucker v. State, 369 S.W.3d 179, 185 Caution in entering an intersection is proper. The (Tex.Crim.App.2012); Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d Defendant sat at the intersection for 26 seconds that the 101, 109 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). Concerning application- [sic] Officer Padgett could observe and that is not of-law-to-fact questions that do not turn on the credibility obstructing a highway. and demeanor of the witnesses, we review the trial court’s rulings on those questions de novo. Amador, 221 S.W.3d But the court finds the defendant could be stopped for at 673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 disregarding the traffic control device and making a (Tex.Crim.App.2005); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652–53. wide turn over the white line.
....
Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we must view the The Court therefore denies the motion to suppress. evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Tucker, 369 S.W.3d at 185; Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24; State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). When the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we determine whether the evidence, when V. LAW ON WARRANTLESS DETENTIONS viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports those fact findings. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable 818–19. We then review the trial court’s legal ruling de searches and seizures by government officials. U.S.
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Const. amend. IV; Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24. To suppress 498, 503–04 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d) evidence because of an alleged Fourth Amendment (following cases that interpret the statute as proscribing, violation, the defendant bears the initial burden of not just a movement, but an unsafe movement). producing evidence that rebuts the presumption of proper police conduct. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 672; seeYoung v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 872 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied,558 U.S. 1093 (2009). A defendant satisfies this burden by establishing that a search or seizure occurred V. REASONABLE SUSPICION OF DRIVING without a warrant. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 672. Once the WHILE INTOXICATED defendant has made this showing, the burden of proof shifts to the State, which is then required to establish that *4 As detailed below, the evidence—viewed in the light the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to a warrant most favorable to the trial court’s finding that the or was reasonable. Id. at 672–73; Torres v. State, 182 evidence supported a traffic-offense stop of Wall for S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex.Crim.App.2005); Ford v. State, disregarding a traffic control device or for making an 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). overly wide U-turn and viewed in the light most favorable to its finding that the evidence did not support a To justify a brief detention for investigative purposes, the reasonable suspicion that Wall was driving while officer must be able to articulate something more than an intoxicated—does not support these findings. SeeKelly, “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’ ” 204 S.W.3d at 820–21 (holding evidence viewed in light Foster v. State, 326 S.W.3d 609, 613–14 (Tex.Crim.App. most favorable to trial court’s ruling did not support it). In 2010) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, fact, the video from Officer Padgett’s dash cam 1883 (1968)). Specifically, the officer must have some indisputably negates the trial court’s findings that Wall minimal level of objective justification for making the committed the traffic offenses of disregarding a traffic stop; when the officer can “point to specific and control device and making an overly wide turn over the articulable facts which, taken together with rational white line. SeeTucker, 369 S.W.3d at 185 (“If the video inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion, intrusion” on the freedom of the person being detained, an then the court of appeals should reverse.”); State v. investigative detention is reasonable. Id. (citing Terry, Houghton, 384 S.W.3d 441, 446 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 392 U.S. at 21); seeDerichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 2012, no pet.) (“We thus give almost total deference to 906, 914 (Tex.Crim.App.2011); Brother v. State, 166 the trial court’s factual determinations unless the video S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). A brief intrusion recording indisputably contradicts the trial court’s is warranted, for instance, where the officer reasonably findings.”). suspects that the person detained actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Derischweiler, Looking first to whether Wall’s reaction to the flashing 348 S.W.3d at 914; Brother, 166 S.W.3d at 257. The yellow light constituted a traffic violation, the reasonableness of a given detention turns on the totality of transportation code simply states that a driver facing a the circumstances, which considers the public and private flashing yellow light “may” proceed with caution. interests that are at stake. Brother, 166 S.W.3d at 259 n.6. SeeTex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.008(b). Nothing in the provision proscribes stopping or excessively decelerating An officer has probable cause to stop and arrest a driver if at a flashing yellow light. See id. Generally, the term he observes the driver commit a traffic offense. State v. “may” indicates an element of discretion rather than Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 469–70 (Tex.Crim.App.2005); compulsion, which is better communicated with words seeState v. Ballman, 157 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Tex.App.–Fort like “shall.” See, e.g.,Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 539 Worth 2004, pet. ref’d). Relevant here, the transportation (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (discussing difference between code provides: “The operator of a vehicle facing a “may” and “must” or “shall”). For example, in the flashing yellow signal may proceed through an preceding subsection of the same statute, the intersection or past the signal only with caution.” Tex. transportation code states that a driver facing a flashing Transp. Code Ann. § 544.008(b) (West 2011). Texas law red signal “shall” stop. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § governing U-turns on a divided highway and not at an 544.008(a) (West 2011); see alsoYazdchi, 428 S.W.3d at intersection, as in this case, requires that the turn be made 837 (holding that words are interpreted in context); Ford, at a location where the dividing physical barrier allows 305 S.W.3d at 539 (discussing consistent use of the term and be made safely and not at the crest of a hill or in the “may” throughout the article relevant there). Giving the middle of a curve. SeeTex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ may-proceed-with-caution language of section 544.008(b) 545.063(b)(1), 545.102, 545.103 (West 2011). Regarding its plain meaning, Wall’s overreaction to the flashing lane compliance, a violation for failure to maintain a yellow light, although unusual, did not violate that single lane requires that a driver’s deviation from a lane section. SeeTex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.008(b). The be made in an unsafe manner. SeeTex. Transp. Code Ann. evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial § 545.060(a) (West 2011); Fowler v. State, 266 S.W.3d court’s finding that Wall disregarded a traffic-device, does not support this finding. SeeYazdchi, 428 S.W.3d at 20!
837 (holding that statutes are reviewed de novo); Amador, flashing-yellow-light intersection were contextualized by 221 S.W.3d at 673 (de novo review of application-of-law- Officer Padgett’s testimony that he observed Wall driving to-fact questions); Estrada, 154 S.W.3d at 607 (same); at 2:00 a.m. on a weekend in a neighborhood with bars. Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652–53 (same). According to Officer Padgett, intoxicated drivers are often confused by flashing traffic control signals, and he noted Looking next to whether Wall’s U-turn constituted a that he had made prior DWI stops at a flashing yellow traffic offense, the video does not support the trial court’s light in “that exact area” of the road that Wall was finding that it did. Although Wall traversed the turning travelling. Officer Padgett thus articulated something lane’s white line while entering the turning lane, she did more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or not re-cross it prior to or during her U-turn. Wall made ‘hunch.’ ” Foster, 326 S.W.3d at 613–14. Considering the the U-turn at a proper opening in the barrier and not at the totality of the circumstances, Officer Padgett possessed crest of a hill or near a curve. SeeTex. Transp. Code Ann. “some minimal level of objective justification for making §§ 545.063(b)(1); 545.102. No cars were near, and there the stop” because he pointed to specific and articulable is no evidence the turn was done in an unsafe manner. facts—Wall’s peculiar driving through two flashing- SeeTex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.103. Thus, even yellow-light intersections, the fact that intoxicated drivers assuming Wall re-crossed the right line or prolonged her are often confused by flashing-light intersections, the fact transition across it, there is no evidence that the that Officer Padgett had made other DWI arrests in this movement was unsafe, and thus it was not a violation. See very location at the flashing-light intersections, the fact Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 545.060(a); Fowler, 266 that Wall was driving at 2:00 a.m. on a weekend in a S.W.3d at 503–04; see alsoTex. Transp. Code Ann. § location near bars—which, taken together with rational 545.103 (requiring all turns and movements be done inferences from those facts, provided reasonable safely). Other than the video, there was no evidence of suspicion that Wall was engaged in criminal activity, Wall’s U-turn, and Officer Padgett did not mention, either DWI. See Id.(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 15); see in his affidavit or in his testimony, that Wall’s U-turn was alsoDerichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914; Brother, 166 improperly performed. Thus, again, giving these S.W.3d at 257. The evidence, viewed in the light most transportation code sections their plain meaning, no favorable to the trial court’s finding that Officer Padgett evidence exists in the record that Wall violated them. The did not possess reasonable suspicion to initiate a evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial temporary detention of Wall, does not support this court’s finding, does not support the trial court’s finding finding. SeeState v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273 that Wall’s U-turn constituted a traffic violation. (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (“[R]easonable suspicion is a SeeYazdchi, 428 S.W.3d at 837 (statutes reviewed de mixed question of law that is reviewed de novo on novo); Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673 (de novo review of appeal.”); Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673 (noting de novo application-of-law-to-fact questions); Estrada, 154 review of application-of-law-to-fact questions); Estrada, S.W.3d at 607 (same); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652–53 154 S.W.3d at 607 (same); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652–53 (same); see alsoTucker, 369 S.W.3d at 185 (holding that (same). appellate courts cannot uphold a finding if the video record does not support it); Houghton, 384 S.W.3d at 446 We overrule the portion of Wall’s sole issue asserting that (same). we should not affirm the denial of her motion to suppress on the ground that Officer Padgett possessed reasonable *5 Having determined that the traffic-offense findings and suspicion to stop her. We sustain the State’s cross-point conclusions made by the trial court in denying Wall’s challenging the trial court’s finding and conclusion that motion to suppress are not supported by the evidence, we Officer Padgett did not possess reasonable suspicion to sustain the portion of Wall’s issue challenging these initiate a temporary detention of Wall. We affirm the trial findings. court’s denial of Wall’s motion to suppress on this theory.
SeeStevens, 235 S.W.3d at 740 (holding that appellate We next address Wall’s alternative argument and the courts may uphold a trial court’s judgment under any State’s cross-point. Wall alternatively argues that we applicable theory of law supported by the record); cannot affirm the trial court’s denial of her motion to Armendariz, 123 S.W.3d at 404 (same). suppress on the ground that Officer Padgett possessed reasonable suspicion that Wall was engaged in the criminal activity of DWI because the trial court correctly found and concluded that he did not. The State argues that this finding by the trial court is not supported by the VI. CONCLUSION evidence.
*6 Having determined that the trial court’s denial of Wall’s prolonged stop at one flashing-yellow-light Wall’s motion to suppress was proper based on the theory intersection and her delayed application of her brakes and that Officer Padgett possessed reasonable suspicion to quick, almost complete stop in the middle of the next initiate a temporary detention of Wall, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2015 WL 2169307 !
All Citations
Footnotes!
! 1! SeeTex.!R.!App.!P.!47.4.!
!
! 2! This! case! was! originally! submitted! without! oral! argument! on! Friday,! May! 30,! 2014,! before! a! panel! consisting! of! Chief!
Justice!Livingston,!Justice!Gardner,!and!Justice!Gabriel.!The!court,!on!its!own!motion!on!January!15,!2015,!ordered!this!case!
! reset!without!oral!argument!on!February!5,!2015;!assigned!this!case!to!a!new!panel,!consisting!of!Chief!Justice!Livingston,!
Justice!Walker,!and!Justice!Gabriel;!and!assigned!the!undersigned!to!author!the!opinion.! !
3! As!set!forth!below,!the!events!leading!up!to!the!stop!were!recorded!by!Officer!Padget’s!dash!cam!video!recorder;!we!have!
reviewed!the!video.!
! !
!
End$of$Document$ ©!2015!Thomson!Reuters.!No!claim!to!original!U.S.!Government!Works.!
$ !
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