Walker v. United States of New York

• Court: District Court, S.D. New York
• Decided: May 29, 2025
• Docket: 7:25-cv-04447
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -------------------------------------------------------------------------x GLENROY WALKER,

Petitioner, ORDER – against – 23-CR-662 (CS) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 25-CV-4447 (CS)

Respondent. -------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Seibel, J. Defendant Glenroy Walker has filed what purports to be a petition for habeas corpus. Such relief is sought in federal cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which permits motions to vacate sentence. See Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2001) (Section 2255 “is generally the proper vehicle for a federal prisoner’s challenge to his conviction and sentence.”). But a collateral attack is generally only available on a final judgment of conviction. See Stantini v. United States, 140 F.3d 424, 426 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a § 2255 motion can only be filed after sentencing); United States v. Gonzalez, No. 00-CR-447, 2001 WL 987866, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2001) (“[W]here a federal prisoner has not yet been sentenced, a district court lacks jurisdiction over a motion pursuant to Section 2255.”). Here, because Defendant has not yet been sentenced, his conviction is not final and there is no judgment to vacate. Indeed, his motion for a judgment of acquittal is still pending. Moreover, although there is no jurisdictional bar to adjudication of a Section 2255 motion while a direct appeal is pending, courts generally avoid expending resources to reach a decision that could be rendered a “nullity” by the results of a direct appeal. United States v. Outen, 286 F.3d 622, 632 (2d Cir. 2002); see United States v. Vilar, 645 F.3d 543, 548 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that a criminal defendant is generally required to pursue a direct appeal before bringing a § 2255 motion); Wall v. United States, 619 F.3d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[H]abeas petitions filed before the petitioner has exhausted his direct appeal are generally considered premature.”); cf. United States v. Rodgers, 101 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1996) (divesting a district court of jurisdiction pending an appeal is in the interest of judicial economy and “avoid[s] confusion or waste of time resulting from having the same issues before two courts at the same time”). Assuming I deny the motion for judgment of acquittal, Defendant may, once he is sentenced and his judgment of conviction has become final, file a direct appeal and, if his conviction is affirmed, a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to challenge his conviction. For now, the petition is dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate ECF No. 215 in No 23-CR-662 and to close No. 25-CV-4447.

SO ORDERED. Dated: May 29, 2025 White Plains, New York .