Walker v. United States of America

Opinion

STEVEN ERIC WALKER, Case No.: 20-cv-31 DMS (AGS)

Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S v. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION STATE OF CALIFORNIA, And All Actors, Agents, and Elected Officials Thereof, and Does 1 through 100 Respectively, Defendants.

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 6.) On January 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that state and federal laws infringe on his Second Amendment right under the United States Constitution to possess firearms for self-defense despite his status as a convicted felon. (Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶ 1 & Conclusion.) Plaintiff contends that “defendants do not have any legitimate or rational government interest or function in making laws which infringe upon [his] right to keep and bear firearms in the defense of his home, family, life, or community regardless of his previous status.” (Mem. & Auth. in Sup. of Compl., at 16.) Plaintiff also submitted a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). (ECF No. 2.) On April 24, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and sua sponte dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim under Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent upholding the constitutionality of laws that curtail Second Amendment rights of convicted felons. (Order, ECF No. 3, at 4.) Plaintiff now moves the Court to reconsider its earlier order. I. Rule 59(e) allows for a party to submit a motion to alter or amend a judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).1 “The purpose of Rule 59(e) is ‘to allow the district court to correct its own errors, sparing the parties and appellate courts the burden of unnecessary appellate proceedings.” Sanchez v. Davis, --- F. Supp. ----, 2016 WL 1643468, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2016) (quoting Howard v. United States, 533 F.3d 472, 475 (6th Cir. 2008)). In general, “there are four basic grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: (1) if such motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment rests; (2) if such motion is necessary to present newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) if such motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) if the amendment is justified by an intervening change in controlling law.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011). “[A]mending a judgment after its entry remains an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” Id.

1 Motions for reconsideration are also subject to Civil Local Rule 7.1(i)(1), which requires applications for reconsideration to “present to the judge … an affidavit of a party or witness or certified statement of an attorney setting forth the material facts and circumstances surrounding each prior application, including inter alia: (1) when and to what judge the application was made, (2) what ruling or decision or order was made thereon, and (3) what new or different facts and circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown, upon such prior application.” Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has not complied (internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Plaintiff appears to move the Court “to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment rests[.]” See id. “Manifest error is, effectively, clear error.” Teamsters Local 617 Pension and Welfare Funds v. Apollo Group, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 216, 231 (D. Ariz. 2012) (citing Ybarra v. McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 998 (9th Cir. 2011)). The Ninth Circuit has not defined “clear error” for the purposes of a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e), (Campion v. Old Republic Home Protection Co., Inc., --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 2011 WL 1935967 at *1 (S.D. Cal. 2011)), but it is certainly a “very exacting standard.” Id. “Mere doubts or disagreement about the wisdom of a prior decision … will not suffice for this exception. To be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike us as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must be dead wrong.” Id. (quoting Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 273 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (analyzing standard in the Fifth Circuit)). Moreover, “the movant must demonstrate a ‘wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.’” Id. (quoting Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (analyzing standard in the Seventh Circuit)). II. Here, Plaintiff contends the Court erred in its findings for several reasons: (1) by categorizing him as a felon, even though “he is and has been a law-abiding citizen for approximately 30 plus years, with the exception of one incident in April of 1990,” has not committed any crimes since April 27, 2020, and was paroled from prison because he “earned his place back in society”; (2) by addressing the Complaint with regard to the rights of felons, even though the Complaint did not “state anything about felons,” but requested an injunction to support the right of “law-abiding” citizens; (3) by using Plaintiff’s memorandum of points and authorities when addressing Plaintiff’s claims; and (4) by dismissing Plaintiff’s case for failure to state a claim by relying on Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent when “stare decisis does not apply” and the cases relied on by the Court were an “incorrect interpretation of the law.” (See Mot. to Recon. (“Mot.), ECF No. 6, at 2–15) (emphasis in original.) Plaintiff’s arguments are addressed in turn. A. Categorization as “Felon” First, Plaintiff contends the Court was wrong to interpret his Complaint as it did, referring to Plaintiff as a “felon” seeking to vindicate his right to bear arms. To that end, Plaintiff notes he never referred to himself as a “felon,” but rather only stated he had “a historical conviction, but the one-time conviction does not now outweigh the fact[] that he is a law-abiding citizen and has been for over 30 years.” (Mot. at 3) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, Plaintiff contends the Court should have used “judicial experience and common sense … to conclude that a one-time conviction when a person was 26 years old, does not rationally indicate a serious or major threat to public safety as age 56, after 30 plus years of law-abiding and conforming behavior.” (Id.) Unfortunately for Plaintiff, all that matters is that Plaintiff previously suffered a felony conviction that disqualifies him from possessing firearms under state and federal law. There is no dispute that Plaintiff has suffered such a conviction. Plaintiff admits in his Complaint that he was convicted of premeditated attempt murder with use of a firearm in violation of California Penal Code §§ 664, 187 and 189 on August 9, 1990, in California Superior Court, County of San Diego, Case No. CR113777. (Compl. at ¶ 3.) For that offense, Plaintiff was sentenced to an indeterminate life term with the possibility of parole. (Id. at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff served 22.6 years and was granted parole on June 26, 2012. (Id.) Plaintiff contends he has been law-abiding since the time of his conviction and no longer poses a risk of danger to society. (Id.) The Court commends Plaintiff for his rehabilitation and accepts as true for purposes of this motion his representation that he has been a law-abiding citizen for decades, is not a danger to others or to society, and now enjoys many constitutional rights, including the right to vote. (See id. at ¶¶ 5-7.) But those facts, even if true, do not entitle Plaintiff to relief. Under the law, Plaintiff’s conviction, standing alone—not whether Plaintiff is labeled a “felon” or has reformed—divests Plaintiff of his Second Amendment rights. B. Law Abiding Citizens Plaintiff contends he is not seeking to restore the right of “felons” to bear arms, but to restore the right of “law-abiding citizens” to bear arms. (Mot. at 2-3.) This distinction does not assist Plaintiff. Individuals who have a prior felony conviction like Plaintiff’s, cannot restore their Second Amendment rights under existing law, except in limited circumstances, even if they become law-abiding citizens.2 The Court cannot restore those rights. Only the Legislature can. C. Complaint Next, Plaintiff contends the Court erred by considering the memorandum and authorities he submitted along with his Complaint. Plaintiff notes “the verified Complaint” is “the only document which can be reviewed under a summary dismissal.” (Mot. at 3) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff argues that the Court does not “credit[] the entire factual context of Complaint,” because it relied on “legal arguments set forth in a separate Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted with the complaint.” (Mot. at 3-4.) “Review is generally limited to the contents of the complaint, but a court can consider a document on which the complaint relies if the document is central to the plaintiff’s claim, and no party questions the authenticity of the document.” Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, Plaintiff submitted the memorandum of authorities himself, and accordingly did not indicate that he “question[ed] the authenticity of the document.” See id. Moreover, Plaintiff submitted the document alongside the Complaint, and titled it: “Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.” (ECF No. 1-2.) The document was filed along

2 Generally, a person sentenced to prison on a felony cannot restore their right to bear arms under the Second Amendment unless they get a Certificate of Rehabilitation and a Pardon with the Complaint, referred to the Complaint, and set forth arguments in support of it. (See generally id.) As such, the Court interpreted the document as supporting the Complaint. Given these circumstances, the Court did not err in relying on the memorandum of points in authorities in addition to the Complaint. D. Stare Decisis: Heller and Vongxay Finally, in the Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court relied on Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent upholding the constitutionality of laws barring felons (i.e., a person who has suffered a prior felony conviction) from possessing or owning firearms. Plaintiff contends reconsideration is warranted because the Court erred in relying on that precedent. First, the Court relied on Heller v. District of Columbia, where the Supreme Court stated, “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on the longstanding prohibitions on possession of firearms by felons.” (Order at 3-4) (quoting 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008)). In response, Plaintiff contends that the Court erred because stare decisis does not apply. To that end, Plaintiff notes that “the Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that ‘[o]ur precedents are not sacrosanct” because decisions and opinions of the Court can change based on varying and substantial circumstances.” (Mot. at 6-7) (emphasis in original). Further, Plaintiff states he is “not asking this Court to overrule any prior judicial decision,” but rather “to construe and interpret the Second Amendment in accordance with its plain meaning.” (Id. at 7.) Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s arguments, the Complaint seeks an injunction to invalidate laws that impinge on the right of certain individuals to bear arms, specifically, those who have suffered a prior felony conviction and imprisonment. But in interpreting the Second Amendment, the Supreme Court in Heller held that legislative bodies are free to enact laws that prohibit possession of firearms by felons. See 128 S.Ct. at 2816-17. The precedent in Heller can only be changed by the Supreme Court itself and that has not happened. Accordingly, the Court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint under Heller because that case is squarely on point and binding on this Court. The Court also set out cases in the Order from the Ninth Circuit which recognize the validity of statutes barring felons from possessing firearms, including United States v. Vongxay, United States v. Smith, and United States v. Gilbert. (Order at 4) (citations omitted). Plaintiff contends the Court impermissibly relied on Vongxay because the plaintiff there was “the type of felon who refuses to reeducate themselves in order to become a productive and conforming member of society,” in contrast with Plaintiff, who contends he is part of a category of “law abiding, responsible citizens who have a fundamental right to bear arms.” (Mot. at 16-17.) Plaintiff’s argument does not demonstrate “clear error” by the Court. Notably, the Court relied on Vongxay to the extent it recognized decisions within the Ninth Circuit that held Heller did not expand the rights of felons to possess firearms. (Order at 4.) See also United States v. Smith, 329 Fed. Appx. 109, 111 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Heller did not disturb Lewis’s narrow holding—that felons have no constitutional right to possess firearms.”) Plaintiff does not provide any new evidence showing that the Court erred in its earlier holding. “Ultimately, a party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court’s decision, and recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party’s burden.” Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians v. California, 649 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1070 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is denied. For the foregoing reasons, the Court respectfully denies Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. Dated: August 4, 2020 J ] rn Yn. Hon. Dana M. Sabraw United States District Judge