5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE
8 GLEN L. WALKER, Case No. C19-565RSM
9 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 10 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. 11 TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE CO., THE 12 HARTFORD, 13 Defendants. 14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 16 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Twin City Fire Ins. Co. (“Twin 17 City”)’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. #24. U.S. Bank moves for dismissal of Plaintiff 18 Glen Walker’s claims for insurance coverage and bad faith damages because “he has made 19 material misrepresentations in the presentation of his claims.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff Walker has not 20 filed a timely response to this Motion. Oral argument has not been requested. For the reasons 21 22 stated below, the Court GRANTS this Motion and dismisses this case. 23 II. BACKGROUND FACTS 24 On March 19, 2016, Mr. Walker, while driving his 1968 Chevrolet pickup truck, struck 25 a parked car in Kent, Washington. When police responded to the scene of the accident, Mr. 26 Walker described the accident to the responding officer, who recorded in his police report the 27 28 following: Upon arriving I contacted D1 [Walker] who told me that he was 1 driving NB on 116th Ave SE when a car driving SB came into his 2 lane of travel. He said that he swerved out of the way to avoid the vehicle in his lane, and he struck an unoccupied parked vehicle on 3 the shoulder on the East side of the road.
4 Dkt. #25-1 at 2. Walker was cited for improper lane travel. Id. 5 Mr. Walker was issued an automobile insurance policy by Twin City. The policy 6 provided personal injury protection coverage, uninsured motorist coverage, and coverage for 7 8 damage to Walker’s covered auto. The Twin City policy provides: 9 FRAUD We do not provide coverage for any insured who has made 10 fraudulent statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct in 11 connection with any accident or loss for which coverage is sought under this policy. 12 13 Dkt. #25-15 at 49. 14 Mr. Walker reported the claim to Twin City on March 20, 2016, and made a personal 15 injury protection (“PIP”) claim for medical expenses, wage loss and essential services. He also 16 made a collision claim for damage to his truck. He did not make an uninsured motorist claim. 17 On March 22, 2016, Mr. Walker provided his first recorded statement to Twin City. 18 19 Consistent with the police report, Mr. Walker explained in his recorded statement that he 20 swerved to avoid an oncoming vehicle in his lane and struck a parked car. See Dkt. #25-2 21 (“Walker Recorded Statement”) at 5:14-6:8. Mr. Walker recounted this same detail to his 22 medical providers. See Dkt. #25-3 at 2 and 4. 23 Mr. Walker provided a second recorded statement to a Twin City investigator three 24 25 months later on June 2, 2016. Mr. Walker again explained he swerved to avoid a vehicle in his 26 own lane. See Dkt. #25-4 at 33:16-35:5. 27 28 On October 3, 2016, Mr. Walker called Twin City, and for the first time, requested his 1 2 claim be covered as an uninsured motorist (“UIM”) claim. See Dkt. #25-5. When the adjuster 3 on the phone explained that, due to the facts of the loss as described in two separate recorded 4 statements, there was no such coverage, Mr. Walker stated that a vehicle had approached him 5 from behind, performed a “PIT” pursuit intervention technique maneuver, hitting his vehicle, 6 and causing him to lose control and strike the parked car. 7 8 After its investigation was completed, Twin City made the following coverage 9 determinations: Twin City paid Walker $12,388.99 for the damage to his truck under the 10 collision coverage; Twin City denied PIP coverage for wage loss and household services and 11 noted that no medical bills had been submitted (however, Hartford eventually did pay more 12 13 than $13,000 in medical bills for treatment incurred on the date of the accident at Valley 14 Medical Center that Walker submitted); Twin City denied Walker’s UIM claim. See Dkts. #25- 15 6, #25-7 and #25-8. 16 Mr. Walker filed this litigation on March 29, 2019. During the litigation, Walker 17 provided a letter dated July 11, 2016, from an alleged witness, Cheryl Read, corroborating that 18 19 a vehicle had struck Mr. Walker’s truck. Dkt. #25-9. 20 III. DISCUSSION 21 A. Legal Standard 22 Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine 23 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 24 25 R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). Material facts are 26 those which might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 27 248. In ruling on summary judgment, a court does not weigh evidence to determine the truth of 28 the matter, but “only determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Crane v. Conoco, 1 2 Inc., 41 F.3d 547, 549 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O’Melveny & 3 Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1992)). 4 On a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence and draws inferences 5 in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Sullivan v. 6 U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 365 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court must draw all reasonable 7 8 inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See O’Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d at 747, rev’d 9 on other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994). However, the nonmoving party must make a “sufficient 10 showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof” 11 to survive summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 12 13 B. Analysis 14 When interpreting an insurance policy, the court must consider the policy as a whole 15 and arrive at a “fair, reasonable, and sensible construction as would be given to the contract by 16 the average person purchasing insurance.” Quadrant Corp. v. American States Ins. Co., 154 17 Wn.2d at 171, 110 P.3d 733 (2005) (quoting Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Comm’l Union Ins. Co., 142 18 19 Wn.2d 654, 666, 15 P.3d 115(2000)). If the language in an insurance policy is unambiguous, 20 “[the court] must enforce it as written; we may not modify it or create ambiguity where none 21 exists.” Quadrant, 154 Wn.2d at 171. 22 Here, the Twin City policy does “not provide coverage for any insured who has made 23 fraudulent statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct in connection with any accident or loss 24 25 for which coverage is sought under this policy.” Dkt. #25-15 at 49. Twin City’s investigation 26 did not support Mr. Walker’s version of the facts. Twin City presents sufficient evidence that 27 Mr. Walker has made misrepresentations in seeking the coverage at issue, including the 28 preparation of what appears to the Court to be a fraudulent witness statement. See Dkt. #24 at 1 2 6–10. The record indicates that Twin City confronted Ms. Read with metadata evidence that 3 her 2016 letter was actually prepared in 2019, that she and Mr.
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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE
8 GLEN L. WALKER, Case No. C19-565RSM
9 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 10 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. 11 TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE CO., THE 12 HARTFORD, 13 Defendants. 14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 16 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Twin City Fire Ins. Co. (“Twin 17 City”)’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. #24. U.S. Bank moves for dismissal of Plaintiff 18 Glen Walker’s claims for insurance coverage and bad faith damages because “he has made 19 material misrepresentations in the presentation of his claims.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff Walker has not 20 filed a timely response to this Motion. Oral argument has not been requested. For the reasons 21 22 stated below, the Court GRANTS this Motion and dismisses this case. 23 II. BACKGROUND FACTS 24 On March 19, 2016, Mr. Walker, while driving his 1968 Chevrolet pickup truck, struck 25 a parked car in Kent, Washington. When police responded to the scene of the accident, Mr. 26 Walker described the accident to the responding officer, who recorded in his police report the 27 28 following: Upon arriving I contacted D1 [Walker] who told me that he was 1 driving NB on 116th Ave SE when a car driving SB came into his 2 lane of travel. He said that he swerved out of the way to avoid the vehicle in his lane, and he struck an unoccupied parked vehicle on 3 the shoulder on the East side of the road.
4 Dkt. #25-1 at 2. Walker was cited for improper lane travel. Id. 5 Mr. Walker was issued an automobile insurance policy by Twin City. The policy 6 provided personal injury protection coverage, uninsured motorist coverage, and coverage for 7 8 damage to Walker’s covered auto. The Twin City policy provides: 9 FRAUD We do not provide coverage for any insured who has made 10 fraudulent statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct in 11 connection with any accident or loss for which coverage is sought under this policy. 12 13 Dkt. #25-15 at 49. 14 Mr. Walker reported the claim to Twin City on March 20, 2016, and made a personal 15 injury protection (“PIP”) claim for medical expenses, wage loss and essential services. He also 16 made a collision claim for damage to his truck. He did not make an uninsured motorist claim. 17 On March 22, 2016, Mr. Walker provided his first recorded statement to Twin City. 18 19 Consistent with the police report, Mr. Walker explained in his recorded statement that he 20 swerved to avoid an oncoming vehicle in his lane and struck a parked car. See Dkt. #25-2 21 (“Walker Recorded Statement”) at 5:14-6:8. Mr. Walker recounted this same detail to his 22 medical providers. See Dkt. #25-3 at 2 and 4. 23 Mr. Walker provided a second recorded statement to a Twin City investigator three 24 25 months later on June 2, 2016. Mr. Walker again explained he swerved to avoid a vehicle in his 26 own lane. See Dkt. #25-4 at 33:16-35:5. 27 28 On October 3, 2016, Mr. Walker called Twin City, and for the first time, requested his 1 2 claim be covered as an uninsured motorist (“UIM”) claim. See Dkt. #25-5. When the adjuster 3 on the phone explained that, due to the facts of the loss as described in two separate recorded 4 statements, there was no such coverage, Mr. Walker stated that a vehicle had approached him 5 from behind, performed a “PIT” pursuit intervention technique maneuver, hitting his vehicle, 6 and causing him to lose control and strike the parked car. 7 8 After its investigation was completed, Twin City made the following coverage 9 determinations: Twin City paid Walker $12,388.99 for the damage to his truck under the 10 collision coverage; Twin City denied PIP coverage for wage loss and household services and 11 noted that no medical bills had been submitted (however, Hartford eventually did pay more 12 13 than $13,000 in medical bills for treatment incurred on the date of the accident at Valley 14 Medical Center that Walker submitted); Twin City denied Walker’s UIM claim. See Dkts. #25- 15 6, #25-7 and #25-8. 16 Mr. Walker filed this litigation on March 29, 2019. During the litigation, Walker 17 provided a letter dated July 11, 2016, from an alleged witness, Cheryl Read, corroborating that 18 19 a vehicle had struck Mr. Walker’s truck. Dkt. #25-9. 20 III. DISCUSSION 21 A. Legal Standard 22 Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine 23 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 24 25 R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). Material facts are 26 those which might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 27 248. In ruling on summary judgment, a court does not weigh evidence to determine the truth of 28 the matter, but “only determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Crane v. Conoco, 1 2 Inc., 41 F.3d 547, 549 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O’Melveny & 3 Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1992)). 4 On a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence and draws inferences 5 in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Sullivan v. 6 U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 365 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court must draw all reasonable 7 8 inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See O’Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d at 747, rev’d 9 on other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994). However, the nonmoving party must make a “sufficient 10 showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof” 11 to survive summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 12 13 B. Analysis 14 When interpreting an insurance policy, the court must consider the policy as a whole 15 and arrive at a “fair, reasonable, and sensible construction as would be given to the contract by 16 the average person purchasing insurance.” Quadrant Corp. v. American States Ins. Co., 154 17 Wn.2d at 171, 110 P.3d 733 (2005) (quoting Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Comm’l Union Ins. Co., 142 18 19 Wn.2d 654, 666, 15 P.3d 115(2000)). If the language in an insurance policy is unambiguous, 20 “[the court] must enforce it as written; we may not modify it or create ambiguity where none 21 exists.” Quadrant, 154 Wn.2d at 171. 22 Here, the Twin City policy does “not provide coverage for any insured who has made 23 fraudulent statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct in connection with any accident or loss 24 25 for which coverage is sought under this policy.” Dkt. #25-15 at 49. Twin City’s investigation 26 did not support Mr. Walker’s version of the facts. Twin City presents sufficient evidence that 27 Mr. Walker has made misrepresentations in seeking the coverage at issue, including the 28 preparation of what appears to the Court to be a fraudulent witness statement. See Dkt. #24 at 1 2 6–10. The record indicates that Twin City confronted Ms. Read with metadata evidence that 3 her 2016 letter was actually prepared in 2019, that she and Mr. Walker collaborated on her 4 version of events, and that her testimony of what she witnessed was hopelessly incompatible 5 with what Mr. Walker had previously submitted to Twin City and the actual damage to Mr. 6 Walker’s vehicle. See id. 7 8 Clauses similar to the fraud clause at issue have been upheld in Washington. See, e.g., 9 Mutual of Enumclaw v. Cox, 110 Wn.2d 643, 757 P.2d 499 (1988). Considering all of the 10 above, combined with Mr. Walker’s failure to respond to the instant Motion, the Court finds 11 that Mr. Walker’s claims are barred by the Policy and Washington insurance law. 12 13 The Court notes that, even if Twin City had not relied on the fraud clause, under the 14 above summary judgment standard there is insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to 15 conclude that Mr. Walker’s claims have any merit. Mr. Walker has failed to make a sufficient 16 showing on the essential elements of his case to survive summary judgment. 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 19 Having considered the applicable briefing submitted by the parties and the entire record, 20 the Court hereby finds and ORDERS that Defendant Twin City’s Motion for Summary 21 Judgment, Dkt. #24, is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED. 22 DATED this 10th day of December, 2020. 23
24 25 A 26 RICARDO S. MARTINEZ 27 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28