Walker v. Town of Elkin

118 S.E.2d 1, 254 N.C. 85, 1961 N.C. LEXIS 360
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedFebruary 3, 1961
Docket671
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 118 S.E.2d 1 (Walker v. Town of Elkin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walker v. Town of Elkin, 118 S.E.2d 1, 254 N.C. 85, 1961 N.C. LEXIS 360 (N.C. 1961).

Opinion

RodmaN, J.

This appeal presents two questions: (1) Was the *87 ordinance of 1958 permitting the maintenance of public utility storage or service yards in Neighborhood Business zones void for failure to give notice of the proposed change as required by G.S. 160-175?

The statute is explicit. Notice with an opportunity to be heard must be given before the zoning ordinance can be modified. An ordinance adopted without notice as required by the statute can have no validity. Eldridge v. Mangum, 216 N.C. 532, 5 S.E. 2d 721.

The court found: “The amendment to the general zoning ordinance went into effect after April 25, 1958. It was adopted after due Notice of a Public Hearing on the amendment was published in The Elkin Tribune, a public newspaper of general circulation published in Elkin, Surry County, North Carolina, on November 7, 14, and 21, 1957, and after a public hearing was held at 8:00 o’clock P.M. on November 26, 1957.” The court’s finding with respect to publication is supported by the evidence. The finding is conclusive. Eakley v. Raleigh, 252 N.C. 683, 114 S.E. 2d 777; Insurance Co. v. Shafer, 250 N.C. 45, 108 S.E. 2d 49.

The notice which the court found was published read:

"In The Matter of a Request for a Change of the Zone of the below described property to ‘Neighborhood Business Zone’ and a Request for change in Zoning Ordinance.

“Notice hereby is given that at 8:00 o’clock P.M. on November 26, 1957, a public hearing will be held by the Mayor and Board of Town Commissioners at the City Hall in the Town of Elkin, at which time the changes of the Zone of the below described property to that of Neighborhood Business will be thoroughly discussed, and that a proposed change in the zoning ordinance of the Town of Elkin to allow ‘Public Utility Storage or Service Yard’ in the Neighborhood Business Zone will be thoroughly discussed. All persons for or against these proposed changes are invited to be present and make whatever statements they desire.”

Then followed a description of the property proposed to be rezoned.

Plaintiffs contend this notice related to a single change, i.e., to rezone a specific area and change its classification to Neighborhood Business with the privilege of operating public utility storage or service yards limited to the area so rezoned. Defendants assert the notice related to two distinct questions: (a) to reclassify an area, and (b) to permit the maintenance of storage or service yards in any area zoned as neighborhood business.

If plaintiffs’ interpretation is correct, the ordinance is, as they assert, invalid. When a city adopts a zoning ordinance restrictions on use must be uniform in all areas in a defined class or district. Different areas in a municipality may be put in the same class. *88 The law does not require all areas of a defined class to be contiguous, but when the classification has been made, all areas in each class must be subject to the same restrictions. G.S. 160-173.

Manifestly the town did not intend to hold a hearing on the question of the adoption of a void ordinance. The first paragraph definitely indicates two questions are to be considered. Information is given that a discussion will be had of each question, and all persons “for or against these proposed changes” (emphasis supplied) are invited to attend. We do not think that any interested citizen could have been misled as to the questions open for debate. The court correctly concluded that the amendment adopted in 1958 was valid, and that -the right existed to maintain public utility storage or service yards in any Neighborhood Business zones or districts.

(2) Was the reclassification of the area from Residential Neighborhood Business by the 1960 ordinance void because in excess of the authority vested in the town council?

The court found.: “The 3.56-acre tract is a rough hill or ridge which has been graded down to some extent on top and also graded at the northwest corner of the intersection of N.C. Highway No. 268 and Church Street. On the south the property fronts on N.C. Highway No. 268 a distance of approximately 700 feet. It rises steeply from the highway presenting a high bank on its southern, or highway, side. The property just across Hendrix Avenue on the north and west from the 3.56-acre tract is undeveloped except near Church Street. The land on the east side of Church Street and on the south side of the highway had been built up for a number of years prior to the adoption of the general zoning ordinance in 1954. Six hundred feet in a direct line from the southeastern corner of the property is the new operations building and office of the Central Telephone Company. Six hundred to seven hundred feet directly southwest of the property is the Elkin water filtration plant and nearby is an electric substation. A new street has been opened since 1954 from the Elkin business section to N.C. Highway No. 268 with which it forms a junction near the southwest corner of the 3.56-acre tract. The Elkin water filtration plant is on this street which was opened into the highway. That due to the terrain and its location the 3.56-acre tract is not suitable for residential development.”

“N. C. Highway No. 268 to North Wilkesboro, which adjoins the 3.56-acre tract to the south, is one of the two public highways passing through Elkin. There are no houses on the north side of the highway from Church Street to where Oakland Drive intersects said highway approximately one-half mile to the northwest beyond the 3.56-acre tract. There are no houses on the south side of the high *89 way from Spring Street to where the highway crosses Elkin Creek also one-half mile or more to the northwest beyond the 3.56-acre tract.”

There is evidence to support each of the specific findings, and these findings, we think, justify the factual conclusion that “the 3.56-acre tract is not suitable for residential development.” Since the court was by consent exercising the function of a jury, it had the right to draw factual conclusions justified by the evidentiary facts.

Based on the facts found the court concluded:

“The Board of Commissioners of the Town of Elkin in adopting the rezoning ordinance on January 5, 1960, did not abuse its discretion. The action of the Board of Commissioners in adopting the ordinance was reasonable and not inconsistent with its charter, with its general zoning plan, or with the laws of North Carolina, particularly Chapter 160, Article 14, of the General Statutes.”

Municipalities adopting zoning ordinances are commanded to enact regulations “made with reasonable consideration, among other things, as to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such municipality.” G.S. 160-174.

The section which authorizes the original enactment of a zoning ordinance authorizes amendments. G.S. 160-175.

To prevent hasty or ill-conceived amendments, notice must be given of proposed changes. G.S. 160-175.

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Bluebook (online)
118 S.E.2d 1, 254 N.C. 85, 1961 N.C. LEXIS 360, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walker-v-town-of-elkin-nc-1961.