Walker v. Segro

848 So. 2d 464, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 9929, 2003 WL 21506535
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedJuly 2, 2003
DocketNo. 4D02-4627
StatusPublished

This text of 848 So. 2d 464 (Walker v. Segro) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walker v. Segro, 848 So. 2d 464, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 9929, 2003 WL 21506535 (Fla. Ct. App. 2003).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

John Segro (“Segro”) was declared to be the father of appellant Lisa Walker’s (<fWalker”) child in a 1996 judgment of paternity. He was denied any visitation because of criminal problems, some of which involved drug addiction.

In response to a petition to adopt filed by the child’s stepfather, Segro scheduled a hearing on his petition to modify parental responsibility and establish visitation for November 8, 2002. The hearing was cancelled by the judge due to unavailability. On November 14, Segro’s counsel rescheduled the hearing for 2:30 p.m. on November 18, and faxed the only notice of this hearing to Walker’s counsel at 2:26 p.m. Walker’s counsel faxed a response to Segro’s counsel the following day objecting to the short notice, citing her inability to contact Walker and preexisting family obligations on the afternoon of the hearing. The judge was aware of this objection. At hearing, the judge entered a temporary' visitation order. Walker moved to set aside the order, the motion was denied, and this appeal ensued.

Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(d), which applies to family law matters through Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.090, notice of a hearing on a motion “shall be served a reasonable time before the time specified for the hearing.” There is no clearly delineated definition of reasonable time, but the notice requirement envisions at a minimum, actual notice and time to prepare. Harreld v. Harreld, 682 So.2d 635, 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). The Harreld court considered the four days notice given by mail and fax to the husband prior to a final dissolution hearing, and concluded that such was not reasonable notice. Id. The court held that two working days’ notice, notice on Friday [466]*466for a Tuesday hearing, was insufficient prior to such an important hearing, especially considering that the husband did not reside in Florida. Id.

The present situation is similar to that in Harreld. Here, Walker also received four days notice of the permanent visitation hearing by fax, notice of which also spanned a weekend from Thursday to Monday. Walker’s counsel would also have had at best two working days to prepare for the important hearing.1 Additionally, the situation was similarly complicated by the fact that counsel was having difficulty contacting Walker to notify her of the hearing and would be forced to rearrange her busy schedule on short notice to accommodate the hearing. Therefore, we hold that the notice given by Segro to Walker was insufficient under the standard set by Rule 1.090(d).

Even if the notice considered alone was not insufficient, one key difference exists between Harreld and the present case— the notice was not properly served on Walker in the first instance. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080(a) states that service is required for every “other paper” filed in an action. The term “other paper” encompasses notices of motion hearings. HenRY P. Trawicic, JR., Florida Practice and Procedure § 9-7 (1999 ed.). Therefore, Rule 1.080(b) applied to Segro’s service of the notice of hearing on Walker. This rule explicitly requires that when a paper is served by facsimile, “a copy shall also be served by any other method permitted by this rule,” including mail, as in Harreld, and hand delivery. There is no evidence in the record that Segro’s attorney served any other form of notice of the hearing, and consequently, Segro violated this rule.

In sum, the temporary visitation order is reversed and remanded due to insufficient and improperly served notice of the motion hearing that violated Walker’s due process rights. Quay Dev., Inc. v. Elegante Bldg. Corp., 392 So.2d 901, 903 (Fla.1981) (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)).

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

GUNTHER, KLEIN and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.

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Related

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
339 U.S. 306 (Supreme Court, 1950)
QUAY DEV. v. Elegante Bldg. Corp.
392 So. 2d 901 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1981)
Harreld v. Harreld
682 So. 2d 635 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1996)

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Bluebook (online)
848 So. 2d 464, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 9929, 2003 WL 21506535, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walker-v-segro-fladistctapp-2003.