Walker v. Phi Beta Sigma Fraternity (Rho Chapter)

706 So. 2d 525, 1997 WL 817321
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 29, 1997
Docket96 CA 2345
StatusPublished
Cited by66 cases

This text of 706 So. 2d 525 (Walker v. Phi Beta Sigma Fraternity (Rho Chapter)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walker v. Phi Beta Sigma Fraternity (Rho Chapter), 706 So. 2d 525, 1997 WL 817321 (La. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

706 So.2d 525 (1997)

Duronne K. WALKER, Judith K. Walker and Willie Walker, Jr.
v.
PHI BETA SIGMA FRATERNITY (RHO Chapter), Phi Beta Sigma Fraternity (Gulf Coast Region), Phi Beta Sigma Fraternity, Inc. (National Fraternity), Robert Selders, Robert Washington, Byron J. Farlough, Alonzo Johnson and Arthur R. Thomas.

No. 96 CA 2345.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

December 29, 1997.

*526 Lawrence J. Smith, Crystal Craddock-Posey, New Orleans, for Plaintiff-Appellants Duronne K. Walker, Judith Walker and Willie Walker, Jr.

Glen Scott Love, Dawn T. Trabeau-Mire, Baton Rouge, for Defendant-Appellee Phi Beta Fraternity, Inc. (National Fraternity).

Before GONZALES, PARRO and TYSON, JJ.[1]

RALPH E. TYSON, Judge Pro Tem.

Plaintiffs, Duronne K. Walker, Judith K. Walker, and Willie Walker, Jr., appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment in favor of defendant, Phi Beta Sigma Fraternity, Inc.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Duronne K. Walker (Mr. Walker) was a full-time student at Southern University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. On or about February 25, 1992, Mr. Walker was accepted into the Membership Intake Program of Phi Beta Sigma Fraternity. Mr. Walker alleges that, during the intake process, he was physically beaten and abused by several members of the fraternity while they were conducting "hazing" intake activities. Mr. Walker further alleges that he suffered severe injuries as a result of these activities.

In March of 1993, Mr. Walker, along with Judith K. Walker and Willie Walker, Jr., filed suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans for damages resulting from this incident. In this petition, plaintiffs named several defendants, including Phi Beta Sigma Fraternity, Inc. (National Fraternity).[2] Thereafter, plaintiffs amended the petition to add as defendants the Southern University Board of Supervisors and Rose Roche, the Director of Student Activities at Southern University.

Pursuant to a consent judgment dated February 26, 1993, this matter was transferred to the Nineteenth Judicial District Court in East Baton Rouge Parish. Thereafter, the petition was amended to reflect that Judith and Willie Walker, Jr. were the parents of Mr. Walker.

On June 23, 1993, an answer to plaintiffs' petitions was filed by several defendants, including the National Fraternity, generally denying the allegations. In addition to the *527 answer, the defendants also filed a cross-claim against several individual members of the fraternity.

The National Fraternity filed a motion for summary judgment, contending it was not personally or vicariously liable for the actions of its chapter members. After a hearing was held on January 26, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment, which granted the National Fraternity's motion for summary judgment and ordered that plaintiffs' claims as to the National Fraternity be dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiffs now appeal from this judgment.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine factual dispute. Kidd v. Logan M. Killen, Inc., 93-1322, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/20/94); 640 So.2d 616, 618. It is well settled that the granting of summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(B); Lewis v. Diamond Services Corporation, 93-1150, p. 5 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/20/94); 637 So.2d 825, 828, writ denied, 94-1638 (La. 10/14/94); 643 So.2d 159. The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions. The procedure is favored and shall be construed to accomplish these ends. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2).

A fact is material if its existence is essential to the plaintiff's cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery. Material facts are those that potentially insure or preclude recovery, affect the litigant's ultimate success, or determine the outcome of a legal dispute. Penalber v. Blount, 550 So.2d 577, 583 (La.1989); Kidd v. Logan M. Killen, Inc., 640 So.2d at 619.

In the 1997 Regular Session, the Louisiana legislature amended the summary judgment law by amending and reenacting Sections C and E of LSA-C.C.P. art. 966 and by repealing Sections F and G of the article. 1997 La. Acts No. 483. In part, the purpose of these amendments was to clarify legislative changes made to LSA-C.C.P. art. 966 in 1996 (specifically, see 1996 La. Acts, 1st Ex.Sess., No. 9, § 1), and to set forth the burdens of proof which must be met by the respective parties when a motion for summary judgment is made. 1997 La. Acts No. 483, § 4. These burdens of proof are stated in Section C of amended LSA-C.C.P. art. 966, as follows:

C. (1) After adequate discovery or after a case is set for trial, a motion which shows that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law shall be granted.
(2) The burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the movant's burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact.

Section 4 of Act 483 indicates that the amendments are designed to legislatively overrule all cases inconsistent with Hayes v. Autin, 96-287 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 12/26/96); 685 So.2d 691, writ denied, 97-0281 (La. 3/14/97); 690 So.2d 41. In Hayes v. Autin, 685 So.2d at 694, the court set forth the following rules regarding the burdens of proof in a summary judgment setting:

Under the amended statute, the initial burden of proof remains with the mover to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. However, under Art. 966(C), once the mover has made a prima facie showing that the motion should be granted, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present evidence demonstrating that material *528 factual issues remain. Once the motion for summary judgment has been properly supported by the moving party, the failure of the non-moving party to produce evidence of a material factual dispute mandates the granting of the motion.

The Hayes court also noted that, since its amendment in 1996, LSA-C.C.P. art. 966 has effected a substantial change in the law of summary judgment. Under previous jurisprudence, summary judgments were not favored and were to be used only cautiously and sparingly. The pleadings and supporting documents of the movant were to be treated indulgently. Further, any doubt was to be resolved against granting the summary judgment, and in favor of trial on the merits. Hayes v. Autin, 685 So.2d at 694. See also Jenson v. First Guaranty Bank, 96-0381, 96-0382, p. 3 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/9/97); 699 So.2d 403, 405. However, under the 1996 amended version of LSA-C.C.P. art.

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706 So. 2d 525, 1997 WL 817321, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walker-v-phi-beta-sigma-fraternity-rho-chapter-lactapp-1997.