Walker v. Miyamoto

District Court, N.D. California·Decided November 18, 2024·No. 5:24-cv-04342·Unknown

Opinion

Case No. 24-cv-04342 EJD (PR) Plaintiff, ORDER OF SERVICE; DENYING MOTION FOR JOINDER; v. DIRECTING DEFENDANTS TO FILE DISPOSITIVE MOTION OR NOTICE PAUL MIYAMOTO, et al., REGARDING SUCH MOTION; Defendants.

Plaintiff, a civil detainee at the San Francisco County Jail (“Jail”), filed the instant pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officers and medical staff at the Jail. Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4. After the Court denied his motion for a temporary restraining order, Plaintiff appealed the matter to the Ninth Circuit. Dkt. No. 8. On October 21, 2024, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute. Dkt. No. 10. Accordingly, the Court shall proceed with an initial review of the complaint. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be addressed in a separate order. A. Standard of Review A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). B. Plaintiff’s Claims Plaintiff is a civil detainee under California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”). Dkt. No. 1 at 7. Plaintiff claims that since his arrival at the Jail on October 27, 2021, after his latest probable cause hearing, his rights as an SVP under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment have been violated due to being confined in conditions that are punitive. Id. He claims that he has been subjected to excessive force, retaliation, treats to his life, assault by other inmates, denial of mental health housing, and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Id. at 9. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and damages, as well as joinder of all his pending lawsuits. Id. at 27. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, civilly committed persons retain substantive liberty interests, which include at least the right to basic necessities such as adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care; safe conditions of confinement; and freedom from unnecessary bodily restraint. Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307-315-16 (1982); id. at 321-322 (“Persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions are designed to punish.”) The Fourteenth Amendment requires that civilly committed persons not be subject to conditions that amount to punishment within the bounds of professional discretion. Hydrick v. Hunter, 599 F.3d 978, 997 (9th Cir. 2007). Moreover, due process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement for SVPs bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which they are committed. Id. (quoting Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001). While the nature of a SVP’s confinement may factor in this balance of what is reasonable, it is clearly established that the substantive due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to SVPs. Id. Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations that his conditions of confinement at the Jail violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment as a civil detainee state cognizable claims under section 1983. Accordingly, the Court will order service of this action on the named defendants. C. Joinder Plaintiff requests joinder of all his pending actions. Dkt. No. 1 at 26. He has two other actions pending before this Court: Walker v. Wong, et al., (“Walker I”) Case No. 24- 02513 EJD (PR); and Walker v. Adams, et al., (“Walker II”) Case No. 24-03314. Walker I involves an excessive force claim against Officer Wong, and a medical indifference claims against Dr. Main based on an incident that took place on March 29, 2024. Walker I, Dkt. No. 10. Walker II was dismissed with leave to amend because the original complaint involved claims based on events that took place at two different jails and involved two different sets of defendants; Plaintiff was directed to file an amended complaint that complied with the rules governing joinder of claims. Walker II, Dkt. No. 16. Parties may be joined as defendants in one action only “if any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). “A buckshot complaint that would be rejected if filed by a free person – say, a suit complaining that A defrauded plaintiff, B defamed him, C punched him, D failed to pay a debt, and E infringed his copyright, all in different transactions – should be rejected if filed by a prisoner.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that, in prisoner complaint seeking to join 24 defendants and approximately 50 distinct claims, prisoner made no effort to show that 24 defendants he named had participated in the same transaction or series of transactions or that a question of fact is common to all defendants). The three pending cases before this Court involve different claims against different defendants. As such, the right to relief asserted by Plaintiff does not arise out of or relate no question of law or fact common to all defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Joining the three lawsuits would result is a “buckshot complaint” which would violate the rules governing joinder. Accordingly, the request to join the actions is DENIED. For the reasons set forth above, the Court orders as follows: 1. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service of Summons, a copy of the complaint and supplements thereto, (Dkt. No. 1), and all attachments thereto, and a copy of this order upon Defendants Sheriff Paul Miyamoto, Deputy Sheriff Johnson, Chief Adams, Captain Tilton, Lt. Clausal, Sgt. Callaway, Director Mary Doe, Dr. Lisa Pratt, Dr. Main, Captain Collins, and Former Chief Kevin Paulson via the Office of Chief Legal Counsel for Sheriff’s Dept. (Sheriff’s Dept., Room 456, One Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place, San Francisco, CA 94102, Attn. Mark Nicco). The Clerk shall also mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff. 2. No later than ninety-one (91) days from the date this order is filed, Defendants shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion with respect to the claims in the complaint found to be cognizable above. a. Any motion for summary judgment shall be supported by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Rule

Walker v. Miyamoto, (N.D. Cal. 2024).

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