Walker v. Mississippi Val. & W. Ry. Co.

U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Missouri

Walker v. Mississippi Val. & W. Ry. Co.

29 F. Cas. 39

CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Missouri

DecidedJuly 15, 1875

StatusPublished

This text of 29 F. Cas. 39 (Walker v. Mississippi Val. & W. Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Walker v. Mississippi Val. & W. Ry. Co., 29 F. Cas. 39 (circtedmo 1875).

Pincite

Opinion

DILLON, Circuit Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court, orally.

THE COURT held-

1. That it was competent for the legislature, and within the legitimate scope of legislative power, to provide in the act, entitled “An act to protect contractors, sub-contractors and laborers in their claims against railroad companies or corporations, contractors or subcontractors,” approved March 21st, 1873 (Sess. Acts 1S73, p. 58), that the lien given by the act should be prior to all mortgages or incum-brances placed upon the railroad property subsequent to the passage of the act. There is no constitutional objection to such a provision. Phil. Mech. Liens, pp. 46, 47, § 30; Stonewall Jackson Loan & Building Ass’n v. McGruder. 43 Ga. 9; Hildebrand’s Appeal, 39 Pa. St. 133; Blauvelt v. Woodworth, 31 N. Y. 285; Hicks v. Murray, 43 Gal. 515; Davis v. Bilsland, 18 Wall. [85 U. S.] 659.

2. The lien given by the lien act is prior to all mortgages or incumbrances placed upon the railroad and its property subsequent to March 21, 1873, the date of the approval of the law. The phrase “subsequent to the passage of this act,” and in the second section of the act, means subsequent to the approval by the governor. And a mortgage lien placed upon the railroad and its property between the date of the approval of the act, to-wit: — March 21st, 1873, and June 19th, 1S73, the end of ninety days after the approval, is subordinate and inferior to the lien of the contractor, laborer or material-man acquired under the lien act. As to the meaning of the phrase “passage of an act,” see In re Tebbetts [Case No. 13,817] opinion of Judge Story; Johnson v. Fay, 16 Gray, 144. And as to when an act is passed, Logan v. State, 3 Heisk. 442; Wartman v. City of Philadelphia, 33 Pa. St. 202; People v. Clark, 1 Cal. 406; Brainard v. Bushnell, 11 Conn. 17; In re Richardson [Case No. 11,777].

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

DILLON, Circuit Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court, orally.

THE COURT held-

1. That it was competent for the legislature, and within the legitimate scope of legislative power, to provide in the act, entitled “An act to protect contractors, sub-contractors and laborers in their claims against railroad companies or corporations, contractors or subcontractors,” approved March 21st, 1873 (Sess. Acts 1S73, p. 58), that the lien given by the act should be prior to all mortgages or incum-brances placed upon the railroad property subsequent to the passage of the act. There is no constitutional objection to such a provision. Phil. Mech. Liens, pp. 46, 47, § 30; Stonewall Jackson Loan & Building Ass’n v. McGruder. 43 Ga. 9; Hildebrand’s Appeal, 39 Pa. St. 133; Blauvelt v. Woodworth, 31 N. Y. 285; Hicks v. Murray, 43 Gal. 515; Davis v. Bilsland, 18 Wall. [85 U. S.] 659.

2. The lien given by the lien act is prior to all mortgages or incumbrances placed upon the railroad and its property subsequent to March 21, 1873, the date of the approval of the law. The phrase “subsequent to the passage of this act,” and in the second section of the act, means subsequent to the approval by the governor. And a mortgage lien placed upon the railroad and its property between the date of the approval of the act, to-wit: — March 21st, 1873, and June 19th, 1S73, the end of ninety days after the approval, is subordinate and inferior to the lien of the contractor, laborer or material-man acquired under the lien act. As to the meaning of the phrase “passage of an act,” see In re Tebbetts [Case No. 13,817] opinion of Judge Story; Johnson v. Fay, 16 Gray, 144. And as to when an act is passed, Logan v. State, 3 Heisk. 442; Wartman v. City of Philadelphia, 33 Pa. St. 202; People v. Clark, 1 Cal. 406; Brainard v. Bushnell, 11 Conn. 17; In re Richardson [Case No. 11,777].

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

29 F. Cas. 39, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walker-v-mississippi-val-w-ry-co-circtedmo-1875.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack